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Veranderinge in beleggingsbestuur en vooruitgang in die ekonomiese en 
finansiële veld het tot omvattende hervorming van trustbeleggingsreg in New York, 
die Verenigde Koninkryk en Nieu-Seeland gelei. Die kern van hierdie hervorming is 
moderne portefeulje teorie (“MPT”). Tans word die wyse waarop trustees in elkeen 
van hierdie jurisduksies kan belê, beheer deur ’n reël wat op MPT gebaseer is. In 
teenstelling hiermee, het die Suid-Afrikaanse trustreg nie op hoogte van 
kontemporêre veranderinge in trustbeleggingsreg gebly nie en gevolglik word 
trustees in Suid-Afrika nie ingevolge ’n beleggingsreël gebaseer op MPT beoordeel 
nie. 
Die oogmerk van hierdie proefskrif is om te ondersoek of trustees se 
beleggingsfunksies in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg deur die implementering van ’n 
beleggingsreël gebaseer op MPT gemoderniseer moet word. Om hierdie oogmerk te 
bereik, analiseer die proefskrif trustees se beleggingstandaarde in Suid-Afrika, 
verduidelik dit MPT en vergelyk dit die teoretiese onderbou van trustbeleggingsreg 
soos dit in Suid-Afrika van toepassing is vis-à-vis die drie bogenoemde buitelandse 
jurisduksies. 
Die proefskrif bevind dat trustees en begunstigdes groot voordeel uit die 
modernisering van trustees se beleggingsfunksies kan trek en verskaf dan 




Changes in investment management and advances in economics and finance 
have led to extensive reform of trust investment law in New York, the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand. The centrepiece of this reform is modern portfolio theory 
(“MPT”). Today, trustee investing in each of these jurisdictions is governed by an 
investment rule based on MPT. In contrast, South African trust law has not kept 
abreast of contemporary changes to trust investment law and, consequently, 
trustees in South Africa are not judged by an investment rule based on MPT. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine whether trustees’ investment 
functions in South African law should be modernised through the implementation of 
an investment rule based on MPT. To this end, the dissertation analyses the 
development of trustees’ investment standards in South Africa, explains MPT, and 
compares the theoretical underpinnings of trust investment law as applicable in 
South Africa vis-à-vis the three foreign jurisdictions mentioned above. 
The dissertation concludes that trustees and beneficiaries can benefit greatly from 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
1 Introduction and chapter overview 
This dissertation offers a comparative analysis of the theoretical underpinnings 
of trust investment law as applicable in South Africa vis-à-vis three other legal 
jurisdictions, namely the state of New York (“New York”), the United Kingdom 
(specifically England), and New Zealand, with a particular focus on the integration of 
the principles of modern portfolio theory (hereafter referred to as “MPT”) into trust 
law. 
The following elements will be discussed briefly in this introductory chapter: 
(a) the terminology used in the dissertation; 
(b) the context of the main research questions; 
(c) the issues to be examined in the chapters that follow; 
(d) the reasons for choosing the three foreign jurisdictions used in the 
dissertation; and 
(e) the research methodology. 
2 Terminology used in the dissertation 
With regard to the terminology used, the following should be noted: in the South 
African context, the word “founder” is used while in the foreign context, the word 
“settlor” is used; reference is made to “trustees” rather than “a trustee”, the 
assumption being that founders usually select both a family member and an 
independent trustee to act as trustees; “trustees’ investment functions” refers to 
trustees’ investment duties and powers; the term “trust property” is used 
interchangeably with “trust assets”; and the words “shares”, “stocks” and “equities” 
are used interchangeably since these words basically have the same meaning and 
any real distinction between them is pretty blurred. Also note that the male gender is 
used for references to natural persons unless it is clear from the context that a 




3 Context of the main research questions 
A trust can be described as an arrangement through which the ownership in 
property of one person (the founder) is transferred to other persons (the trustees) 
during the founder’s lifetime (an inter vivos trust) or on the founder’s death 
(a testamentary trust) to be administered for the benefit of certain individuals (the 
beneficiaries) or for a specified purpose.1 
This is similar to what is described in South African law as a trust in the strict or 
narrow sense.2 A common example of a trust in the strict sense is a private or family 
trust – the focus of this research. A private trust is a trust established by an individual 
for the benefit of beneficiaries who may include himself and his family members. At 
the most basic level, the principal objective of a private trust is to provide income to 
income beneficiaries and to protect and preserve capital for capital beneficiaries.3 
Typical trust assets in a private trust include: cash, bonds, properties, shares 
on a stock exchange, and shares in a private family company. Considering that 
shares in a family company sometimes form part of the assets of a trust, it is clear 
that private trusts can have certain business features.4 But this does not make it a 
“business trust” – it remains a private trust. A trust is regarded as a business trust if it 
has as principal objective the carrying on of business for profit.5 This type of trust, 
however, falls outside the scope of this dissertation. 
Almost every private trust requires of trustees to make an investment.6 For 
trustees, the question becomes how best to invest trust assets not only to safeguard 
it from loss, but also to meet the needs of trust beneficiaries. Taking the wishes of 
                                                            
1 See E Cameron, M de Waal, B Wunsh, P Solomon & E Kahn Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 
5 ed (2002) 4; MJ de Waal “The core elements of the trust: aspects of the English, Scottish and South 
African Trusts compared” (2000) 117 SALJ 548 549 footnote 10; and MJ de Waal “Is the DCFR trust 
a ‘proper’ trust? An evaluation from a South African perspective” (2014) Acta Juridica 221-223 and 
229. The South African bewind trust should be distinguished. In a bewind trust ownership of property 
is transferred to the beneficiaries, but control over it is given to the trustees. Such a trust is rarely 
used in practice: De Waal (2000) SALJ 561. The bewind trust does not form part of the research. 
2 See Cameron et al Honoré’s Law of Trusts 4. 
3 B Wunsh “Trading and business trusts” (1986) 103 SALJ 561 561. 
4 561. 
5  F du Toit, B Smith & A van der Linde Fundamentals of South African Trust Law (2018) 200; 
Wunsh (1986) SALJ 561. 
6  LOC Chukwu “Theoretical underpinnings of trust investment law: juxtaposing Nigerian law with 




the trust founder into account, trustees are expected to determine which investment 
vehicles to choose and how much of the trust’s assets to invest in each vehicle.7 
This is not an easy task seeing that investment management has changed 
significantly over the past 50 years and has become more complicated and 
sophisticated – both from an academic and a practical point of view. Nowadays all 
investors, be they trustees, private individuals or professional investors, are faced 
with an extraordinary range of investment products and techniques when it comes to 
building and maintaining an investment portfolio. 
These changes in investment management and advances in economics and 
finance have led to extensive reform of trust investment law in New York, England 
and New Zealand. The centrepiece of this reform is MPT. In its simplest form, MPT 
is a theory of investment that “attempts to maximise portfolio expected return for a 
given amount of portfolio risk, or equivalently minimise risk for a given level of 
expected return, by carefully choosing the proportions of various assets”.8 Today, 
trustee investing in each of these jurisdictions is governed by an investment rule 
based on MPT. 
In contrast, South African trust law has not kept abreast of contemporary 
changes to trust investment law. As will become evident in the subsequent chapter, 
trustees in South Africa are not judged by an investment rule based on MPT. 
In light of international development, the main research questions posed for 
purpose of this dissertation are: first, should trustees’ investment functions in South 
African law be modernised through the implementation of an investment rule based 
on MPT? Second, if the answer to the first question is yes, what should the core 
features of such an investment rule be? In order to answer the main research 
questions, the following additional and more specific questions must be answered in 
the course of the dissertation: 
(a) Question 1: what is the principal problem that trustees face when they are 
unable to rely on an investment rule based on MPT? 
                                                            
7 SM Penner “International investment and the prudent investor rule: the trustee’s duty to consider 
international investment vehicles” (1995) 16 Michigan J Int’l L 601 602; P Collins & J Stampfli 
“Promises and pitfalls of total return trusts” (2001) 27 ACTEC J 205 205. 
8 I Omisore, M Yusuf & N Christopher “The modern portfolio theory as an investment decision tool” 




(b) Question 2: is an investment strategy based on MPT the best possible 
approach for people managing other people’s assets? 
(c) Question 3: which areas of trustee investment would be most affected by 
integrating MPT principles into trust law? 
(d) Question 4: how should these areas of trustee investment be amended in 
South African trust law in order to accommodate MPT? 
4 Overview of the content of the dissertation 
In order to address the two main research questions and answer the four 
additional questions, the chapters of the dissertation are structured as follows: 
4 1 Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 describes and analyses the development of trustees’ investment 
standards in South Africa. The aim of the chapter is to determine which approach 
currently governs trustee investing and what the key features of this approach are. 
Trustee investing in South African law is either governed by a “court list” 
approach or some version of the “prudent man rule”. A significant part of the chapter 
is devoted to determining which of these two approaches are currently being 
followed. What can be stated with absolute certainty is that South Africa, unlike the 
three foreign jurisdictions, has not adopted an investment rule based on MPT. The 
chapter establishes that trustees in South Africa are obliged to protect the real value 
of trust capital and to ensure that an adequate income is produced continuously. In 
chapter 2, this is referred to as trustees’ “main investment objective”. It is important 
to note that what is expected of trustees in this instance corresponds with the goals 
embodied in an investment rule based on MPT. This raises the following question: is 
it possible for trustees to achieve their main investment objective without being able 
to rely on an investment rule based on MPT? This question can only be answered by 
analysing the development of trustees’ investment standards in the comparable 
foreign jurisdictions. If the answer to this question is no, it means that trustees 
cannot achieve their main investment objective if they are unable to rely on an 




4 2 Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 introduces and explains MPT. The chapter is not intended to give a 
comprehensive explanation of all the elements and aspects of the theory. Rather, the 
intention is to provide a basic insight into MPT in order to aid a better understanding 
of the issues examined in more detail in the chapters that follow. 
In order to achieve this basic insight into MPT, the chapter briefly compares it to 
another popular investment strategy, details the development of the theory from the 
1950s, and provides a summary of its major lessons. 
The aim of the chapter is, first, to illustrate that the theory presents a better 
account of risk and safety than other popular models of investment behaviour, and 
second, to demonstrate that an investment strategy based on MPT is the best 
possible approach for people managing other people’s assets. 
4 3 Chapters 4, 5 and 6 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 describe and analyse the development of trustees’ 
investment standards in New York, England and New Zealand, respectively. The aim 
of each chapter is twofold. First, each chapter intends to show that it is exceedingly 
difficult – if not impossible – to achieve trustees’ main investment objective without 
being able to rely on an investment rule based on MPT. This is done in each chapter 
by discussing the main characteristics of previous approaches to trustee investing; 
explaining why old-fashioned approaches to trustee investing had to change; and 
describing the core features of the investment rule currently governing trustee 
investing in that jurisdiction. 
Second, each chapter attempts to confirm what is stated in chapter 3, namely, 
that MPT is the best possible investment strategy for people managing other 
people’s assets by showing the benefits of using MPT strategies when investing trust 
funds. 
Chapters 4 to 6 further illustrate that while the integration of MPT principles into 
trust law affects many areas of trustee investment, six particular areas are affected 
most prominently. In each chapter, the manner in which these areas had to change 




4 4 Chapter 7 
The conclusion reached after the research undertaken in chapters 4 to 6 is that 
the first research question should be answered in the affirmative: trustees’ 
investment functions in South African law should be modernised by implementing an 
investment rule based on MPT. 
The second research question asks: what should the core features of such an 
investment rule be? The aim of chapter 7 is to identify and explain those features. 
This is done by doing a detailed examination of the six areas that are affected most 
prominently by the integration of MPT principles into trust law. Accordingly, chapter 7 
is divided into six sections and each section discusses one of the six areas of trustee 
investment affected by the implementation MPT. To be more precise, each section 
describes in more detail how MPT affects a particular area of trustee investment; 
explains the current problem in South African trust law regarding that area of 
investment; compares the different approaches of each of the foreign jurisdictions 
regarding that area of investment; and recommends how legislation should change 
in order for MPT to be integrated fully into that particular area of trustee investment. 
4 5 Chapter 8 
Chapter 8 constitutes the conclusion to the dissertation. The first part of the 
chapter provides an overview of chapters 2 to 7 and focuses on answering the main 
research questions as well as the four more specific additional questions. The 
chapter concludes with a summary of the proposed legislative changes and 
recommendations for further research. 
5 Jurisdictions used in the dissertation 
As already mentioned, the three foreign jurisdictions chosen for purposes of the 
research are New York, England and New Zealand – all common law jurisdictions, 
meaning that they are legal systems primarily based on the English common law. 
Although the South African trust has its roots in English law, it has been 
adapted by South African courts over the years. 9  As a consequence, the main 
characteristics of the South African trust share many common features with those of 
                                                            




the trusts in the three common law jurisdictions.10 Of course, there are differences. 
Certainly the most fundamental difference is the concept of dual ownership, which is 
foreign to South African law.11 This concept – that trustees have legal (or common 
law) ownership of trust property and beneficiaries have beneficial (or equitable) 
ownership thereof – is an essential feature of the English trust.12 In South African 
law, ownership cannot be split in this fashion and trustees thus have full ownership 
of the trust assets.13 This difference between English trust law and South African 
trust law does not, however, have any significant impact in the context of trustee 
investing. 
The comparative study will proceed on the basis that, although there are 
differences between the trust in South Africa and the trusts in the three foreign 
jurisdictions, sufficient commonality exists that a comparison of trust investment law 
between the different jurisdictions is possible and that South African trust law can 
benefit from the developments and experiences in these jurisdictions. 
The focus of this dissertation is on the development of trust investment law in 
the relevant jurisdictions. Space does not allow for a discussion of the history of trust 
law in these jurisdictions. Moreover, sketching the historical development of trust law 
in a jurisdiction is not considered relevant to the dissertation, since such an overview 
would not aid a better understanding of the issues concerning trustee investing in the 
subsequent chapters or contribute to answering any of the additional questions to 
the main research questions. It should further be noted that detailed historical 
accounts have already been written.14 
                                                            
10  See BR Hauser “United States” in A Kaplan, BR Hauser & P Ogden (eds) Trusts in Prime 
Jurisdictions 2 ed (2006) 315 315-331; De Waal (2000) SALJ 569-570; and New Zealand Law 
Commission Review of the Law of Trusts – Introductory Issues Paper (2010) Issues Paper 19 35-42. 
11 De Waal (2000) SALJ 570. 
12 E Bruwer Settlor control and trustee liability: an analysis of English and offshore trust law with 
indicators for the development of South African Trust Law LLD thesis, University of Stellenbosch 
(2018) 9; MJ de Waal & I du Plessis “A comparative perspective on the ‘joint-action rule’ in the context 
of business trusts” (2014) 2 Stell LR 343 345 footnote 12. 
13 De Waal (2000) SALJ 550; Bruwer Settlor control and trustee liability 91. Note that the concept of 
separation of estates is recognised in South African law. In terms of this concept, a trustee holds two 
separate estates: trust assets are held in the trust estate; and the trustee’s personal assets are held in 
his private estate: De Waal (2014) Acta Juridica 236. 
14 For a history of trust law in the respective jurisdictions, see JP Coetzee`n Kritiese ondersoek na die 




The reasons for specifically selecting New York, England and New Zealand are 
as follows: 
5 1 New York 
Authors and academics from the United States of America set the stage for the 
integration of MPT principles into trust law. Starting in the late 1970s, these critics – 
the most prominent ones being based in New York at the time – began to point out 
the relevancy of the lessons of MPT to trust investment practices and called for 
reform in trust investment law. Their observations and criticisms are quite detailed 
and provide a rich source of ideas for developing an investment rule based on MPT. 
New York has a well-developed trust law based on English common law and a 
highly developed and advanced economy.15 Due to the significant amount of trust 
and economic activity centred there, the law of New York is important in the 
development of the trust law in other states within the United States.16 Furthermore, 
New York’s legislative committees often produce much of the early initiative and 
progress in legislative analysis. For example, New York was the first state to take up 
the task of seriously analysing the benefits of trustees applying “total return 
investing” to trusts.17 
These are the reasons why, with all the American states available to choose 
from, the state of New York in particular was chosen for purposes of this 
comparative study. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
University of South Africa (2006)13-143; JH Langbein “The Contractarian basis of the law of trusts” 
(1995) 105 Yale LJ 625 625-675; New Zealand Law Commission Introductory Issues Paper 8-28. 
15 Other than Louisiana, the states within the United States have a history of continuing the common 
law tradition inherited from England, which includes English trust law: Hauser “United States” in 
Kaplan et al Trusts in Prime Jurisdictions 315 and 319. 
16 FP Manns “New Zealand trustee investing: reflecting on modern portfolio theory and the ancient 
distinction of principle and income” (1998) 28 Victoria U Wellington LR 611 628 footnote 74. 
17 RB Wolf “Estate planning with total return trusts: meeting human needs and investment goals 
through modern trust design” (2001) 36 Real Prop Prob & Tr J 169 177. For a discussion of total 




5 2 England 
England was chosen because English trust law has had a significant influence 
on the development of the trust institution globally and the development of the trust 
figure in South Africa in particular.18 
Furthermore, twentieth-century advances in economics and finance have led to 
extensive reform of England’s trust investment law. After extensive research, a joint 
report from the English Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission19 led to 
the enactment of the Trustee Act 2000. Importantly, the definition of the standard 
investment criteria in the Act accords with MPT.20 
By examining the recommendations made by the authors of the joint report of 
the two law commissions, the cases referred to in the report, the provisions of the 
Trustee Act 2000 dealing specifically with trustee investment, and how 
commentators and authors have interpreted and criticised these provisions, one 
gains valuable insights on how to address and improve the South African position. 
5 3 New Zealand 
Although authors and academics from the United States set the stage for the 
integration of MPT principles into trust law, New Zealand was the first jurisdiction to 
introduce MPT into trust law, even preceding enactments in New York by a few 
years.21 
The New Zealand Law Commission has since reviewed trust law in New 
Zealand and recommended a major overhaul. The overhaul was completed on 
30 July 2019 with the passing of the Trusts Act 2019.22 
Of particular significance is that the Act makes important changes in the area of 
trustee investing. Importantly, none of these changes suggests a movement away 
from MPT-based trust investing. On the contrary, these legislative measures were 
designed to better facilitate the use of MPT techniques when investing trust funds. 
                                                            
18 Coetzee `n Kritiese ondersoek na die aard en inhoud van trustbegunstigdes se regte 10; Bruwer 
Settlor control and trustee liability 8-9 and 105. 
19 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission Trustees’ Powers and Duties (1999) Law 
Com No 260 and Scot Law Com No 172. 
20 Note 25 of the Explanatory Notes, which accompany the Trustee Act 2000. 
21 P Panico “Trustees investment powers in international trust law” (2009) 15 T & T 96 99. 




Examining modern cases dealing with trustee investing, the criticism of 
commentators and academics of the position prior to the passing of the Trusts Act 
2019, the recommendations of the New Zealand Law Commission, and the 
provisions of the Act dealing with trustee investment, provides valuable lessons and 
may aid the development of trust investment law in South Africa. 
6 The research methodology 
This dissertation involves comparative legal research. The dissertation is 
written from a South African perspective and thus the focus throughout will fall on the 
development of trust investment law in South Africa. However, reference will be 
made to the development and current state of trust investment law in three other 
jurisdictions, namely New York, England and New Zealand. The way in which these 
jurisdictions have addressed certain issues concerning trustee investing is studied 
with a view to providing guidance on how the South African position may be 
interpreted, addressed and improved. 
The research will be conducted by analysing the following sources of 
information for each of the relevant jurisdictions: 
(a) textbooks and journal articles by leading authors and academics; 
(b) trust legislation, current and previous, regarding trustee investing; and 





CHAPTER 2 – THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRUSTEES’ INVESTMENT STANDARDS 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
1 Introduction  
This chapter describes and analyses the development of trustees’ investment 
standards in South Africa. The purpose of this chapter is to provide answers to three 
important questions: first, which approach governed the exercise of trustees’ 
investment functions prior to 1998;1 second, which approach has been governing 
trustee investing since 1998; and third, what are the main characteristics of the 
approach that governs trustee investing? 
Trustee investing in our law is either governed by a “court list” approach or some 
version of the “prudent man rule”. A significant part of the chapter is devoted to 
determining whether the court list approach or prudent man rule is currently being 
followed. What can be stated with absolute certainty is that South Africa, unlike the 
comparable foreign jurisdictions, has not adopted an investment rule based on 
modern portfolio theory (“MPT”).  
Answering the three questions above is important because the findings in this 
chapter are later compared with the approaches in New York, England and New 
Zealand. Studying how each of these jurisdictions has developed their own 
investment rules based on MPT might assist in improving the South African position. 
Following this introduction, the chapter is divided into three sections, which are 
summarised in the conclusion at the end of the chapter. The first part of section 2 
discusses relevant court cases from 1925 to 1982 dealing with trustee investing, 
while the second part of section 2 summarises and analyses the position in South 
Africa before 1998. Section 3 describes the approach that the South African Law 
Commission (hereafter referred to as the “Law Commission”) regarded as governing 
trustee investing at the time of the publication of its report. The section also 
discusses the problem that the Law Commission identified with trustee investing and 
the possible solutions it considered. Section 4 begins by discussing the facts of 
Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol 2  (“Estate Richards”). Next, the section 
explains the conclusion reached in the case regarding trustees’ investment 
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standards and highlights what is regarded as the case’s most important contribution 
to trustee investing. Following this discussion, section 4 further presents a critique of 
the conclusion reached in the case and gives specific consideration as to whether 
the criticism is justified. The remaining part of the section briefly discusses two cases 
that were decided after Estate Richards regarding the subject of trustee investing.  
2 The approach to trustee investing before 1998 
2 1 Introduction 
It would be difficult to make recommendations on how trust investment law in 
South Africa should change without adequately identifying and understanding its 
history and nature. Therefore, this section discusses the relevant court cases dealing 
with trustee investing, and provides a summary and analysis at the end of the 
discussion. 
Before commencing the discussion, it is helpful to state briefly what some authors 
and academics – such as Rahman, De Mink, Balden and Rautenbach, and Smith – 
have written on the subject of trustee investing. The picture of the trustee investment 
landscape that they have constructed, can then be tested against a detailed 
discussion of the relevant court cases. 
According to these authors, the development of trust investment law is as follows: 
Sackville West v Nourse3 (“Sackville West”) was the first case in South Africa to 
pronounce on the standard of care required of trustees when investing trust funds.4 
On the strength of the dicta in Sackville West, the courts adopted a conservative 
stance regarding the investment of trust funds.5 To be more specific, the courts have 
for many years favoured fixed-income investments,6 considered it proper for trustees 
to only invest in securities where the capital is fixed,7 and confined the investment of 
                                                            
3 1925 AD 516. 
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University of Western Cape (2006) 77-78. 
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trust funds to only bonds, fixed deposits, loans on mortgage bonds, and immovable 
property.8 Until recently, therefore, the courts have not allowed trustees to invest on 
the stock market, because investing trust funds in shares would be too risky.9 
2 2 Court cases from 1925 to 1982 
2 2 1 Sackville West v Nourse 
In Sackville West, Maximilian Sackville West (“Mr Sackville”) was the beneficiary 
under a trust called the West Trust. The trust was created by a deed of transfer 
dated in 1882 of a farm called Dartington. The trustees were Temple Maynard 
Nourse (“Mr Nourse”) and Edward Mackenzie Greene (“Mr Greene”). Mr Greene was 
a senior partner in the attorney’s firm Bale & Greene. The court described him as the 
active trustee who did all the business of the trust through the agency of the firm, 
including attending to the trust’s investments. The other trustee, Mr Nourse, did not 
take part in the management of the trust and was content to be a trustee “in name 
only”. The trust deed did not contain provisions on how money should be invested. 
The trustees sold the farm Dartington in 1899 and, in 1903, invested a large portion 
of the proceeds from the sale in a first mortgage bond upon the security of a hotel 
premises. The loan was for five years with interest at 6% per year.10 
Interest under the bond was paid for more or less four years, after which the 
mortgagor defaulted and no further interest was forthcoming. 11  The investment 
resulted in both a loss of capital and a considerable amount of interest. 12  The 
beneficiary, Mr Sackville, instituted an action to recover both the capital and interest 
lost from the trustees.13 The key question that the court had to decide was whether 
the investment was negligent and improper.14 The court held that the trustees had 
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11 420 and 428. 
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13 West v Nourse 1924 45 NPD 418 418. 
14 Sackville West v Nourse 1925 AD 516 519. The following aspects of the case are not material for 




acted negligently in investing the trust funds on insufficient security and had to repay 
the capital and the interest lost.15 
Solomon ACJ and Kotzé JA stated that the case raised the important question of 
the duties of trustees in the investment of trust funds. Until that point, there had not 
been any judicial decision in South Africa on this question. The court thus had to 
determine what our law was on the subject. Since the action was based on 
negligence, Solomon ACJ considered the general principles of South African law in 
regard to liability for loss sustained through negligence. Kotzé JA, on the other hand, 
considered the rules of Roman law as expounded by the commentators and by the 
Dutch jurists in order to ascertain what the law was.16 
2 2 1 1 The judgment of Solomon ACJ 
Solomon ACJ stated that liability depends upon culpa; that is “the failure to 
observe that degree of care which a reasonable man would have observed in the 
circumstances”.17 One of the circumstances to be considered by trustees is that they 
are not dealing with their own money but with that of a trust. He stated that trustees 
were required to use greater care and caution when investing trust funds than in 
dealing with their own assets. As authority for this view, Solomon ACJ referred to the 
authorities referred to in the judgment of Kotzé JA. Solomon ACJ also showed that 
this was the position in England at the time.18 
In Sackville West it was not a case of the trustees knowingly taking a risk in the 
investment in question. The active trustee, Mr Greene, believed the investment to be 
a perfectly sound one. The case rather rested on the following two grounds: first, that 
the said property was of insufficient value in 1903 to warrant an investment of £7 500 
on the security thereof; and second, that the said property being used for hotel 
purposes was likely to fluctuate in value, thus constituting improper security for the 
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investment of trust funds. It was decided that these two grounds overlapped and that 
it had to be treated together.19 
In Solomon ACJ’s view, the contention by Mr Sackville was not that it was 
negligent and improper in any circumstances whatsoever for trustees to invest trust 
funds upon the security of hotel property. The contention rather was that, inasmuch 
as the value of the land and buildings of a hotel depend to a great extent on the 
success of the hotel business, which is of a speculative nature, the margin between 
the sum advanced and the value of the security should have been significant.20 
Solomon ACJ noted that, in this respect, the case bears some resemblance to 
Learoyd v Whiteley 21  (“Learoyd”) in which trust funds were advanced upon the 
security of a brickfield.22 In Learoyd, Lopes LJ found that if the investment on the 
security of a certain brickfield had been a smaller amount, no objection could have 
been taken to the character of the investment.23 He concluded that no prudent man 
investing money for the benefit of himself and others would have invested such a 
large sum on such a hazardous security.24 
Solomon ACJ found that the margin of security in Sackville West was not 
sufficient to justify the investment in question; therefore, the trustees did not use 
proper care or caution in the transaction.25 He was not prepared to lay down any 
hard-and-fast rule on what the margin ought to have been, and felt it was sufficient to 
state only that the margin should have been substantial.26 
2 2 1 2 The judgment of Kotzé JA 
As mentioned above, in order to ascertain what the law on trustee investment 
was, Kotzé JA turned to both Roman and Roman–Dutch law. More specifically, how 
the law dealt with the duty of tutors and curators in the administration and investment 
of the property and funds of their wards and others whose interests and affairs have 
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been entrusted to their care. Kotzé JA found that the same principles that applied to 
a tutor in dealing with the property of his ward could be extended to other persons 
administering the affairs of others. Trustees, therefore, are to be included in this 
category.27 
The old authorities revealed that tutors were obliged to invest the ready money of 
their wards. It was also said that a tutor must observe greater care in dealing with his 
ward’s money than he does with his own, for, “while a man may act as he pleases 
with his own property, he is not at liberty to do so with that of his ward”.28 The 
standard of care to be observed is accordingly not that which an ordinary man 
generally observes in the management of his own affairs, but that of the prudent and 
careful man; or to use the technical expression of Roman law, the standard of the 
bonus et diligens paterfamilias.29 
Kotzé JA found that the customs of the Dutch allowed tutors to invest the money 
of their wards in the purchase of landed property or put their money out at interest 
under sufficient pledges and suretyships. Certain Dutch laws authorised tutors to 
invest their wards’ money in government obligations or put it out at interest to the 
treasury itself. These investments were deemed to be safe and secure.30 
Kotzé JA also examined the practice of a tutor continuing a mercantile 
undertaking that the father of the ward had commenced, and carried on at the date 
of his death. According to Voet (as paraphrased by Kotzé JA), the correct approach 
was:31 
“…the tutor is obliged to complete the particular matters of trade or commerce, already 
undertaken by the deceased parent, with the object of withdrawing the ward’s property as 
speedily as possible from the uncertain if of trade, and placing it in safety. … Nor should it 
be countenanced that where, e.g. a ward is only a year or two old, the tutor is to continue 
to carry on a commercial venture, begun by the deceased, until the ward attains majority, 
and in this way expose the property of the ward to such a risky undertaking and doubtful 
issue of trade, except where the father has so directed by his will …” 









According to Kotzé JA, Voet’s opinion was thus that the money of the ward was 
not to be invested in a matter of “hazardous or uncertain nature, or involving the risk 
of mercantile speculation”.32 Kotzé JA concluded that the rule of our law is that 
“a person in a fiduciary position, like a trustee, is obliged, in dealing with and 
investing the money of the beneficiary, to observe due care and diligence, and not to 
expose it in any way to any business risks”.33 
Kotzé JA thus agreed with Solomon ACJ that, under the circumstances, the 
trustees were accordingly responsible for the consequent loss. 
2 2 2 Colonial Banking and Trust v Estate Hughes 
In Colonial Banking and Trust v Estate Hughes34 (“Estate Hughes”), Meshach 
Hughes (“Mr Hughes”) died in 1925 and was survived by his widow, Mary Love 
Hughes (“Mrs Hughes”), as well as their four children, Ernest, Rowland, Gordon, and 
Marjorie.35  In his will, dated 6 January 1919, Mr Hughes bequeathed his whole 
estate to Mrs Hughes and Ernest as trustees in trust. The purpose of the trust was to 
pay Mrs Hughes the trust income so long as she remained unmarried, and on her 
death or her remarriage the trust capital was to be divided and paid over to the 
children in equal shares as soon as the youngest child reached the age of 21. The 
will gave the trustees full power to realise the estate, and when the assets had been 
realised, the trustees were required to invest the proceeds “on security of first 
mortgage over fixed property in South Africa and/or in the purchase of Government 
Stock of the Union or Great Britain”.36 
Mr Hughes’ second son, Rowland, bought the farm Eureka (together with some 
movables on the farm) from the trustees.37 The payment of the purchase price was 
secured by the passing of a bond (the “first bond”) for £5 250 secured on Eureka in 
favour of the trustees. Rowland was unsuccessful in his farming operations and fell 
into arrears with the payment of the interest on the first bond. 38  The trustees 
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assumed that fresh working capital could be employed profitably on the farm.39 
Rowland accordingly, with the signed consent of the trustees, passed another 
mortgage bond (the “second bond”) for an amount of £1 500 over the farm in favour 
of the Colonial Banking & Trust Company (“Colonial Banking”).40 
Soon thereafter, Rowland became hopelessly insolvent. A petition for his 
sequestration was signed by Mrs Hughes and Rowland’s brother, Ernest, and his 
estate was sequestrated in August 1929. 
Frederick Martin, the trustee of Rowland’s insolvent estate, immediately took 
steps to sell Eureka so as to pay off the bonds registered against the farm. In 
October 1929, a deed of sale was signed between Frederick Martin in his capacity 
as trustee of the insolvent estate and the purchasers, namely, Russel and Hendler. 
The balance of the purchase price remaining after the necessary deductions was 
£5 620.41 
Colonial Banking argued that the passing of the second bond ranked pari passu 
(on equal footing) with the claim of the trustees under the first bond.42 Therefore, the 
purchase price of £5 620 had to be divided in the proportion of £1 230 to Colonial 
Banking and £4 390 to the trustees of Mr Hughes’ trust. 43  This meant that the 
trustees could potentially suffer a loss of £860. 44  The trustees argued that the 
second bond did not rank pari passu with the first bond and that they had to be put in 
the position in which they were prior to giving consent.45 The trial court found that the 
trustees were entitled to an order declaring the first bond to be preferent to the 
second bond.46 Colonial Banking appealed to the Appellate Division. 
The Appellate Division reversed the decision a quo on the following grounds: first, 
the will authorised an investment jointly with others on a pari passu bond. Second, 
taking a mortgage ranking pari passu with an existing mortgage was in effect an 
exercise of a power to invest on a pari passu bond. Alternatively stated, consenting 
to share a security pari passu under the circumstances was indeed an “investment” 
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and not merely “the giving away of portion of the security of an existing 
investment”.47 Third, the consent of the trustees to the second bond was not only in 
the interest of Rowland Hughes, but in the interest of all the beneficiaries. 48 
Therefore, it cannot be said that the trustees did not act in the interest of the trust 
estate. Stratford JA stated that:49 
“… it seems reasonable to suppose that the estate was very much interested in Rowland 
making a success of his farming operations, since he was its debtor and unable at the 
time to pay his rent. The trustees (Ernest was then the only active one), must have 
assumed that fresh working capital could and would be profitably employed on the farm.” 
Fourth, even if there was a breach of trust, the beneficiaries, with full knowledge of 
their alleged rights, had voluntarily entered into an agreement, which amounted to a 
confirmation of the action of the trustees.50 
Estate Hughes is an important case since it laid down the following trust law 
principles: first, whether or not an investment can be said to have been prudent is a 
question that can only be decided on the facts of each particular case. Wessels ACJ 
formulated this principle as follows:51 
“Our law draws no hard and fast line in regard to the discretion of a fiduciary heir who is 
required to invest the funds of an estate on behalf both of himself and others. Every case 
must depend on its own circumstances. A fiduciary heir who acts under a will in the 
interests of the whole family has a somewhat wider discretion than a stranger who is 
appointed as the administrator of a fund.” 
Second, where a trustee is also a beneficiary, and acts in such a way as to benefit 
himself at the expense of the other beneficiaries, his acts will be scrutinised 
narrowly. Third, on the one hand, the court must see that trustees carry out their 
duties with scrupulous care for the benefit of the beneficiaries; yet on the other hand, 
the court must be careful not to “fetter too much or to punish trustees” for exercising 









their discretion in dealing with the investments they are required to make in a bona 
fide manner.52  
2 2 3 Ex parte Harrington and Perry 
Although Ex parte Harrington and Perry53 (“Ex parte Harrington”) is a case from 
Southern Rhodesia (now part of Zimbabwe), it is relevant for purposes of the 
research because both Cameron and others 54  and Frere-Smith 55  refer to it as 
authority.56 
Thomas Edwin Speight (“Mr Speight”) under his will set up two trusts, namely, “my 
wife’s trust fund” and the “Davies trust fund”. The issue raised in the case related 
only to the second trust. Mr Speight provided in his will that his trustees were to set 
aside and hold sufficient shares in gold mining companies, or as he had expressed it 
in his will, “gold shares”, to give an annual yield of £240. He gave the following 
instructions as to the manner in which the Davies trust fund had to be dealt with:57 
“I direct my administrators to invest my wife’s trust fund and Davies trust fund with power 
from time to time to vary the investments and to receive the income thereof. I authorise 
my administrators, if they think fit, to leave undisturbed any investments in the form in 
which they are at the time of my death and I direct that my administrators are not liable to 
make good to my estate any loss which may be occasioned through leaving any such 
investments undisturbed or through any other investments bona fide made by them.” 
The question that had to be decided was what the exact meaning of Mr Speight’s 
directions in regard to the Davies trust fund was. In particular, did the trustees have 
to leave the trust’s investments undisturbed or were they permitted to vary the 
investments? Hudson J made an order declaring that on a proper construction of the 
will it was clear that the trustees had the power to vary the investments in the trust 
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and invest trust capital in such a manner as they “thought fit”, and that their 
investments did not necessarily had to be confined to gold shares.58 
Hudson J remarked that, although gold shares were looked upon as having a 
fairly long period of life, there was no doubt that they tended to fluctuate 
occasionally. He cautioned that holding gold shares could later turn out to be not 
such a safe investment as the trustees first considered it to be. It was further 
stressed that if the interests of minor children were concerned, and the interested 
parties consented, he would not have allowed an investment in gold shares, but 
would have only permitted an investment in some other more “satisfactory form”. 
Nevertheless, despite his view of gold shares, Hudson J did not confine the 
investment of trust funds to investments “suitable for a trust fund” as he called it, but 
left the investment of trust funds to the discretion of the trustees.59 
2 2 4 Ex parte Executor Testamentary Estate Late Arthur Storm 
In Ex parte Executor Testamentary Estate Late Arthur Storm60 (“Ex parte Storm”), 
Arthur Storm (“Mr Storm) died in 1942 and was survived by his widow and their only 
daughter. He left amongst his assets shares in a company called The Coronation 
Brick and Tile Company (the “Coronation Company”) in trust.61 In his will, he directed 
his trustee to invest in “recognised trust securities”:62 
“The whole of the remainder of my Estate I direct my Trustee to hold and administer as 
hereinafter provided, directing that they shall invest such Estate in recognised trust 
securities with power to realise such securities from time to time should they deem it 
advisable, and to reinvest the proceeds.” 
The trustee, who was the chairman of the Durban Board of Executors and Trust 
Company Limited, applied for an order confirming the sale of the Coronation 
Company shares to certain limited liability companies. An important aspect to 
highlight is the fact that the trustee was also the chairman and controlling 
                                                            
58 109-110. 
59 110-111. 
60 1943 NPD 279. 





shareholder of each of the companies to which he proposed to sell the shares.63 
Mr Storm’s widow had consented to the transaction both on her own and on her 
minor daughter’s behalf.64 
Selke J was not prepared to grant the order for the following reasons: first, he 
viewed the proposed transaction as one where the trustee presumably stood to 
derive personal benefit, whether directly or indirectly. Such a situation is one in which 
a trustee’s interest as an individual tends to conflict with his duty as a trustee. In the 
view of Selke J, the court has always been particularly careful before giving its 
approval to transactions of this type. 65  Therefore, although the trustee had the 
consent of the beneficiaries, Selke J was not satisfied that the proposed transaction 
could be approved. 
Second, the Coronation Company was regarded in the market as a “safe lockup 
investment”.66 This view was also held by the Master who had furnished a report to 
the application. The Master viewed the Coronation Company as a sound and 
flourishing company, and an investment in its shares as a “sound investment, far 
removed from the class of speculative investment”.67 In support of his view, the 
Master gave the following reasons in his report: the dividends on the shares 
averaged 28.8% per annum over a period of six years; and the company’s balance 
sheet showed that the company was extremely healthy and in a sound position. 
Selke J stated that he was in general agreement with the view of the Master.68 
Third, putting the shares on the open market all at once would almost certainly 
have resulted in a serious fall in their market price. The trustee would thus have had 
to realise them for much less than their real value. Selke J felt that it was not 
necessary or desirable that the trust estate had to make such a sacrifice.69 
Fourth, Selke J did not understand the provisions of the will to mean that the 
trustee had to realise the trust’s assets immediately, nor did he find any urgency 
about their realisation. For example, there were no debts or obligations of the trust 











estate that had to be fulfilled, nor was there any reason to suppose that there would 
be a serious permanent fall in the value of its shares in the near future. Selke J found 
that the language of the will suggested that the trustee possessed some degree of 
discretion as to which assets he would realise and when he would realise them. 
Applying Sackville West, Selke J stated that, in exercising his discretion, the trustee 
had to have “genuine and exclusive regard to the interests of the estate and of the 
beneficiaries”, and had to act as the “ideal ‘prudent and careful man’ would act in 
similar circumstances”.70 
In conclusion, the court in casu did not simply order the trustee to sell the shares 
in the public company in order to invest the proceeds in “recognised trust securities”. 
Instead, it emphasised the importance of considering the circumstances relevant to a 
particular case, the nature of the investment in question, and what would be in the 
best interest of the trust’s beneficiaries. 
2 2 5 Jonsson v Estate Jonsson 
In Jonsson v Estate Jonsson71 (“Estate Jonsson”), Frederick Leonard Jonsson 
(“Mr Jonsson”) executed a will in 1933 and gave the following directions to his 
trustees on how trust assets had to be dealt with:72 
“… to vary investments from time to time, provided that any investments made by them 
[the trustees] shall be in first mortgage of rent producing properties in Durban or in British 
or South African Government or municipal stocks.” 
Before his death in 1935, he widened his trustees’ investment powers by a codicil 
to his will so that they could invest in “such investments as trustees are entitled to 
invest moneys in”.73 
Two questions arose in the matter, of which only the second question is relevant 
for present purposes. The trustees asked the court whether they were entitled to 
invest the trust funds in any or all of the following investments: the purchase of rent-
producing properties anywhere in South Africa; first mortgage upon such properties; 
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South African or British government or municipal stocks; or stocks of any public utility 
corporation, such as the Electricity Supply Commission and the Rand Water Board.74 
Carlisle AJP noted that there was no “fixed list of proper trustee investments” as 
was the case in English law. 75  Before 1961, trustees in England without wide 
express powers of investment were limited to the narrow categories of investment 
set out in the Trustee Act 1925 – principally, fixed-income securities.76 He referred to 
Sackville West as authority for the view that trustees are obliged to observe due care 
and diligence in dealing with and investing the money of beneficiaries, and not to 
expose it to business risks in any way.  
After further reference to Sackville West, and in particular Kotzé JA’s discussion of 
Voet, Carlisle AJP held that the trustees were entitled to invest the trust funds in any 
part of South Africa in the purchase of landed property or by way of first mortgage, or 
in British or South African government or municipal stocks. He emphasised that each 
particular investment must be selected as a proper one for the trust funds after full 
and careful investigation has taken place.77 
Regarding the investment in the stocks of public utility corporations, Carlisle AJP 
stated that the role of the court is not to say whether such an investment is a proper 
one or not. The trustees have to decide these matters for themselves:78 
“The trustees must exercise their discretion in accordance with the principles which they 
must follow in regard to such matters as these.” 
In conclusion, the decision in Estate Jonsson is not such a conservative decision 
as one might think after a first read. Carlisle AJP held that the trustees were entitled 
to invest in first mortgages on property and in government and municipal stocks, but 
both mortgages and government and municipal stocks were already permitted in 
terms of the will. Therefore, the only investment that was permitted that fell outside 
the terms of the will was the purchase of rent-producing properties. Despite there not 
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being any express direction that the trustees may invest in the stocks of public utility 
corporations, Carlisle AJP did not confine investment only to properties, mortgages, 
and government and municipal stocks, but left investment decisions to the trustees. 
2 2 6 Ex parte Knight and others 
The material facts of Ex parte Knight and others79 (“Ex parte Knight”) are as 
follows:80 the petitioners were the trustees of the testamentary trust of the late Frank 
Gibaud, the trustees of the testamentary trust of the late Clifford Louis Gibaud 
(“Clifford Gibaud”), and the trustees of the testamentary trust of Thomas Ponsonby 
Bagshaw (“Thomas Bagshaw”). The trustees applied to the court for an order 
authorising them to sell or exchange the shares that they held in their respective 
capacities as trustees in two private companies, Bagshaw Gibaud & Coy Ltd and 
Sargent Ltd, for shares in a proposed public holding company, referred to in the case 
as the “New Company”.81 The application was opposed by one of the beneficiaries of 
Frank Gibaud’s trust.82 
The directors of both Bagshaw Gibaud & Coy Ltd and Sargent Ltd advised the 
trustees that it was an opportune time to enter into a reconstruction scheme under 
which the New Company would purchase the shares of the existing companies. The 
purchase consideration was in effect an exchange of the shares of the two existing 
companies for similar shares in the New Company. The trustees asked the court to 
determine whether they had the necessary power and authority in terms of the 
respective wills, and also to consider the merits of the proposed reconstruction 
scheme.83 Regarding the latter request, the court was essentially asked to advise the 
trustees whether or not they should embark upon the scheme. 
Before arriving at his conclusion, Steyn J discussed the specific duties of trustees 
in respect of investments. First, the normal powers of trustees include the right to 
retain the investments in a trust. Second, if the investments received are risky and 
speculative, it would be negligent for the trustees to maintain them. Trustees should 
thus realise such investments and invest the proceeds in adequate securities. Third, 
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it is the trustees’ duty to consider the best interests of all the beneficiaries with due 
regard to the production of fruits and the security of the corpus. Fourth, how 
investments are to be made is a matter for the trustees’ discretion. Their discretion 
is, however, always subject to the express directions of the founder or testator 
limiting their powers and discretion. Fifth, it is not the function of the court to advise 
trustees as to the exercise of the discretion vested in them, or to confirm their actions 
done in pursuance thereof. Instead, it is the function of the trustees to weigh up the 
advantages and disadvantages of certain investments opportunities and to come to a 
decision thereon.84 
On examination of the three wills, Steyn J concluded that with regard to Frank 
Gibaud’s trust and Clifford Gibaud’s trust, the trustees had the power under the 
trusts to consent to a reconstruction scheme; with regard to Thomas Bagshaw’s 
trust, the trustees had a similar power since all the interested persons under the trust 
had consented to the reconstruction scheme.85 
Steyn J decided to confine his decision only to the interpretation of the powers in 
the wills. Since the trustees already had the necessary powers of investment, he 
held that it was for them to determine whether or not they would exercise the 
discretion that was vested in them. 86 Steyn J did not, therefore, confine the 
investment of the trust funds only to certain investments, but left the investment 
decisions to the discretion of the trustees. This was despite the fact that none of the 
trust documents gave an express direction that the trustees could invest in the 
shares of a public company. 
2 2 7 Ex parte Stein 
In Ex parte Stein, NO87 (“Ex parte Stein”), Sam Stein (“Mr Stein”) died in 1934 and 
created a trust by appointing his three sons as his sole heirs in equal shares and 
providing that their inheritances should not be paid out until 25 years after the date of 
his death.88 In his will, he provided that the trust funds should be invested either in 
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immovable property or in first mortgage thereon.89 After selling certain immovable 
properties in 1947, the trustee invested a portion of the proceeds in shares in certain 
building societies and in deposits on current accounts with such societies. These 
investments, though not specifically authorised by the will, were effected because 
the trustee did not want trust funds to lie idle until permanent investments in 
immovable property or first mortgage could be secured.90 
The trustee applied, first, for an order confirming his action in making these 
investments; second, for authority to place trust funds on deposit with certain 
specified building societies from time to time and to purchase shares therein; and 
third, for authority to acquire shares in one or more private companies where the 
principal assets consist of immovable property.91 Murray J was prepared to grant the 
first and second prayers, but he was not prepared to grant the trustee the power to 
acquire shares in private property companies.92 The two main reasons for granting 
the second prayer was because there was a statute at the time that exercised official 
control over building societies, and the investments in building societies were only a 
temporary measure pending final investment of the character specified in the trust.93 
Murray J expressly refused the authority to invest in the shares of private 
companies despite the fact that such an arrangement had been consented to by all 
the beneficiaries.94 Is this case then an example of the court taking a conservative 
approach in that it limited the investment of trust funds to fixed-income investments 
only? The answer to this question is no. The Master gave various reasons for the 
general inadvisability of permitting the investment of trust funds in the shares of 
private companies:95 
“… due to the normal fluctuations in value thereof, the possibility of prejudice owing to the 
exercise by directors and shareholders of their rights connected with such companies, the 
difficulty of controlling the activities of a trustee in his dealings with such shares either as 






94 767-768; Ex parte Van Hasselt 1965 3 SA 422 (W) 426. 




a shareholder or a director, and the possibility that a lower standard of diligence may be 
required of a trustee in his capacity as a director.” 
Murray J stated, however, that his principal difficulty lay elsewhere. The trustee 
was given specific directions as to the method in which trust funds had to be 
invested – he had to invest in immovable property or in first mortgage thereon. 
Since, in Murray’s J opinion, an investment in shares is not entirely the same as the 
ownership of land, the trustee could not invest in the shares of private property 
companies.96 Therefore, in Ex parte Stein, an investment in shares was refused 
simply because the testator’s will circumscribed the trustee’s powers of investment.97 
2 2 8 Peffers, NO v Attorneys, Notaries and Conveyancers Fidelity Guarantee Fund 
Board of Control 
In Peffers, NO v Attorneys, Notaries and Conveyancers Fidelity Guarantee Fund 
Board of Control98 (“Peffers v Board of Control”), an attorney as co-executor stole 
certain moneys from the estate of Alexander Collie Peffers (“Mr Peffers”) who died in 
1953. The action was brought against the Board of Control of the Attorneys, Notaries 
and Conveyancers Fidelity Guarantee Fund (the “Board of Control”) for the payment 
of the money stolen. The plaintiffs were the widow of Mr Peffers and Barclays Bank 
in their capacities as executors and administrators of the estate of the late 
Mr Peffers.99 
Theron J concluded that an investment in an unsecured loan to an individual, 
even though his financial position may be judged to be sound, would undoubtedly 
not be considered to be a proper investment for trust funds. Loans of this type should 
be avoided, unless the trust instrument in question specifically authorises it.100 The 
Board of Control was found liable in respect of the loss suffered.101 
Theron J considered it relevant to the case to obtain clarity on the legal position of 
administrators or trustees in relation to the investment of trust funds entrusted to 
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them for administration. He confirmed that there was no statute in South Africa – as 
there was in England – stipulating that trustees should invest only in certain types of 
investment. Instead, trustees are required to invest the funds entrusted to their care 
with diligence and safety. The standard of care required from trustees is higher than 
that which the ordinary man generally observes in the management of his own 
affairs: it is the standard of the bonus et diligens paterfamilias. Theron J explained 
that the high standard of care demanded by our law had resulted in a general 
acceptance by all persons concerned with the administration of trusts and estates 
that only certain classes of investment were by nature suitable for the investment of 
trust funds.102 According to Theron J, these are:103 
“Government or Municipal stocks, loans secured by first mortgage bonds over immovable 
property, fixed deposits in a reputable bank or trust company or building society, and so 
forth.” 
Note that Theron J concludes the list with the words “and so forth”, which indicate 
that the list should not be seen as a closed list (numerus clausus). Therefore, the list 
includes other types of fixed-income investment as well as other investments 
deemed to be safe, such as the purchase of rent-producing properties.104 
2 2 9 Ex parte van Hasselt 
In Ex parte van Hasselt 105 (“Van Hasselt”), an application was made for the 
appointment of a curator bonis to Carel Louis van Hasselt (“Mr Van Hasselt”) who 
was alleged to be incapable of managing his affairs. Mr Van Hasselt was 77 years of 
age at the time and, according to the medical evidence, his life expectancy was three 
years at the utmost. Lilias Ivuna van Hasselt (“Mrs Van Hasselt”) with the 
concurrence of the curator ad litem and Mr and Mrs Van Hasselt’s major son 
(hereafter referred to as the “applicants”) requested the court to authorise the curator 
bonis to invest Mr Van Hasselt’s funds in shares on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (“JSE”). The court also had to decide whether to qualify the power to 
operate on the sharemarket with certain provisions. The applicants suggested that 
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the curator bonis had to consult with and receive the approval of a stockbroker; had 
to report to the Master, giving full particulars of transactions already completed; and 
had to be subject to instant dismissal by Mr and Mrs Van Hasselt.106 
Hiemstra J declared Mr Van Hasselt incapable of managing his affairs and 
appointed a curator bonis.107 The Master felt that it should not to be charged with the 
duty of approving share investments. Hiemstra J agreed and found that the Master 
was not equipped for the discharge of such a duty since it involves “great expertise 
and minute attention to detail”.108 It was ordered that the curator bonis could invest 
and reinvest the funds under his control in shares on the JSE, provided that he first 
had to consult with and receive approval from a stockbroker and that Mr and Mrs 
Van Hasselt could at any time cancel the authority given in this regard.109 
Hiemstra J stated that the following features of the case were important 
considerations for him: first, Mr Van Hasselt had previously, while still of lucid mind, 
entrusted the person who was appointed as curator bonis with control over dealings 
in his portfolio; second, Mrs Van Hasselt and the couple’s son, the only eventual 
beneficiaries of the estate, strongly supported the application; third, the case did not 
involve protecting the interests of minors; fourth, the curator ad litem assured the 
court that, whatever may happen to the share investments, there would always be 
sufficient funds to ensure the comfort of Mr Van Hasselt during his lifetime and to 
meet any urgent cash commitments; fifth, Mr Van Hasselt’s life expectancy was only 
about three years; and sixth, the investments were spread over fifteen companies.110 
The Master suggested that it would be highly dangerous to authorise share 
dealings. Hiemstra J did not deny that there are many hazards implicit in investing in 
shares on the JSE, but clarified this by stating that investing in fixed-income 
securities also has its disadvantages. He explained that, because of inflation, the 
value of money is uninterruptedly and steadily declining.111 According to Hiemstra J, 
a well-spread portfolio of ordinary shares selected with care and kept under constant 
                                                            









supervision by experts in this field constitutes a form of investment that was suited to 
the requirements of the most prudent investor.112 
What makes the decision in Van Hasselt significant, is that Hiemstra J provided an 
insight that seems to have eluded trustees for many years. He showed that there 
was nothing in the authorities referred to in Sackville West that suggested a 
preference for a particular type of investment:113 
“The seventeenth and eighteenth century writers referred to by the Appellate Division in 
1925 expressed no preference for a particular type of security. They merely insist on 
prudence on the part of a trustee.” 
Therefore, an important principle to be taken from Van Hasselt is that there is no 
justification for a hard-and-fast rule that precludes the investment of trust assets on a 
recognised stock exchange.114 
2 2 10  Ex parte Bennett 
In Ex parte Bennett, NO 115  (“Ex parte Bennett”), Mary Sheila Bennett 
(“Mrs Bennet”) in terms of her last will bequeathed a comparatively large sum of 
money in trust with powers of investment which, in the will, were expressed in the 
following terms:116 
“… to hold the same in the same state as it may be at the time of my death and with 
power to realise a portion or the whole thereof either by public auction or by private treaty, 
and to reinvest the proceeds derived therefrom upon trust securities and in shares in 
public companies, shares in building societies, fixed deposits and savings accounts …” 
The trustees sought an order that declared that in terms of the will they were 
authorised to invest capital funds belonging to the trust in collective investment 
schemes (unit trusts).117 Mrs Bennet’s husband (the income beneficiary) and her 
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children (the capital beneficiaries) consented to the granting of the relief sought by 
the trustees.118 
According to Fannin J, money invested in the units of a unit trust is invested in the 
shares and other securities that constitute the unit portfolio. The important question 
was whether an investment in the units of a unit trust would constitute an investment 
in “shares in public companies” and thus within the meaning of that particular phrase 
in the will.119 Fannin J found that an examination of the contents of unit portfolios will 
often reveal that some securities, which are not shares, are included in unit 
portfolios.120 Unit trusts will often include debentures, debenture stock, debenture 
bonds and unsecured notes; these investment classes are clearly distinguishable 
from shares in public companies.121 In coming to his conclusion, Fannin J did not 
overlook the argument that these investments (debentures etc.) might be seen as 
so-called “trust investments” and that, on that basis, the trustees should be allowed 
to invest in unit trusts.122 Regarding this line of reasoning he remarked that:123 
“Even where the debentures, debenture stock or debenture bonds are secured by 
mortgage bonds over the assets of the company, and may thus constitute ‘trustee 
securities’, that cannot be said of unsecured notes, which, by their very title, indicate that 
they represent unsecured debts due by the company which issued them.” 
Fannin J concluded that it was impossible to say that the holder of units in a unit 
trust will always hold an investment in shares in public companies and thus refused 
the order. Miller J concurred.124 
The court in casu was not asked to decide whether it was proper to invest in unit 
trusts in terms of the common law, nor was the question before the court whether 
investments in unit trusts could be regarded as trust investments. The court also did 
not express any opinion on these two questions.125 The trustees’ argument was 
confined to whether an investment in unit trusts fell within the power conferred by the 
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will.126 The decision in Ex parte Bennett should, therefore, not be read as authority 
for the view that in 1969 investing trust funds in unit trusts fell within the ambit of 
risky investments and that trustees were thus not licensed to invest in such 
investments. 
2 2 11  Ex parte Baumann 
In Ex parte Baumann NO127 (“Ex parte Baumann”), the testator, Albert Frederick 
Baumann (“Mr Baumann”), died in 1967 and bequeathed his estate to a trust 
established by his will. His estate consisted largely of shares in Bakers South Africa 
Ltd (“Bakers”). His trustees retained the shares in Bakers for fourteen years, after 
which they sold the shares for more than R3 million in 1981.128 The will authorised 
the trustees to realise investments from time to time and reinvest the proceeds in 
“good sound security”.129 Mr Baumann further stated in a postscript that:130 
“As a guide I record that at all times investments either in shares, preference shares or 
deposits with Bakers South Africa Ltd or their subsidiary companies or associate 
companies shall be acceptable. In other respects I approve of investments in shares in 
reputable building societies, or fixed deposits or savings accounts in such societies, or 
upon first mortgage bonds …” 
The trustees wished to invest the proceeds from the sale of the Bakers shares in 
shares quoted on the JSE. Uncertain about their investment powers, they 
approached the court for direction.131 The trustees sought an order declaring that 
they have a power to invest in shares on the JSE; or if they did not have such a 
power, they requested the court to give them such a power. All parties interested in 
the trust fund knew of and supported the application.132 The trustees believed that 
investments with building societies or investments in mortgage bonds were not wise 
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given the state of the country’s economy at the time.133 The trustees were most 
probably referring to the high average rate of inflation in South Africa from 1981 to 
1982.134 In the trustees’ opinion, it was thus more beneficial to the trust fund to invest 
in shares on the JSE.135 
In order to answer the question whether the trustees had the power to invest on 
the JSE, the court had to consider two issues: first, whether Mr Baumann gave 
precise instructions circumscribing the method of investment of the trust assets; and 
second, what the correct interpretation of the word “security” was in the will.136 
Didcott J found that the postscript did not amount to “instructions”, nor did it have 
the effect of limiting the trustees’ choice of investments. The postscript merely 
mentioned the investments that Mr Baumann favoured and was only meant to 
provide the trustees with some guidance.137 Regarding the meaning of security, it 
was found that Mr Baumann intended the word “security” in his will to bear the 
“extended meaning of investment”. 138  Didcott J declared that, according to the 
correct interpretation of the will, the trustees had the power to invest in shares on the 
JSE. Furthermore, in order to meet the will’s requirements, any investment that the 
trustees made had to be “good” and “sound” in their opinion.139 
According to Cameron and others, the Ex parte Baumann decision suggests that 
investing in public companies listed on a stock exchange would be regarded as too 
risky in the absence of express power in the trust instrument. 140  However, the 
trustees in casu were not given express powers to invest in shares on the JSE: the 
will simply stated that they had to invest in “good sound security”. An example of an 
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express power can be found in Ex parte Bennett where “shares in public companies” 
are explicitly mentioned:141 
“… to reinvest the proceeds derived therefrom upon trust securities and in shares in 
public companies, shares in building societies, fixed deposits and savings accounts …” 
Furthermore, Didcott J stated that even if the trustees did not have the power to 
invest on the JSE, he would have given them the opportunity to try and convince him 
to allow them to invest there. That said, Didcott J made it clear that he would have 
made such an order only if the trustees provided very good reasons in support of 
their request.142 It is, therefore, submitted that the decision in Ex parte Baumann is 
not authority for statements that suggest that investing in companies listed on the 
JSE would be too risky for trustees to make.143 
2 3 Summary and analysis of the court cases 
Following the discussion of the court cases from 1925 to 1982, it is submitted that 
the position with respect to trustee investing is as follows: 
A person in a fiduciary position, such as a trustee, is at common law under a duty 
to invest trust funds.144 This duty does not apply to trust assets unsuited or not 
intended for investment.145 
The standard of conduct that is expected from a trustee when undertaking the 
investment of trust funds is that of the “prudent and careful person”. The reasoning 
behind this statement can be explained as follows: trustees hold an office, which 
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gives rise to their general fiduciary duty.146  One of the components of trustees’ 
general fiduciary duty, and perhaps the most significant one, is trustees’ general duty 
of care.147 The extent of care required of trustees is that of the prudent and careful 
person, or to use the technical expression of Roman law, the standard of the bonus 
et diligens paterfamilias.148 Today, this standard is echoed in section 9(1) of the 
Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 (“Trust Property Control Act”).149 In South 
Africa, unlike the position in England, trustees’ general duty of care is applicable to 
both their general administration of trust property 150  and their investment-related 
functions:151 
“A trustee’s general duty of care obliges him at common law to undertake the investment 
of trust funds as a bonus et diligens paterfamilias …” 
Therefore, the rule that governs how trustees should exercise their investment 
functions is referred to as the “prudent and careful person rule”. 
The prudent and careful person rule is applicable to every trust and thus finds 
application in the following circumstances: where the trust instrument imposes 
restrictions on the trustees’ choice of investments; 152  contains no provisions 
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regarding investments; 153  does not contain detailed provisions regarding 
investments;154 and authorises the trustees to invest in riskier types of security.155 
Therefore, even where trustees are afforded wide powers of investment, they 
should still consider the prudent and careful person rule carefully, and whether or not 
to exercise their wider powers. It would be no defence to argue that their actions 
were justified simply on the ground that they were empowered to act.156 Trustees 
who fail to show the required standard of care when investing, and subsequently 
make an improper investment, commit a breach of trust.157 
2 3 1 The elements of the prudent and careful person rule 
A careful reading of the court cases outlined above reveals that the elements of 
the prudent and careful person rule can be formulated as follows: 
First, it is the duty of trustees to consider the best interest of all the beneficiaries 
with due regard to the production of fruits and the security of the capital.158 
Second, the question whether an investment is proper or not is left to the 
discretion of the trustees. It is evident that the courts are not prepared to advise 
trustees as to the exercise of the discretion vested in them or to confirm any acts 
done by them in pursuance of such discretion.159 
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Third, in terms of the prudent and careful person rule, whether an investment is 
prudent or not depends on the circumstances of each particular case. 160  For 
example, it was judged to be negligent and improper in Sackville West to invest upon 
the security of a hotel property, but under different circumstances the court might 
have allowed such an investment.161 
Fourth, trustees must avoid business risks. The need to avoid risks was 
emphasised in Sackville West in the judgments of both Solomon ACJ and Kotzé JA. 
Both contain dicta to the effect that trustees are obliged to avoid investments that are 
“attended with risk”,162 “attended with hazard”, “exposed to risk and hazard”, “not a 
safe and sound investment”, are of a “hazardous or uncertain nature”, involve 
“mercantile speculation”, and involve “business risks”.163 Kotzé JA concluded that it 
is the duty of trustees to observe due care and diligence, and not to expose trust 
funds in any way to any business risks.164 
According to Williams, this statement – that it is the duty of trustees not to expose 
trust funds to business risks – has been interpreted to mean that any investment in 
which the capital of the investment might decline in value was not proper for trustees 
to make. 165  Williams does not provide authority for this strict interpretation of 
Kotzé JA’s statement. At first glance, it might seem that Die Kerkraad, Nederduitse 
Gereformeerde Kerk v Colonial Orphan Chamber and Trust 166 (“Colonial Orphan 
Chamber”) provides authority for such an interpretation. However, Colonial Orphan 
Chamber is a somewhat singular case since it was a special condition in casu that 
the trustees had to guarantee the trust capital.167 In Sackville West, Solomon ACJ 
accepted that the value of some investments may fluctuate:168 
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 “Now it seems to me to be of the greatest importance to bear in mind that the value of 
the land and the hotel buildings would necessarily fluctuate with the success or otherwise 
of the hotel business.” 
Solomon ACJ did not, however, as a general rule prohibit the investment in such 
investments. Instead, he stated that trustees should take factors such as fluctuations 
into consideration and adjust the manner in which they invest when investing in 
certain types of investment:169 
“Considerations of this nature should be present to the mind of a reasonable man, who 
should not, therefore, invest money on such security as this without a very ample margin.” 
Fifth, if trustees receive investments that are speculative, they should sell them 
and reinvest the proceeds in safer investments.170 The term “speculative investment” 
is an amorphous term and none of the court cases discussed provides a definition of 
the term. One should not automatically assume that the term refers to “shares”. In 
Ex parte Storm, the trustees were allowed to invest in the shares of a certain public 
company since the court regarded the investment as a sound investment, far 
removed from the “class of speculative investment”.171 
Sixth, the prudent and careful person rule expresses no preference for a particular 
type of investment. This statement requires explaining. Hiemstra J stated in Van 
Hasselt that the seventeenth and eighteenth century writers referred to in Sackville 
West expressed no preference for a particular type of security.172 This was also the 
position in Learoyd, one of the cases referred to in Sackville West, and the position 
in the Sackville West judgment itself. The Appellate Division did not find it negligent 
and improper in all circumstances whatsoever for trustees to invest trust funds upon 
the security of a hotel property. Therefore, under different circumstances, it might 
have been possible that no objection could have been taken to the nature of such an 
investment.173 
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Finally, the prudent and careful person rule was not interpreted in subsequent 
judicial decisions as limiting the investment of trust funds only to particular 
investments; the courts merely insisted on prudence on the part of trustees.174 For 
example, in Ex parte Harrington, the court allowed the trustees to invest in gold 
shares; in Ex parte Storm, the court regarded the shares in a certain public company 
as a sound investment; in Estate Jonsson, the court did not prohibit the investment in 
stocks of certain public utility corporations; in Ex parte Knight, the court did not 
proscribe the investment in shares of a certain public company; and in Ex parte 
Stein, the court allowed the trustee to invest in, among other things, the purchase of 
shares in building societies.175 
Although the authorities referred to in Sackville West expressed no preference for 
a particular type of investment, it is evident from these authorities that, unless the 
trust instrument directs otherwise, trustees do not have the power to carry on a 
business with the assets of a trust estate.176 Therefore, at common law, trustees 
have no power without an express power in the trust instrument to, for example, 
expose trust assets to farming risks177 or conduct a hardware business through a 
trust.178 
Taking the above elements into consideration, it appears that in some respect the 
prudent and careful person rule resembles one of the versions of the prudent man 
rule in the United States. To be more specific, the South African rule resembles the 
“traditional prudent man rule” in that the latter rule did not express any preference for 
a particular type of investment, but instead relied on the skill and care of trustees to 
decide whether an investment is prudent or not.179 
2 3 2 The emergence of a generally accepted practice of investing 
The high standard of care demanded by the dicta of Sackville West resulted in a 
generally accepted practice that only certain classes of investment were by nature 
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suitable for the investment of trust funds.180 It is important to stress that it was the 
practice of trustees and not the courts to confine the investment of trust funds to trust 
investments. 181  This development is hereafter referred to as the “conservative 
approach”. It is generally accepted that the term trust investments includes the 
following: government or municipal stocks, fixed deposits, loans secured by first 
mortgage bonds over immovable property, and the purchase of rent-producing 
properties.182 Trustees followed the conservative approach especially in cases where 
they were not given wider powers of investment. 183  However, there is a strong 
possibility that the conservative approach was also followed in cases where trustees 
had wider powers of investment.184 It is important to point out that investing in trust 
investments does not dispense with the need for trustees to observe due care and 
diligence. The suitability of each particular investment contemplated still has to be 
investigated carefully.185 
Hiemstra J in Van Hasselt signalled a movement away from the conservative 
approach.186 As discussed above, Hiemstra J rejected the notion that a curator bonis 
had to invest the funds of the person whose estate he was administering only in trust 
investments. Hiemstra J took the view that there was nothing in the authorities cited 
in Sackville West that suggested a preference for a particular type of investment.187 
However, the practice of preferring conservative investments was widespread and it 
was thus unlikely that the statements of Hiemstra J would uproot it.188 
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3 The South African Law Commission’s report 
The Law Commission published a Working Paper189 in February 1984 and its 
report190 on the law of trusts in June 1987.191 In the report, the Law Commission 
discussed a number of issues relating to trust law reform. For present purposes, only 
the sections that deal with the investment of trust funds are relevant. 
3 1 The position according to the Law Commission 
The Law Commission, after briefly discussing some of the views concerning the 
investment of trust assets from Corbett and others192 and Honoré,193 concluded that 
no prudent man rule applied in South Africa. 194 It is unclear which version of the 
prudent man rule the Law Commission refers to. From 1940 to 1992, what was 
ordinarily understood in the United States as the prudent man rule (sometimes also 
referred to as the prudent person rule), was in fact the traditional prudent man rule 
as influenced by the work of Scott. In chapter 4, this version of the prudent man rule 
is referred to as “Scott’s prudent man rule”.195 Nevertheless, the point is that the Law 
Commission concluded that no version of the prudent man rule applied. Instead, 
what applied in our law, according to the Law Commission, was a court list 
approach. 
The Law Commission described the court list approach as follows: trustees must 
comply with the express directions in the trust instrument. In the absence of express 
directions, trustees should confine their investments to trust investments. 196  As 
discussed above, trust investments include government or municipal stocks, loans 
secured by first mortgage bonds over immovable property, fixed deposits, and 
investments in immovable property.197 Investments in public companies (companies 
listed on a stock exchange) – whether industrial, commercial or mining companies – 
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are regarded as too risky in the absence of an express power contained in the trust 
instrument.198 
The Law Commission noted that the case for allowing investment in public 
companies had been put forcibly by Hiemstra J in Van Hasselt, but it dismissed the 
importance of the case because it was a curator bonis case in which the patient 
himself had previously invested on the stock exchange.199 
3 2 The problem with a court list approach 
At the time when trust investments became relevant, inflation was either non-
existent or of little consequence.200 However, inflation has been substantial since 
1945. No economist foresaw or could have possibly foreseen anything like the 
inflation that has occurred since then. The effective increase in consumer prices 
between 1945 and 1982 amounted to 825.5%. 201  Relating that to a figure of 
R150 000 in 1945, the equivalent in 1982 would have been R1 238 250. A capital 
amount invested in 1945 and safely returned in 1982 could thus only buy one-eighth 
of what it could buy in 1945. 
As discussed in the preceding section, the Law Commission found that a court list 
approach existed in our law. As a result, trustees had to restrict their investments 
only to trust investments. Except for investments in immovable property, all trust 
investments are fixed-income investments.202 In economic conditions of low inflation, 
such investments produce a reasonable income and secure the rand value of the 
capital invested. 203  However, during periods of high inflation, fixed-income 
investments do not protect the erosion of the real value of the trust capital.204 For 
example, assuming that the returns on fixed-income investments are in the order of 
7%, the returns payable to a trust’s income beneficiaries would probably be closer to 
4% per annum after tax.205 If money is depreciating at, say 6% per annum, the 
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capital invested is necessarily undergoing a process of devaluation.206 As a result, 
not only do the trust’s capital beneficiaries suffer a considerable loss, but the income 
beneficiaries are also affected negatively. Should the capital invested be permitted to 
erode in value in real terms, it is inevitable that the real income available for the 
income beneficiaries will increasingly reduce and eventually cease to be of any 
significance.207 
To summarise, the problem that the Law Commission identified was that a court 
list approach could not counter inflation. Therefore, the court list approach was not 
an appropriate approach to trustee investing. 
3 3 Possible solutions to the problem 
The Law Commission considered three possible solutions to the problem: replace 
the court list approach with a “legal list” approach; replace the court list approach 
with some version of the prudent man rule;208 or enact legislation whereby the court 
may vary trust provisions in certain circumstances.209 
3 3 1 A legal list approach 
Some commentators on the Working Paper proposed a legal list approach to 
trustee investing.210 In brief, a legal list approach offers a range of investments that 
have received the sanction of the legislature and provides statutory guidelines 
regarding the permitted percentage of the trust fund that may be invested in 
particular investments.211 The arguments in favour of a legal list approach are: first, 
non-professional trustees may take comfort in the knowledge that, in all probability, 
they will not incur liability for breach of trust on the grounds of improper investment if 
they keep to the legal list. Second, a legal list may sometimes provide protection 
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against beneficiaries who insist on investments that are riskier than what the trustees 
would consider to be wise in the circumstances.212 
The arguments against a legal list are: first, it is not possible to draw up a simple 
list that would suit the circumstances of every trust. According to the Law 
Commission, the size of the trust fund, the benefits intended by the founder for the 
beneficiaries, the needs of the beneficiaries, and the expected duration of the trust 
are all factors that play a part in determining suitable investments for the particular 
trust. Second, a legal list approach cannot keep pace with changing economic 
circumstances. Even if the list of authorised investments is updated regularly, a legal 
list approach is not flexible enough to provide for all the different cases and changing 
circumstances.213 Third, a legal list approach may encourage trustees to “play it 
safe” by keeping to the legal list, rather than properly investigating which investments 
are really the most suitable for the particular trust.214 
The Law Commission thus felt that the advantages of a legal list approach were 
outweighed by its disadvantages.215 
3 3 2 The prudent man rule 
Another proposal that was considered, was introducing the prudent man rule in 
one form or another.216 All versions of the prudent man rule require trustees to act 
with the care and discretion of a prudent man when investing trust funds.217 The 
rationale for adopting the prudent man rule is that it allows trustees flexibility to 
respond to changing economic and financial conditions that would assist in 
protecting the trust estate.218 The Law Commission discussed four points of criticism 
of the prudent man rule as they understood it: first, the Law Commission was 
concerned that the rule may not provide sufficient guidance to inexperienced 
trustees. However, the Law Commission noted that nothing prevented non-
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professional trustees from obtaining investment advice. 219  The first criticism thus 
merely emphasised that expert advice is necessary when investing trust funds.220 
Second, according to the Ontario Law Reform Commission, it had been 
suggested that the prudent man rule requires trustees to guess in advance the kind 
of investments that the court may later determine to be suitable for the investment of 
trust assets if an action for breach of duty is commenced.221 However, upon further 
investigation, the South African Law Commission could not find any proof of such a 
state of affairs.222 
Third, according to the Law Commission, it was sometimes argued that the 
prudent man rule benefits capital beneficiaries at the expense of income 
beneficiaries.223 In response to this argument, the Ontario Law Reform Commission 
explained that, in truth, both income and capital beneficiaries benefit under the 
prudent man rule:224 
“… the intention of the prudent man concept is not only to permit investment in equities at 
times of high inflation in order to protect capital, but also to permit diversification of 
investment to meet the various needs of a trust during all kinds of changing economic and 
financial conditions.” 
Fourth, the Law Commission claimed that the prudent man rule implies that 
trustees may sometimes “ignore the directions in the trust document”.225 The Law 
Commission did not provide any further explanation, nor did it provide any authority 
for this claim. It is therefore uncertain where this notion stems from. Since no 
authority has been provided to substantiate such a claim, it is submitted that the 
power to ignore directions in the trust document is not one of the elements of any of 
the versions of the prudent man rule. 
In summary, none of the four points of criticism of the prudent man rule is 
convincing. Despite not having any real arguments against the prudent man rule, the 
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Law Commission decided not to recommend the rule as the solution to the problem 
discussed above. 
3 3 3 The amendment of a trust’s provisions in certain circumstances 
The final solution that the Law Commission considered, was to enact legislation 
that would allow the court to vary the provisions of a trust instrument that resulted in 
“the unprofitable investment of trust property”. The Law Commission’s draft bill 
embodied a recommendation to this effect.226 
This recommendation was, however, not enacted.227 That said, where excessive 
rigidity constrains desirable or necessary investment powers, section 13 of the Trust 
Property Control Act creates an avenue for possible change in the investment 
powers of trustees.228 
3 4 Summary 
The Law Commission found that no prudent man rule applied in South Africa; 
instead, a court list approach operated in our law. This claim thus contradicts the 
conclusion reached in section 2 3 above. The discussion of Estates Richards in the 
following section provides clarification to the question of precisely which approach 
applies in our law. 
The Law Commission accepted that, because of the increase in the rate of 
inflation in the second half of the twentieth century, a situation where trustees could 
only invest in fixed-income investments created a problem for beneficiaries. Three 
solutions for reform were considered. The Law Commission decided not to 
recommend a legal list approach or a version of the prudent man rule, and its 
recommendation regarding the amendment of trust instruments was not adopted. 
4 The approach to trustee investing after 1998 
This section begins by discussing the facts of Estate Richards and the conclusion 
reached in the case. Following this discussion, the section explains the conclusion 
reached regarding trustees’ investment standards in more detail and highlights what 
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is regarded as the most important contribution to trustee investing that the case 
makes. Thereafter, the section presents a criticism of the conclusion reached in the 
case and considers whether the criticism is justified. Finally, the section briefly 
discusses two cases on the subject of trustee investing decided after Estate 
Richards. 
4 1 Facts and conclusion reached in Estate Richards 
In Estate Richards, John Herbert Richards (“Mr Richards”) executed a will in 1953 
and died two years later.229 He was survived by his widow, his widow’s daughter, 
and the latter’s daughter, who was thus his step-grandchild. 230  In his will, he 
bequeathed certain movable property as well as a right of occupation to his widow. 
The residue of his estate was bequeathed in trust.231 The trustees were a partner of 
a well-established firm of attorneys and the Board of Executors, a trust company of 
Cape Town.232 From the trust income, the trustees had to pay annuities to certain 
family members, including Mr Richards’ widow and stepdaughter.233 The will made 
no provision for the distribution of the capital of the trust since Mr Richards 
expressed the desire that the trust shall “continue in perpetuity”.234 At the time of the 
judgment, Mr Richards’ step-grandchild was the sole surviving beneficiary.235 
It was apparent from the provisions of the will that Mr Richards had considerable 
confidence in the trustees. For instance, clause 4 of the will afforded the trustees 
wide powers of investment:236 
“… at their own absolute discretion (to) retain, release or reinvest any proceeds of any 
realisation of the whole or part in such manner and upon such security as to my 
administrators may seem fit”. 
Similarly, clause 11 conferred wide powers on the trustees:237 
                                                            
229 Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol 1999 1 SA 551 (SCA) 554B. 
230 Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol 1996 4 SA 253 (C) 255G-I.  
231 Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol 1999 1 SA 551 (SCA) 554B-C. 
232 Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol 1996 4 SA 253 (C) 256E. 








“My executors shall have the power to sell, deal with and dispose of any asset in my 
estate and my said administrators shall in addition to the powers of investment conferred 
upon them in clause 4 of this my will, have full power at their absolute discretion to realise 
or acquire property, both movable and immovable, also power to settle, adjust or 
compromise any claim due to or by me or my estate, and power to deal with any 
investments and to apportion or discriminate between capital and interest in their 
discretion.” 
The questions in issue in the appeal related solely to the powers of investment 
afforded to the trustees.238 The trustees sought an order authorising them to:239 
“… in their discretion, invest and from time to time to reinvest, any assets in the estate in 
such suitable trustee investments and/or securities quoted on any licensed stock 
exchange and/or in licensed unit trusts as applicants may deem appropriate.” 
The court a quo granted and order to this effect, but substituted the words “any 
licensed stock exchange” with “Johannesburg Stock Exchange”. It also attached 
three more restrictions to the investment of trust assets: first, investments in shares 
and unit trusts were limited to 50% of the value of the trust assets; second, the 
trustees had to obtain advice and approval from an independent stockbroker before 
making any investment; and third, the trustees had to render a quarterly report to the 
Master setting out the details of such investments. The trustees appealed against the 
decision of the court a quo.240 
Scott JA held that he could see no justification for a hard-and-fast rule precluding 
the investment of trust funds in shares or unit trusts.241 He cautioned, however, that 
every investment in shares and unit trusts involves an inherent risk of capital loss, 
and that a trustee who exercises due care and diligence will bear this in mind. He 
also held that, in managing a trust portfolio, trustees should avoid investments that 
are of a speculative nature. Furthermore, the extent to which it is prudent to invest in 
the share market will depend on the circumstances of each case, but generally 
speaking, trustees should as far as practicable seek to spread investments over 








various forms of undertaking in order to obtain a balance of stability and growth in 
the capital value of the trust and the income it produces.242 
Regarding the four restrictions imposed by the court a quo, Scott JA held that all 
of them were inappropriate.243 First, “in the light of modern developments” there was 
no reason for restricting investments to shares quoted on the JSE.244 Second, the 
50% limit on investments in shares or unit trusts was not justified. The need for 
flexibility in the administration of a trust, particularly one intended to be of long 
duration, is essential. What is prudent in particular circumstances may vary from well 
below 50% to well above it.245 Third, the requirement that the trustees had to obtain 
advice and approval from an independent stockbroker before investing in shares or 
unit trusts was neither necessary nor appropriate. The trustees enjoyed the benefit of 
advice from a team of investment experts of one of the trustees, the Board of 
Executors.246 Fourth, there was no good reason for the requirement that trustees had 
to render a quarterly investment report to the Master. The Master was on record in 
an earlier decision as saying that he did not want to be burdened with such a 
responsibility.247 
Ultimately, Scott JA held that the appeal had to succeed.248 
4 2 Discussion of the conclusion reached in Estate Richards 
Scott JA acknowledged the existence of the conservative approach and took the 
opportunity to consider the practice amongst fiduciaries of preferring so-called trust 
investments. 249  He pointed out that already in 1965, the Van Hasselt judgment 
signalled a movement away from the conservative approach. 250 However, the 
decision did not adequately solve the problem faced by trustees. The practice of 
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preferring trust investments was widespread and it was thus unlikely that the 
statements of Hiemstra J would uproot it.251 
Scott JA approved the dictum of Van Hasselt that stated that fiduciaries should not 
have a preference for a particular type of security.252 Therefore, the only requirement 
in our law is that the investments of trust assets should be prudent. Such prudence is 
a matter that is determined by the trustees and not the court.253 Scott JA confirmed 
that trustees have to, and have always had to, follow the prudent and careful person 
rule formulated in the Sackville West decision.254  As discussed above, the Law 
Commission concluded that the rule that applied in our law was a court list 
approach.255 It is submitted that the conclusion reached by the Law Commission is 
thus incorrect. 
In Estate Richards, it was also confirmed that whether or not an investment can 
be said to have been prudent or made with due care and diligence is a question that 
can only be determined in the circumstances of each particular case. 256 
“Circumstances” can be divided into circumstances relevant to the particular trust 
(hereafter referred to as “specific circumstances”) and “general circumstances”. 
Examples of specific circumstances are: the ambit of the trustees’ investment 
powers;257 the size of the trust fund; the expected duration of the trust; the benefits 
intended by the founder for the beneficiaries; the needs of the beneficiaries;258 or the 
particular qualities and characteristics of the trustees.259 According to De Waal, the 
trustees in Estate Richards were able to invest in the share market because the trust 
was intended to endure for a long period, the trustees were professional trustees, 
and the trust instrument included wide investment powers.260 
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General circumstances that must be considered include: the prevailing economic 
conditions,261 for example, a high inflation rate;262 the investment philosophy at the 
relevant time,263 for example, an established industry practice of investing in equities 
to combat inflation;264 and the need for diversified investment portfolios.265 
With regard to the requirement that circumstances be taken into account, the 
decision in Estate Richards goes a step further than any other case previously 
decided by drawing attention to the fact that circumstances can change:266 
“But whether or not an investment can be said to have been prudent or made with due 
care and diligence is a question which can only be decided on the facts of each particular 
case …; and circumstances change.” (Emphasis added.) 
In the case of specific circumstances, for example, the needs of the beneficiaries 
can change over time or the original trustees can be replaced with more experienced 
or less experienced trustees. However, taken in context, when Scott JA referred to 
the fact that circumstances change, he was mainly referring to how general 
circumstances can change over time. For example, economic conditions such as the 
inflation rate can change. South Africa’s economy has undergone substantial 
development and change since Sackville West has been decided. In 1925, inflation 
was non-existent.267 In contrast, the issue of inflation was an important factor worth 
considering when Estate Richards was decided.268 As discussed above, investing 
only in fixed-income investments when inflation is high will erode the capital invested 
in real terms. 269  Van der Reyden J in Ex parte Ewing NO: In Re Sheridan 270 
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(“Ex parte Ewing”) stated that such a negative result could hardly have been 
intended by the Appellate Division in 1925.271 
Investment philosophies can also change over time. Most institutions have 
developed an industry practice of investing in equities to combat inflation. In Van 
Hasselt, the evidence included a statement from an investment manager who wrote 
the following in 1961:272 
“…the great majority of institutions have become painfully aware of the demerits of 
monetary investments and have adopted a policy of placing a material proportion of their 
funds in real assets, usually either through the form of fixed property or the ordinary 
shares of public industrial, commercial, and mining companies. This change in policy has 
been common throughout the Western world and it is now rare for an insurance company, 
charitable institution, or pension fund to have no investments in real assets.” 
It can also be argued that the virtues of diversification were not appreciated in the 
first half of the century. For example, in Sackville West, the trustees invested in one 
investment only: a first mortgage of a certain hotel property;273 and in Ex parte 
Storm, the trustees only made one investment: an investment in the shares of a 
public company.274 In contrast, in Van Hasselt, the beneficiary’s investments were 
spread over fifteen companies.275 
The remark regarding the subject of “changing circumstances” is perhaps the 
most significant contribution to the development of trustee investing that the Estate 
Richards judgment makes. As discussed above, Scott JA showed that 
circumstances have indeed changed in the past few decades. More importantly, 
however, he indicated what the consequence of changed circumstances is: trustees 
are obligated to invest in “real assets with potential for capital growth” (eg listed 
shares/unit trusts) in order to protect trust assets from inflation and ensure the 
production of adequate income, particularly in the case of trusts intended to be of 
long duration.276 
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A further significant aspect of the case to highlight is that through Scott JA’s 
discussion of the consequence of changed circumstances, he also revealed the 
investment objective of modern trustees, namely that trustees are obliged to protect 
the real value of trust capital and must ensure the continued production of adequate 
income.277 This is hereafter referred to as trustees’ “main investment objective”. 
It is submitted that Scott JA did not alter the prudent and careful man rule; instead 
he provided much-needed clarification on how the rule should be applied by 
interpreting the rule in light of modern circumstances. 
4 3 Criticism of the Estate Richards judgment 
De Waal commends the decision in Estate Richards for heralding a more 
sophisticated and nuanced model of trusteeship, but suggests that the approach 
followed in the case is incompatible with the approach in Sackville West.278  As 
discussed above, Scott JA could not find justification for a hard-and-fast rule that 
precluded the investment of trust funds in shares and unit trusts.279 He also found 
that the ratio in Sackville West did not impose such a limitation on the investment of 
trust funds.280 
The problem that De Waal has with the conclusion reached by Scott JA can be 
described as follows: Scott JA accepted that every investment in shares (and unit 
trusts) involves some element of risk. He further accepted that this element of risk is 
unavoidable if the capital of a trust is to be preserved in real terms.281 In Sackville 
West, however, the need to avoid risks was emphasised in the judgments of both 
Solomon ACJ and Kotzé JA. Kotzé JA concluded that it is the duty of trustees not to 
expose trust funds to business risks in any way.282 For De Waal, the approach in the 
Sackville West decision is crystal clear: an investment in a trust should in no way 
involve any risk. 283 Taking this seemingly contradictory approaches into 
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consideration, one can understand why De Waal is sceptical of Scott JA’s statement 
that the two approaches are compatible.  
However, the reason for considering Scott JA’s conclusion as correct can be 
explained as follows: first, investing in the shares of a single company should be 
distinguished from investing in a share portfolio. The inherent risk of investing in the 
share market cannot be denied. It is this aspect that has given rise to the opinion that 
investing in shares or unit trusts is unsuitable for the funds of trusts. 284  This 
argument clearly has a certain force in the case of any one individual investment.285 
Even the most “azure of blue chip shares” is unprotected against the vagaries of the 
financial marketplace.286 However, investing trust funds only in the shares of a single 
public company should be distinguished from investing in a well-spread portfolio of 
listed shares selected with care and kept under constant supervision by experts in 
the field. In Van Hasselt, Hiemstra J stated that the risk element of a portfolio of 
shares should not be exaggerated:287 
“To suggest that investment in a portfolio of shares ipso facto involves so much 
‘uncertainty and risk’ that the whole undertaking automatically betrays lack of ‘due care 
and diligence’ is in my view unrealistic.” 
History has demonstrated that the capital value of a well-managed portfolio of 
listed shares and the income it produces will attain a remarkable degree of stability 
and growth over an indefinite period. In fact, it has conclusively been shown that 
such an investment provides a better long-term return than any fixed-rate 
investment.288 The case for allowing fiduciaries to invest in a share portfolio has 
been put forcibly by Hiemstra J:289 
“The present issue remains to be whether operations on the stock exchange, spread over 
a substantial number of equities, and to be conducted by two persons with specialised 
knowledge, are to be regarded as so risky that the curator ought to shun Hollard Street 
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when performing his duties. I do not think that one should, in the present circumstances, 
be overawed by the spectre of Black Friday.” 
Second, avoiding business risk does not mean that trustees should avoid every 
investment where the capital of the investment might decline in value.290 Avoiding 
business risk would certainly include avoiding investing in a single asset with the 
potential of losing all its value. However, where individual shares can lose all their 
value, an investment portfolio containing a diversified portfolio of shares cannot291 – 
especially if proper diversification has been taking place. 292  Thus, from a risk 
perspective, there is a significant difference between investing in the shares of a 
single company and investing in a properly diversified share portfolio. 
Third, the ratio in Sackville West expressed no preference for a particular type of 
investment. Instead, whether an investment is proper or not is left to the discretion of 
the trustees.293 
4 4 Relevant court cases decided after Estate Richards 
It is worth discussing two subsequent cases that at first glance may appear to be 
more conservative decisions than the Estate Richards case. 
4 4 1 Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 
In Jowell v Bramwell-Jones294 (“Bramwell-Jones”), the court was confronted with 
the scenario where the same person (the wife of the founder) was appointed as the 
trustee and sole income beneficiary of a trust. The founder’s children were the 
capital beneficiaries. The founder’s wife, the trustee, participated in a scheme that 
was alleged by the capital beneficiaries to have been affected in the interest of the 
trustee as income beneficiary only. The court found that the trustee had breached 
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her fiduciary duty.295 However, it was held that the action was premature since it was 
not possible to establish whether a loss had been sustained.296 
Scott JA in casu stated that “the vagaries of the share market are legion”.297 The 
context in which the court drew attention to the vagaries of the share market differs 
from that of Estate Richards. In the latter case, the fact that the share market is 
unpredictable was relevant because the question that had to be answered was 
whether it would be prudent for trustees to invest in riskier types of investment such 
as shares and unit trusts.298 In Bramwell-Jones, on the other hand, the reference to 
the vagaries of the share market was relevant because it showed that the future 
values of investments of trust assets were uncertain and it was thus impossible to 
establish that there was going to be a loss in the future.299 
4 4 2 Tijmstra NO v Blunt-Mackenzie 
In Tijmstra NO v Blunt-Mackenzie NO300 (“Blunt-Mackenzie”), one of the trustees 
deposited trust funds that had previously been invested in a safe investment in the 
joint account of himself and his wife.301 The court held that the trustee could not be 
classified as a bonus et diligens paterfamilias.302 Thus, he was removed from the 
office of trustee.303 
According to Geach, the case makes it clear that the investment of trust funds 
must be made with safety and security, and it is not to be placed in “anything 
involving an element of uncertainty or risk”.304 However, it is important to determine 
what is meant by “risk” exactly. Risk in Blunt-Mackenzie does not refer to the 
possibility that the value of an investment might decrease in value because of market 
fluctuations. Instead, because the trustee invested the trust funds in his personal 
name and intermingled the funds with that of his wife, the trust funds were exposed 
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to different types of risk – one being, for example, that all the trust funds might be 
lost if the trustee’s or his wife’s estate became sequestrated. 
4 4 3 Conclusion reached regarding Bramwell-Jones and Blunt-Mackenzie 
Although at first glance it may appear as if more conservative decisions were 
made than in the Estate Richards case, these decisions do not contradict any of the 
conclusions reached in Estate Richards. 
5 Conclusion 
In South Africa, the prudent and careful person rule governs how trustees should 
exercise their investment functions. The rule was enunciated in Sackville West, and 
in Estate Richards it was confirmed that the rule has not been departed from since.  
For many years, trustees preferred to invest in so-called trust investments. This 
was not due to a court list approach operating in our law, but because there was a 
generally accepted practice amongst fiduciaries of preferring trust investments. 
Perhaps the most significant contribution to the development of trustee investing 
that the Estate Richards judgment made is that it highlights the fact that 
circumstances change. The judgment further showed that circumstances had indeed 
changed since 1925 and revealed the consequence of changed circumstances, 
namely that trustees have to invest differently than in the past. To be more specific, 
in order to protect trust assets from inflation and ensure the production of adequate 
income, trustees are obligated to invest in real assets with the potential for capital 
growth (eg listed shares/unit trusts), particularly in the case of trusts intended to be 
of long duration. 
Through his discussion of the consequence of changed circumstances, Scott JA 
also revealed that the main investment objective of trustees is to protect the real 
value of trust capital and to ensure the continued production of adequate income. 
This is referred to in this dissertation as trustees’ main investment objective. It is 
important to note that what is expected from trustees in this instance corresponds 
with what is required from trustees under an investment rule based on MPT.305  
This raises the following question: is it possible for trustees in South Africa to 
achieve their main investment objective without being able to rely an investment rule 
                                                            




based on MPT? This question can only be answered by analysing the development 
of trustees’ investment standards in the comparable foreign jurisdictions. If the 
answer to this question is no, it means that trustees cannot achieve their main 
investment objective if they are unable to rely on an investment rule based on MPT. 
Before examining the development of trustees’ investment standards in the three 
foreign jurisdictions, it is first necessary to obtain a basic understanding of MPT 
since the theory played a significant role in the reform that took place in these 





CHAPTER 3 – MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY 
1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces and explains modern portfolio theory (“MPT”). The 
purpose of the chapter is, first, to illustrate that MPT presents a better account of risk 
and safety than other popular models of investment behaviour, and second, that an 
investment strategy based on MPT is the best possible approach for people 
managing other people’s assets. 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, in its simplest form, MPT is a theory of 
investment that “attempts to maximise portfolio expected return for a given amount of 
portfolio risk, or equivalently minimise risk for a given level of expected return, by 
carefully choosing the proportions of various assets”.1 
As one might expect, MPT is highly technical in structure. The chapter is not 
intended to provide a detailed account of all aspects and elements of the theory, but 
rather to provide a basic understanding of MPT. It is suggested that original sources 
should be consulted if one is interested in a rigorous proof of the elements of the 
theory.2 
Following this introduction, the chapter is divided into five sections, which are 
summarised in the conclusion at the end of the chapter. Section 2 discusses the 
development of another popular investment strategy, namely focus portfolio theory 
(“FPT”), and explains its central features. Comparing MPT to another theory of 
investment management is a helpful way of gaining a better understanding of MPT. 
Section 3 details the development of MPT. Special attention is paid to the work of 
Harry Markowitz in the 1950s and the contributions of William Sharpe in the 1960s, 
as both their efforts were key to the development of the theory. Section 4 provides a 
summary of the theory’s major lessons. Section 5 explains the implications of 
adhering to the tenets of MPT. Section 6 provides reasons for the necessity of 
involving professional investment managers when administering portfolios in 
accordance with MPT. 
                                                            
1 I Omisore, M Yusuf & N Christopher “The modern portfolio theory as an investment decision tool” 
(2012) 4 J Account Taxation 19 20. 
2 See eg HM Markowitz “Portfolio selection” (1952) 7 J Finance 77 and WF Sharpe “A simplified 




2 Focus portfolio theory 
As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, comparing MPT to FPT is a helpful way 
of gaining a better understanding of MPT. FPT is sometimes also referred to as 
value-oriented fundamental analysis,3 the individual investment approach,4 or value 
investing.5 According to Athanassakos, FPT “cannot be more different” than MPT.6 
FPT was a popular approach prior to the development of MPT and remains a 
popular investment strategy today.7 
FPT is a theory of investing developed by Ben Graham at Columbia University in 
New York in the early 1930s.8 The famous investment expert, Warren Buffet, studied 
under Graham whereafter he worked for his mentor for two years from 1952.9 Buffet 
has been extremely successful in using variations of Graham’s model.10 
According to Butler, FPT requires the investor to identify “those investment 
vehicles which are likely to perform best in the future, and then tells her to invest all 
of the available investment funds in those vehicles”.11 More precisely, FPT involves a 
three-step process:12 
“First, identify possibly undervalued stocks by choosing stocks with low price-to-
earnings (P/E), price-to-book (P/B) or other valuation related metrics, second, 
value in depth the stocks that pass the screening process to estimate their 
intrinsic value and third, make an investment decision to buy only if the stock price 
is below the intrinsic value by a predetermined margin of safety …” 
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FPT is grounded in the following set of beliefs: first, the market is not always 
efficient. 13  Thus, “focus investors” assume that the market sometimes misprices 
investments.14 Hence, they believe that through careful research they will be able to 
recognise such mispricing, affording them opportunities to outperform the market.15 
Second, focus investors define risk as “valuation risk”, which is paying too much for a 
particular stock.16 According to Hagstrom, the risk for an investor who misjudges the 
value of the shares of a company listed on a stock exchange is that the investment 
might not give the investor “at least as much purchasing power as he had to begin 
with, plus a modest rate of interest on that initial stake”.17 Third, focus investors 
believe that the less diversified a portfolio is, the better it will perform. In other words, 
FPT entails concentrating a portfolio to a few selected truly undervalued stocks.18 
Hagstrom provides the reason why focus investors are unconcerned with portfolio 
diversification:19 
“… by purposely focusing on just a few select companies, you are better able to study 
them closely and understand their intrinsic value. The more knowledge you have about 
your company, the less risk you are likely to be taking.” 
And Loeb expressed it as:20 
“…once you attain competence, diversification is undesirable.” 
The remainder of the chapter shows that MPT presents completely different views 
than FPT concerning the likelihood of outperforming the market, the meaning of the 
term “risk”, and the importance of diversification. 
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3 The development of MPT 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, MPT was of consuming interest to theorists and 
researchers. Investment managers, on the other hand, paid little attention to the 
theory since portfolio management was uncharted territory. However, by the 1970s, 
this all changed. The downward spiral of the United States stock market in the early 
1970s forced investment managers to take the writings coming from major 
universities seriously and consider the possibility that there might be better ways of 
managing investment portfolios. By the late 1970s, it had become commonplace for 
investment managers to apply MPT.21 
3 1 Markowitz’s contribution 
MPT is traceable to a landmark paper by Harry Markowitz entitled “Portfolio 
selection” published in the Journal of Finance in 1952. 22  Markowitz’s insights 
ultimately won him the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences.23 Although pioneered by 
Markowitz in the 1950s, the theory was furthered by William Sharpe in the 1960s.24 
Markowitz proposes that in designing a portfolio, an investor should look to the 
risk of his portfolio as well as its return.25 In order to understand Markowitz’s thinking, 
the concept of “expected return” and the concept of “risk” must be explained first. 
3 1 1 The concept of expected return 
The expected return of an investment is calculated by “multiplying every possible 
return by its probability of being the actual return, and then adding up the results of 
the multiplication”. 26  To illustrate, assume that there is a 50% probability that a 
particular stock, the price of which is R10 today, will be worth R12 one year from 
now, a 40% probability that it will be worth R15, and a 10% probability that it will be 
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worth R0. 27  Consequently, there is a 50% probability of a R2 return, a 40% 
probability of a R5 return, and a 10% probability of a -R10 return. The expected 
return is thus R2.28 Measured as a percentage of the original price of the share,29 the 
expected return is 20%.30 
It is also possible to calculate the return of a portfolio consisting of one, two, or 
many investments. The expected return of a portfolio is simply the weighted average 
return of the individual assets that make up the portfolio.31 
In addition, MPT defines what constitutes return using the concept of “total return”. 
Total return includes both cash flow to the investor and changes in market value.32 
For stocks, return consists of both dividends and capital gains;33 while for bonds, 
return consists of interest paid plus the change in price.34 
3 1 2 The concept of risk 
In finance, risk is defined as “the variance from the potential or expected outcome 
of an investment”.35 Accordingly, risk does not refer to its more informal meaning of 
“the chance that something bad will happen”.36 Hereafter, the use of the term “risk” is 
restricted to its connotative meaning in financial theory, unless otherwise specified. 
The degree of variance can be calculated mathematically. The variance of an 
investment equals the probability-weighted average of squared deviations from the 
expected value.37 Alternatively, standard deviation can be used as a measure of risk. 
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Standard deviation is the square root of variance. Either variance or standard 
deviation can be employed to measure risk; which of the two is used is solely a 
matter of convenience. A ranking of investments by variance will be identical to a 
ranking by standard deviation.38 Since standard deviation is in the same units as an 
investment’s rate of return, it is generally more convenient to use standard 
deviation.39 
An investment with a high standard deviation is described as having a high 
volatility because it has a greater probability of uncertain returns, whereas an 
investment with a low standard deviation is described as having low volatility.40 Risk 
management requires careful attention to a particular investor’s tolerance for 
volatility.41 All things being equal, it is better to invest in a stock with a lower volatility. 
To illustrate this point, consider the following example:42 
Assume that an investment of R100 is made in two investments; one rises and falls in 
value by 50% each year while the other neither increases nor decreases. The first 
investment increases 50% after one year and is worth R150, but in year two, falls in value 
to R75 and so on. After four years, this investment will be worth about R56 while the other 
investment will still be worth R100. Both have an average annual return of zero, but the 
more volatile investment has fallen in value. 
3 1 3 Determining the riskiness of an investment portfolio 
As mentioned in paragraph 3 1 above, Markowitz proposes that in designing a 
portfolio, an investor should be interested in the risk of the portfolio as well as its 
expected return:43  
 “My 1952 article on portfolio selection proposed expected (mean) return, E, and variance 
of return, V, of the portfolio as a whole as criteria for portfolio selection …” 
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Markowitz’s statement might appear remarkably self-evident. According to 
Hagstrom, however, it was a revolutionary concept in the 1950s:44 
“Until that time, investors gave very little thought to managing a portfolio or to the concept 
of risk. Portfolios were constructed haphazardly. If a manager thought a stock was going 
to go up in price, it was simply added to the portfolio. No other thinking was required.” 
Support for this statement can be found in Markowitz’s 1952 article:45 
“There is a rule which implies both that the investor should diversify and that he should 
maximize expected return. The rule states that the investor does (or should) diversify his 
funds among all those securities which give maximum expected return.” 
According to Markowitz, the strategy of investing in securities that provide the 
greatest return lacked “a measure of risk”.46 In other words, what was missing was a 
way of determining the riskiness of an entire investment portfolio. So, Markowitz 
found a way of calculating the riskiness of the portfolio as a whole. The method 
Markowitz chose for determining the riskiness of an entire investment portfolio was 
“co-variance”.47 This method requires explaining. 
As already discussed, a portfolio’s return is equal to the weighted average return 
of its individual assets. 48  The procedure for determining the expected standard 
deviation of portfolio returns is, however, more complex. One might think the 
riskiness of a portfolio is simply the weighted average variance of all the individual 
stocks in the portfolio. While variance may provide a gauge regarding the riskiness of 
an individual stock, the average of two variances does not provide a measure for the 
riskiness of a two-stock portfolio. The variance and, therefore, the standard deviation 
of a portfolio is not merely the sum of the variances of the individual stocks that 
make up the portfolio. 49  The solution is co-variance. Co-variance is a statistical 
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measure of how one investment moves in relation to another.50 If two investments 
tend to be up or down during the same time periods, then the two investments have 
positive co-variance. 51  If the highs and lows of one investment move in perfect 
coincidence to that of another investment, then the two investments have perfect 
positive co-variance. In the extreme case of perfect positive co-variance, the 
standard deviation of the portfolio will simply be the weighted average of the two 
investments.52 If one investment tends to rise in value at the same time as another 
falls in value, then the two investments have negative co-variance.53 One could also 
say that the two investments are negatively correlated.54 If there is no discernible 
pattern to the up-and-down cycles of one investment compared with another, then 
the two investments have no co-variance. 
By combining investments that do not go up and down in value at the same time 
as one another, one can reduce the risk of a portfolio. To appreciate this statement, 
consider the following familiar example:55 
Assume that an investor has the opportunity to invest in two businesses – one that sells 
suntan lotion and the other umbrellas. If the investor decides only to invest in the suntan 
lotion manufacturer, he will do well when the sun is shining but not so well when it is 
raining. Conversely, if the investor only purchases shares in the umbrella manufacturer, 
he will suffer a fall in the value of his investment during sunny periods, but experience a 
rise during rainy periods. Now consider what will happen if the investor invests half of his 
money in the suntan lotion manufacturer and the other half in the umbrella manufacturer. 
The value of the combined portfolio will not suffer the ups and downs of the individual 
holdings; the ups and downs will cancel each other out. Abnormally sunny or rainy 
weather will enhance one manufacturer’s profits even while it hurts the other 
manufacturer’s profits. The investor’s overall return will thus be the same as when 
investing all his money in one or the other. 
                                                            
50 Levy “The prudent investor rule: theories and evidence” (1994) 1 Geo Mason U LR 1 13; B Goodall, 
L Rossini, M Botha, W Geach & L du Preez The South African Financial Planning Handbook (2017) 
para 21.6. 
51 Shipway (2009) T & T 68. 
52 Blair & Heggestad (1978) L F 91. 
53 Shipway (2009) T & T 68. 
54 Butler (1995) Bond LR 122. 
55  This example is a combination of Shipway’s deckchairs/umbrellas and Gordon’s suntan 
lotion/umbrellas examples: Shipway (2009) T & T 68 and JN Gordon “The puzzling persistence of the 




The normalised version of co-variance, namely the correlation coefficient, ranges 
from −1 to +1, and denotes the correlation between the returns on two assets.56 
Combining assets that have a low correlation with each other will produce a portfolio 
with a lower standard deviation than either of the individual assets. An example 
might be instructive. Levy, an American academic, provides the following example:57 
“The correlation coefficient between long-term government bonds and small capitalization 
stocks over the 10-year period ended June 30, 1992 was 0.155; the respective 
annualized standard deviations for these two assets were 11.8% and 21.4% (ie small 
capitalization stocks were nearly twice as volatile as long-term government bonds). Since 
the correlation is fairly low, combining the assets should stabilize return. In fact, the 
standard deviation of a portfolio allocated two-thirds to long-term government bonds and 
one-third to small capitalization stocks would be 11.2%.” 
3 1 4 Conclusion 
Markowitz points out that it is not simply the number of different stocks that 
investors own that matters. 58  Rather, when making portfolio decisions, investors 
should consider the relationship between the rate of return pattern of each asset 
versus each other asset in a portfolio.59 From Markowitz’s standpoint, in order to 
reduce a portfolio’s risk, investors should combine investments that do not go up and 
down in value at the same time as each other. In more technical terms, what is 
required is that the investments in a portfolio should have a low co-variance with 
each other.60 Markowitz thus not only encourages diversification, but argues for the 
“right kind” of diversification.61 Ruce refers to this type of diversification as “proper 
diversification”.62 An important point to highlight is that proper diversification reduces 
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a portfolio’s overall risk without reducing the anticipated return rate of the portfolio as 
a whole.63 
3 2 Sharpe’s contribution 
3 2 1 A simpler version of the Markowitz’s model 
The problem with Markowitz’s model as a practical matter, however, is that it 
requires countless co-variant calculations. 64  Where the number of stocks in a 
portfolio increases beyond two, it becomes difficult to calculate the co-variances 
between each set of stocks. According to Levy, with only 100 stocks there are 4 950 
pairs of co-variances to be considered.65 Fortunately, Sharpe developed a simpler 
version of Markowitz’s model. 
In 1963, Sharpe published his dissertation titled: “A simplified model of portfolio 
analysis”.66 He suggested that instead of calculating the co-variances between each 
set of stocks, one only has to calculate the relationship between each security and 
some underlying base factor. 67  For Sharpe the underlying base factor was the 
market as a whole.68 Sharpe’s volatility measure will be referred to as “beta”. Beta, 
also known as the beta coefficient, 69  measures how volatile an investment or 
portfolio is compared to the overall market.70 Stocks that rise and fall in value exactly 
in line with the market are assigned a beta of 1.0.71 Thus, a stock with a beta of 1.0 
moves up 10% when the market moves up 10% (and down 10% when the market 
moves down 10%).72 
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A portfolio’s beta is simply the weighted average of the betas of the stocks within 
the portfolio.73 Knowledge of the portfolio’s beta informs an investor of the riskiness 
of the portfolio.74 Any portfolio with a beta of less than 1.0 means the portfolio is less 
risky than the market as a whole. Similarly, a portfolio with a beta of more than 1.0 is 
riskier than the market. 
3 2 2 Systematic and unsystematic risk 
The other major contribution that Sharpe made to MPT was to introduce a far-
reaching concept called the capital asset pricing model (“CAPM”).75 According to the 
CAPM, it is preferable to separate risk into two components.76 Sharpe terms the first 
component “systematic risk”, 77  and the second component “unsystematic risk”. 78 
Systematic risk, also known as “market risk”, is the risk common to all securities and 
reflects general economic, political and social conditions.79 The systematic risk of a 
stock or a portfolio is measured by its beta.80 The other component of risk, namely 
unsystematic risk (also known as “non-market risk”,81 “unique risk”,82 “residual risk”,83 
“independent risk”,84 or “firm-specific risk”85), refers to the risk that surrounds an 
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individual security and is peculiar to that security. For example, a company’s 
profitability can be affected by “the loss of an important customer, by the unexpected 
death of a senior executive, by litigation or regulatory problems, by labour strikes, or 
other events unique to that company”.86 
Systematic risk cannot be diversified away within a market. 87  In view of this, 
systematic risk is also known as “undiversifiable risk”. 88  Unsystematic risk, by 
contrast, can be reduced greatly through diversification.89 Hence, unsystematic risk 
is sometimes called “diversifiable risk”.90 By diversifying their portfolios, investors can 
theoretically reduce all unsystematic risk, since stocks do not react to events in the 
same way. 91  According to the CAPM, since investors do not have to bear 
unsystematic risk, they are not automatically compensated by higher returns in the 
marketplace for incurring the extra risk. 92  To illustrate this point, consider the 
following example by Manns:93 
“The rate of return of a company’s shares is the same for all investors for the same period 
of time; those who own only Telecom are not rewarded with a higher rate of return on 
their Telecom shares compared to those Telecom shareholders who also own shares in 
other companies.” 
3 3 A sensible strategy for risk averse investors 
MPT generally assumes that investors are “risk averse”.94 This assumption of risk 
aversion is probably realistic for most investors. 95  According to Langbein and 
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Posner, risk aversion should even be more prevalent among trustees managing trust 
assets for the benefit of trust beneficiaries than among individual investors 
generally.96 Bines shares Langbein and Posner’s belief since he states that people 
managing other people’s assets are legally obligated to be risk averse.97 
Risk aversion does not mean that investors do not want to take any risk. Rather, it 
means that given two investments that offer the same level of return, investors will 
generally choose the less risky investment.98 Moreover, a risk averse investor will 
take on increased risk only if he is compensated by an appropriate increase in 
expected return,99 or any additional risk is justified by a lower price.100 
By diversifying his portfolio, an investor can theoretically reduce all unsystematic 
risk.101 The only risk remaining in the portfolio will be systematic risk.102 In contrast, 
there will be systematic risk and unsystematic risk in a non-diversified portfolio. The 
risk of a non-diversified portfolio will thus be higher than a diversified portfolio.103 
Conversely, the risk of a diversified portfolio will be lower than that of a non-
diversified portfolio. Consequently, a risk averse investor would diversify his 
portfolio.104 
Applying these rules to a portfolio of investments, an investor will endeavour to 
construct a portfolio containing assets that provide the lowest level of risk for a given 
rate of return or,105 alternatively, the highest rate of return for a given level of risk.106 
This is the so-called “efficient portfolio”. In an efficient portfolio, an investor will have 
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to accept additional risk to obtain a higher return,107 or give up returns to reduce the 
riskiness of the portfolio.108 According to Begleiter, there is an infinite number of 
efficient portfolios depending on the investor’s choice of risk or rate of return.109 
Investors will select their optimal portfolios based on their tolerances for risk.110 
Efficient portfolios plot graphically on the efficient frontier.111 The efficient frontier 
can be thought of as “a line in a graph, one axis of which is risk assumed and the 
other of which is return generated”. 112  This line represents the best possible 
combination from a range of assets.113  Any portfolio below the line is less than 
optimal. 114  Therefore, risk averse investors should only want to hold efficient 
portfolios.115 
3 4 The implication of the efficient capital market hypothesis  
The efficient capital market hypothesis (“ECMH”) is an idea partly developed by 
Eugene Fama.116 It is a particularly important concept, which is often coupled with 
MPT.117 The ECMH states that a market is efficient if the prices of securities in that 
market fully reflect all available information.118 In an efficient market, the prices of 
securities adjust quickly and in an unbiased manner to new information.119 Fama 
distinguishes between three forms of market efficiency:120 
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The strong form – both public and insider information are built into a security’s price. 
The semi-strong form – all publicly available information is built into a security’s price. 
The weak form – only historical performance is built into a security’s price. 
According to professors RW Vivian and C Auret from the University of the 
Witwatersrand, empirical evidence differentiates the JSE as a “semi-strong efficient 
market”. 
It is important to note that not all markets that may interest an investor will 
necessarily approximate closely to the efficiency model. The major areas where the 
markets are less efficient include: real estate; venture capital; foreign securities; 
financial derivatives such as managed futures; private equity; and hedged funds.121 
The ECMH has important implications for the conduct of investors. Supporters of 
the hypothesis believe that it is extremely difficult to “beat the market” (ie trying to 
earn a return greater than that of the market as a whole) consistently over an 
extended period of time.122 Begleiter explains why it is so difficult to outperform the 
market consistently:123 
“The reason for this is that to locate undervalued stocks, the investor must consistently 
discover information about companies that is not generally known. The ECMH says this is 
impossible because by the time such information is discovered, it has already been 
reflected in the price of the stock.” 
The implication of the ECMH taken together with MPT is that a prudent investor 
will follow a passive investment approach in an efficient market.124 Passive investing 
is discussed in paragraph 5 below. 
4 The lessons of MPT 
At the centre of MPT are a number of key lessons: first, MPT defines what 
constitutes return using the concept of total return. 125  The significance of this 
definition of return is that it gives people managing investment portfolios “greater 
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flexibility in assessing trade-offs between risk and reward by providing a much 
broader view of what constitutes return and, consequently, what justifies increased 
risks for the portfolio”.126 
Second, MPT teaches that the proper focus is on the “total portfolio”. 127  In 
contrast, proponents of FPT examine investments individually, build up portfolios of 
favoured stocks, and do not consider how the stocks in their portfolios relate to each 
other.128 MPT departs from this strategy by shifting emphasis from analysing the 
characteristics of individual investments to determining the statistical relationships 
among the individual stocks that comprise the overall portfolio. Markowitz shows that 
it is not simply the number of different stocks an investor owns that matters, but, 
rather, that it is the correlation of those stocks with one another that matters.129 
Therefore, the riskiness of a portfolio depends on the co-variance of its holdings and 
not on the average riskiness of the separate investments.130 Accordingly, decisions 
as to the particular investments included in the portfolio must be made by 
considering the role each investment plays in the whole portfolio. It is important to 
note that such decisions cannot be made in isolation.131  
Third, according to MPT, no asset or investment technique is inherently good or 
bad or prohibited per se as too risky.132 MPT’s focused attention on the portfolio as a 
whole means that injecting an asset that is highly volatile in itself into a portfolio is 
not necessarily illogical.133 Intuitively, it is not obvious that adding high-risk stocks 
(eg small capitalisation stocks) to a portfolio of low-risk investments (eg government 
bonds) would make the portfolio less risky than a portfolio composed entirely of low-
risk investments. But, as seen above, it is possible to reduce a portfolio’s risk by 
adding an asset that moves inversely to the other investments of the portfolio.134 
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MPT thus teaches that the true economic measure of a stock’s risk is its contribution 
to portfolio risk. 
Fourth, diversification is essential to the management of risk. The purpose of 
diversification is to reduce the unsystematic risk in a portfolio by investing in stocks 
that move in different ways in relation to one another. The only risk that will remain in 
the portfolio is systematic risk. Consequently, the volatility of a properly diversified 
portfolio will be lower than one that is not diversified. Importantly, this is achieved 
without lowering return expectations.135 
5 The implications of adhering to the tenets of MPT 
The major insight offered by MPT is that risks specific to an investment in any 
particular company may be virtually eliminated by holding a diverse portfolio of 
shares in other companies. As a result, the volatility of a properly diversified portfolio 
will be lower than one that is not diversified. Since there is no compensation for 
taking on extra risk, MPT indicates that investors should eliminate it.136 
Consequently, one of the strongest implications for an investor who adheres to the 
principles of MPT is that the investor will hold the “market portfolio”. 137  The 
hypothetical market portfolio represents the aggregate of all risky assets. For 
example, “if IBM represents one percent of all risky assets it represents one percent 
of the market portfolio”.138 The beta of the market portfolio is 1.0.139 
An appropriate step for an investor who wants to construct a portfolio that is near-
perfectly correlated with the market portfolio would be to place his funds in an index 
fund tracking a market index. These terms require clarification. An index fund is 
designed to match or track the components of an established index of stocks or 
some other investment type (eg fixed-income investments). 140  A market index is 
intended to represent an entire stock market. For example, a market index such as 
the Standard & Poor’s 500 index (“S&P 500”) is a broad representation of the United 
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States equity market.141 Typically, an index fund tracking a market index will contain 
all the securities covered by the market index in the same relative weight as their 
weight in the index. Hereafter, an index fund that is constructed to approximate the 
performance of a market index will be referred to as a “market index fund”.142  
A market index fund provides low operating expenses and low portfolio 
turnover.143 Investing in such a fund is regarded as a passive investment strategy. A 
passive investment strategy requires minimal input from the investor, relies on 
diversification, and buys many stocks in the same market to match the performance 
of a market index.144 In South Africa, investors can access index-tracking strategies 
either via unit trusts or exchange-traded funds (“ETFs”).145 
The aim of an investment in a market index fund is to generate the same expected 
return as a market portfolio. In other words, the investor expects the market rate of 
return.146 The question then becomes: what if the investor desires a higher expected 
return than that of the market as a whole or wishes to adjust portfolio risk 
downwards? 
5 1 Increasing expected return 
One method for an investor to increase the expected return of his portfolio is to 
cast out less risky stocks until the average beta of the remaining stocks is 2.0.147 
However, trying to increase the expected return by increasing the concentration in 
riskier securities in a portfolio is inefficient, because it introduces diversifiable risk 
into the portfolio.148 
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According to MPT, an increase in expected return is rather obtained by increasing 
exposure to market risk.149 So how does one increase exposure to market risk? The 
answer is that it is accomplished through leverage.150 By borrowing money to buy 
additional stocks, an investor can increase expected return without sacrificing any 
diversification.151 For example:152 
Suppose an investor has funds of R500 000. The investor borrows an additional 
R500 000, thus giving him R1 000 000 that he invests in a market index fund. He pays 
9% interest on the loan and the expected return on the market index fund is 12%. 
However, by using leverage, the expected rate of return on his portfolio increases to 
15%.153 
In the present example, the expected return after using leverage is higher than the 
return on the market index fund alone, but the beta of the investor’s portfolio is 
higher than the market index fund’s beta too. If, for example, the market declined by 
10%, the portfolio would be worth R900 000. Since the investor still owes R500 000 
to the lender, his net assets would be only R400 000. That is 20% less than before 
the decline of the market. The portfolio’s beta is thus 2.0.154 Langbein and Posner 
admit that leverage intensifies a portfolio’s reaction to events and increases its level 
of risk.155 However, they defend such a strategy with the following comparison:156 
“Indeed, the difference between the market portfolio levered to a beta of 1.5 and the 
individual stock having a beta of 1.5 is of almost metaphysical subtlety, since very often 
the reason a stock has a high beta is precisely that the company issuing it is highly 
levered (i.e., has a high proportion of debt in its capital structure).” 
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5 2 Adjusting risk downward 
An investor could also consider adjusting his risk downward. Suppose an investor 
wants half as much risk as the market as a whole exhibits (ie a portfolio that will have 
a beta of 0.5). As risk and return are inextricably linked,157 the investor must be 
willing to accept a lower return in exchange for less volatility.158 
One method is to do away with riskier stocks until the average beta of the 
remaining stocks in the portfolio is 0.5.159  The investor will thus hold a portfolio 
comprising of low-risk stocks.160 This will, however, have the effect of reducing the 
diversification of the portfolio.161 
According to MPT, the best method of achieving the desired risk/return 
combination is not by holding a portfolio of low-risk stocks, but rather to mix risky 
assets with relatively risk-free assets.162 In other words, securities with typically low 
betas, such as corporate or government bonds or other fixed-income investments, 
should be added to the portfolio to decrease the average beta of the portfolio to 
0.5.163 
5 3 Conclusion 
Casting out riskier stocks to reduce portfolio risk or increasing the concentration in 
riskier stocks to gain higher expected returns sacrifices diversification. A professional 
investment manager who fails to diversify adequately, raises the risk of his client’s 
portfolio above systematic risk,164 and the market does not compensate the client 
with higher returns. 165  No reasonable investment manager would add risk to a 
portfolio if he could achieve the client’s objectives with less risk. Stated differently, a 
reasonable investment manager would construct a non-diversified portfolio only if he 
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was certain that the strategy would produce an expected return equal to or above 
what he could achieve simply by raising systematic risk.166 
6 The integral role of professional investment managers 
Based on what has been discussed thus far, it may seem that the only rational 
strategy under MPT is to invest in a market index fund and borrow funds if a higher 
return is desired, or buy securities with low betas if less risk is required. This raises a 
crucial question: if the most efficient portfolio can be created by adopting a passive 
strategy, is there any need for expert assistance when investing in accordance with 
MPT? It is submitted that the answer to this question is yes. There are three reasons 
why investors require assistance from professional investment managers: first, 
different opinions exist regarding the extent of diversification required when investing 
according to MPT; second, there are professional skills involved in constructing a 
portfolio with different asset classes, monitoring its performance, and adjusting the 
asset allocation when circumstances change; and third, active management 
strategies might be necessary in certain situations. These reasons will now be 
considered. 
6 1 Different opinions regarding the extent of diversification 
According to Langbein and Posner, investing only in a market index fund, does 
not “exhaust the possibilities for diversification”.167 Begleiter states that:168 
“While the extent of diversification required is subject to dispute, the necessity of 
diversification is not”. 
Market index funds attempt to duplicate some market index,169 for example, the 
S&P 500. 170  The S&P 500 is broad representation of the United States equity 
market, but it does not contain such other asset classes as small stocks, real estate, 
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commodities, metals, and non-United States securities. 171  If MPT is taken to its 
logical conclusion, an investor should include some of each type of investment in his 
portfolio. Indeed, purists assert that an investor’s portfolio should theoretically 
include the aggregate of all risky assets.172 It may well be that investing in the full 
range of risky assets will be necessary since assets react differently to different 
events. 173  There are, for example, differences in performance of established 
companies and new enterprises, and these differences cannot be ignored.174 This is 
why some academics believe that adding certain assets to a portfolio (or investing in 
other markets) will make the portfolio more diversified than a pure market index fund. 
One of these academics, Halbach, suggests that investors should pursue an 
investment strategy that includes programmes involving real estate and venture 
capital.175 
Another academic, Levy, suggests that precious metals, foreign stocks and 
futures contracts should be added to a portfolio to contribute to the quality of the 
portfolio’s diversification. In his paper, Levy offers compelling evidence of the 
benefits of including these speculative, high-risk assets in a portfolio. He compared a 
market index fund that was 98.8% as diversified as the broad-based S&P 500 to 
what he called an “optimal portfolio”. In his comparison, the expected returns of each 
of the three investments, namely an index of metals stocks, an index of foreign 
stocks, and an index of futures contracts, were 10.2% – the same as the market 
index fund. The optimal portfolio’s resultant mix was 48% market index fund, 6% 
metals, 18% foreign stocks and 28% futures contracts. While the standard deviation 
of the market index fund was 15.3%, the standard deviation of the optimised portfolio 
turned out to be 11.9%. The result was nearly a 23% reduction in risk compared to 
the pure market index fund.176 
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Another academic, Gordon, suggests that adding foreign securities and futures 
contracts, and using options, will increase the diversification of a portfolio. 177 
According to Gordon, the returns from foreign companies respond to different 
economic factors than the returns from a country’s own firms, while futures and 
options enable an investor to “reshape the risk associated with owning a particular 
security”.178 
6 2 Maintaining an appropriate mixture of asset classes 
Under MPT, the role of a professional investment manager is to assist an investor 
in assembling a diversified portfolio with an appropriate level of systematic risk.179 
The appropriate level of risk depends on the investment objectives of the investor.180 
Determining the preferred risk automatically determines the expected return, and 
vice versa.181 
Suppose the beta coefficient of a certain market index fund is 0.86 and its 
standard deviation is 15.3%. The investor might not be willing to bear a standard 
deviation of 15.3%. As discussed above, the investment manager can lower the beta 
of the investor’s portfolio by adding asset classes with typically low betas.182 Such 
asset allocation determinations usually involve a relatively long-term structuring of 
the portfolio.183 However, the investor’s investment objectives might change.184 This 
will require the investment manager to adjust the portfolio’s asset allocation to suit 
the investor’s new objectives. 
It should be pointed out that MPT does not allow for tactical portfolio manipulation. 
To be more specific, the theory does not support an approach where an investment 
manager makes strategic shifts among asset classes in an attempt to take 
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advantage of market opportunities or in response to changes in the economic 
environment.185 
Another challenge to portfolio construction is that the correlations among assets 
do not remain constant. The correlations among asset class returns change over 
time or in particular circumstances.186 The investment manager will have to change 
the portfolio’s mix of assets when correlations break down.187 
Investors require assistance from professional investment managers since 
professional skills are required to construct a diversified portfolio with different asset 
classes, monitor its performance, and adjust the asset allocation when an investor’s 
objectives change or the correlations between assets break down. 
6 3 The need for active management 
Active management strategies might be necessary in certain situations. Active 
investing is when a professional investment manager trades stocks under 
conventional stock-picking principles following research that suggests opportunities 
for outperforming the market. 188  Active investment requires high levels of 
competence and special skills.189 
There are two situations where the use of active investing strategies might be 
appropriate: first, where the market in which an investor wants to operate does not 
approximate closely to the efficiency model; 190  and second, where an active 
investing strategy will make the equity component of the portfolio more diversified 
and thus less risky. The first situation is fairly easy to understand, and the major 
areas where the markets are less efficient are listed above.191 The second situation 
requires explaining. 
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One of the characteristics of the South African stock market is that it is highly 
concentrated:192 
“Currently Naspers, the largest company in South Africa by market capitalisation, makes 
up over 20% of the SWIX [shareholder weighted] Top 40 Index: it would take the 16 
biggest companies in the S&P 500 Index to make up the equivalent weighting of Naspers 
in that market … Prior to the rise of Naspers, it was the resources sector that dominated 
the local market, comprising nearly 50% of the SWIX Top 40 Index value at the top of the 
resources cycle.” 
One way of addressing the issue of high market concentration is by using “core-
satellite investing”. Financial intermediaries developed core-satellite investing in the 
United States in the 1970s.193 In their 1977 article, Langbein and Posner refer to this 
approach as the “core/noncore concept”;194 these days, financial intermediaries refer 
to it as core-satellite investing.195 Core-satellite investing involves investing in a core 
portfolio, typically a market index fund, as well as in actively managed separate 
portfolios.196 The general principle that the investments in the portfolio should not be 
closely correlated, remains. Therefore, the style or stock selection of the satellite 
portfolios should be different from the core portfolio. An example of core-satellite 
investing in a South African context would be the following: 197 
“A core portfolio that tracks a large-capitalisation index, such as the FTSE/JSE Top 40, 
could be complemented by satellite portfolios with exposure to managers that specialise 
in small capitalisation shares.” 
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According to Langbein and Posner, the fact that core-satellite investing involves a 
major commitment to a passive investment strategy is a point in its favour. 198 
Combining active and passive strategies requires expert assistance; the involvement 
of a professional investment manager is thus essential. 
7 Conclusion 
Technically speaking, MPT comprises Harry Markowitz’s portfolio selection theory, 
which was first introduced in 1952, and William Sharpe’s contributions to the theory 
of financial asset price formation, which was introduced in 1963 and came to be 
known as the CAPM. Markowitz admits that the diversification of investments has 
been a well-established practice long before he published his paper on portfolio 
selection in 1952. However, what was lacking prior to 1952 according to Markowitz 
was “an adequate theory of investment that covered the effects of diversification 
when risks are correlated, distinguished between efficient and inefficient portfolios, 
and analysed risk-return trade-offs on the portfolio as a whole”.199 MPT solved this 
problem because it deals with the effects of diversification when risks are correlated, 
distinguishes between efficient and inefficient portfolios, and creates a mathematical 
framework that allows investors to have some idea of the risk and return that they 
might expect from the combination when mixing individual investments. 
There are a number of key lessons at the centre of MPT: first, MPT defines what 
constitutes return using the concept of total return; second, when managing an 
investment portfolio, the focus should be on the total portfolio and not on the 
individual investments; third, no asset or investment technique is inherently good or 
bad or prohibited per se as too risky; and fourth, diversification is essential to the 
management of risk. Chapters 4 to 6 will illustrate how these lessons have been 
incorporated into the trust law of the respective foreign jurisdictions. 
There are three reasons why investors require expert assistance when investing 
in accordance with MPT: first, different opinions exist regarding the extent of 
diversification required when investing according to MPT; second, professional skills 
are required to construct a portfolio with different asset classes, monitor its 
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performance, and adjust the asset allocation when circumstances change; and third, 
active management strategies might be necessary in certain situations. 
Butler summarises the advantage of MPT as follows:200 
“The advantage of the theory is that a careful application of its principles allows an 
investor to aim for reasonably good returns with a greater degree of security than was 
possible under previously popular models of investment behaviour.” 
The main reason why investors are capable of achieving a greater degree of 
security under MPT is due to the theory’s emphasis on diversification or, to be more 
precise, its emphasis on the “right kind” or “proper” diversification. In order to reduce 
a portfolio’s overall risk, MPT requires an investor to combine investments that do 
not go up and down in value at the same time. The chapter demonstrated that this 
type of diversification is highly effective in reducing risk without reducing expected 
return. It is submitted, therefore, that MPT presents a better account of risk and 
safety, and thus a better guide to prudent investment, than other models of 
investment behaviour. 
Taking the above-mentioned into consideration, MPT emerges as a highly 
attractive investment decision tool for investors in general. It should be borne in mind 
that an individual investor is free to accept more risk than necessary in constructing 
his portfolio. A greater opportunity for high gain may, for example, excite the investor 
enough to outweigh the greater risk associated with his portfolio. Such an attitude, 
however, is not an appropriate course of action for a professional investment 
manager who, in most cases, is required to ensure an appropriate risk level in light of 
the needs of his client and is obliged to be risk averse. Risk aversion means that 
given two investment portfolios that offer the same level of return, the investor will 
choose the less risky one. The chapter illustrated that the risk of a diversified 
portfolio is lower than the risk of a non-diversified portfolio. Consequently, a risk 
averse investment manager would choose a diversified portfolio. In doing so, the 
investment manager is able to provide his client with good returns and a greater 
degree of security than is possible under other theories of investment. It is submitted, 
therefore, that an investment strategy based on MPT is the best possible approach 
for someone managing someone else’s assets. 
                                                            




Chapters 4 to 6 will attempt to confirm this last statement by showing the benefits 






CHAPTER 4 – THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRUSTEES’ INVESTMENT STANDARDS 
IN NEW YORK 
1 Introduction 
This chapter describes and analyses the development of trustees’ investment 
standards in New York. An examination of the trust law in New York indicates that 
trustees are judged by a rule based on modern portfolio theory (“MPT”) – the prudent 
investor rule.1 Previously, the prudent man rule governed the way trustees invested.2 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide answers to four important questions: first, 
what are the main characteristics of the prudent man rule? Second, why did the 
prudent man rule need modernisation? Third, what set the stage for the evolution 
from the prudent man rule to the prudent investor rule? Fourth, what changes were 
made to trustee investment standards and what are the core features of the prudent 
investor rule? In answering these questions, the chapter explains the problems that 
trustees face when they are unable to rely on a rule based on MPT, provides a better 
understanding of the benefits and features of the prudent investor rule, and 
illustrates which areas of trustee investment have to change in order for reform to 
occur. 
Following this introduction, the chapter is divided into five sections, which are 
summarised in the conclusion at the end of the chapter. Section 2 briefly discusses 
the influence that England had on the development of trustee investment practices in 
nineteenth-century United States, as well as the differences that existed regarding 
trustee investing between these two countries. Following this discussion, the section 
details the historical evolution of trustee investment standards in the United States 
from 1830 to 1930. Section 3 describes what led to the majority of states adopting 
the prudent man rule after 1930. The section explains how the position in New York 
differed from other states and that it took another 40 years before New York’s 
version of the prudent man rule was legislated. The remaining part of section 3 
clarifies the main features of New York’s prudent man rule and compares its features 
with the version of the prudent man rule that governed trustee investing in most other 
states. Section 4 discusses criticism by certain authors and academics of the 
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prudent man rule that most states adopted from 1976 to 1987. Section 5 describes 
the prudent investor rule as formulated in New York’s Prudent Investor Act. The 
section demonstrates the progression of trustees’ investment standards by 
discussing the fundamental changes made by the Act, some of the key features of 
the new rule, and the effect of the new standard on trustee investing. Section 6 
presents a major criticism of New York’s prudent investor rule and considers whether 
the criticism of the rule is justified. 
2 The early development of trustees’ investment standards 
2 1 A shortage of safe investments 
England greatly influenced the development of trustee investment practices in 
nineteenth-century United States.3 The English rules for trust fund investing were the 
product of financial disaster.4  It is thus understandable that the rules were quite 
conservative.5 The rules were largely designed to protect beneficiaries from losses 
caused by speculative investments.6 The English Court of Chancery developed a list 
of presumptively proper investments for trustees.7 Trustees were generally limited to 
investing in government securities, such as British consols,8 and first mortgages.9 
England’s influence resulted in the United States later adopting England’s legal list.10 
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The conditions in the early United States, however, were both economically and 
politically quite different from those in England.11 The United States did not have a 
developed financial market or a stable government capable of issuing and backing 
government securities of an equivalent rating to British consols. 12  This led to a 
shortage of “safe” trustee investments that were regularly available in England.13 
This shortage encouraged the majority of American trustees to direct their 
investments toward promising industrial enterprises instead.14 As a result, it became 
necessary for American courts to deliberate whether trustees could take part in a 
more extensive range of trust investments.  
2 2 The traditional prudent man rule 
In Harvard College v Amory 15  (“Amory”), the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts rejected the conservative English approach requiring investment in 
government securities only.16 The material facts of the case were as follows: the 
testator bequeathed $50 000 in trust for the maintenance of his wife during her life.17 
Upon his wife’s death, the remainder of the trust was to be divided equally between 
Harvard College and the Massachusetts General Hospital. 18  The trustees were 
directed to invest the $50 000 in safe and productive stocks. It was clear that the 
testator did not intend to limit the investments simply to interest-bearing bonds.19 The 
trustees purchased shares in manufacturing and insurance company stocks. These 
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shares subsequently fell in value.20 The college and the hospital brought suit alleging 
that the trustees acted imprudently by investing in corporate stocks.21 
The court pointed out that it was not appropriate merely to dismiss investments in 
stocks as safe or unsafe.22 The court recognised that property management in the 
United States has always been necessarily speculative.23  Furthermore, the court 
also realised that no investment in the United States was universally “safe”. As 
Putnam J said, “Do what you will, the capital is at a hazard”. 24  For example, 
investments in public debt were not completely “safe”:25 
“If the public funds are resorted to, what becomes of the capital when the credit of the 
government shall be so much impaired as it was at the close of the last war?” 
Based upon the understanding that the trust fund is always subject to some risk 
regardless of the investment choices of the trustees, the court upheld the trustees’ 
investment.26 Putnam J expressed the new rule as follows:27 
“All that can be required of a trustee, is that he shall conduct himself faithfully and 
exercise sound discretion. He is to observe how men of prudence, discretion, and 
intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the 
permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the 
probable safety of the capital to be invested.” 
The rule formulated in Amory can be referred to as the “Massachusetts prudent 
man rule”,28 the “common law prudent man rule”,29 the “American version of the 
prudent man standard”,30 the “flexible prudent man rule”,31 the “original prudent man 
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rule”,32 or the “prudent man rule” as traditionally understood.33 Hereafter it is referred 
to as the “traditional prudent man rule”. 
There are three important observations to be made here regarding the traditional 
prudent man rule: first, in making investment decisions, trustees were subject to the 
prevailing standard of how prudent men handled their own affairs, and not how 
prudent men safeguarded the property of others.34 Second, the rule did not draw 
distinctions between categories of “proper” and “improper” investments,35 but relied 
on the skill and care of the trustees to protect the trust investments. Grosh observes 
that:36 
“This [Putnam’s statement] is very broad language and its thrust is clearly that it is not the 
type of investment which is important (provided it is one that pays income), but rather the 
reasonableness of the investment in light of all relevant factors, and the exercise of care 
in making the investment.” 
Third, the rule directed trustees not to speculate.37 Trustees were thus not allowed 
to enter into transactions for a quick turnover or profit.38 It is worth pointing out that it 
was “speculation” that was prohibited, and not investing in “speculative investments”. 
Trustees could invest in speculative investments in certain circumstances:39 
“…a trustee only needed to exercise good judgment and the care of a prudent man in 
order for the courts to interpret even speculative investments such as common stocks as 
prudent.”  
2 3 Narrowing of the traditional prudent man rule  
Initially, the investment rule in New York was stated in terms not much different 
from those promulgated in Amory. However, over time, the rule began to be 
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narrowed in practice in important respects.40 Nearly forty years after Amory, the rule 
was re-examined by the New York State Court of Appeals in King v Talbot 41 
(“Talbot”). 
In Talbot, the testator died in 1845 and left to each of his three minor children a 
sum of $15 000 in trust. At first, the trustees invested the funds in United States 
treasury notes and state bonds, but eventually sold these investments and took the 
profits and purchased stocks in various corporations. The investments 
underperformed, and the beneficiaries sued the trustees. 42  The court ruled 
investments in equities to be improper for responsible trust administration.43 From 
this conclusion, the court held that the beneficiaries had the right to reject the stock 
investments.44 In rendering its decision, the court explained that a trustee was bound 
to:45 
“…employ such diligence and such prudence in the care and management, as in general, 
prudent men of discretion and intelligence in such matters, employ in their own like 
affairs.” 
The court then listed the types of investments excluded by the standard adopted 
in Talbot:46 
“This necessarily excludes all speculation, all investments for an uncertain and doubtful 
rise in the market, and, of course, everything that does not take into view the nature and 
object of the trust, and the consequences of a mistake in the selection of the investment 
to be made.” 
The court’s ruling as a whole reflected the feeling that trustees should only invest 
in secure investments.47 The court’s stance of preferring secure investments was 
prompted by three factors: first, the court held that “the preservation of the fund, and 
the procurement of a just income therefrom, are primary objects of the creation of the 
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trust itself, and are to be primarily regarded”.48 Second, the court implied that there 
were two kinds of prudence – one for businessmen generally, and one for managers 
of trust funds:49 
“If it be said, that men of the highest prudence do, in fact, invest their funds in such 
stocks, becoming subscribers and contributors thereto, in the very formation thereof, and 
before the business is developed, and in the exercise of their judgment, on the probability 
of its safety and productiveness, the answer is, so do just such men, looking to the hope 
of profitable returns, invest money in trade, and adventures of various kinds. In their 
private affairs, they do, and they lawfully may, put their principal funds at hazard; in the 
affairs of a trust they may not. The very nature of their relation to it forbids it.” 
Third, the court viewed investments in stocks as dangerous because it removes 
the trust assets from the control and discretion of the trustees. The court reasoned 
as follows:50 
“The moment the fund is invested in bank, or insurance, or railroad stock, it has left the 
control of the trustees; its safety and the hazard, or risk of loss, is no longer dependent 
upon their skill, care, or discretion …” 
In addition to these three factors, the economic factors at the time also seem to 
have influenced the court in adopting its stance. First, government bonds were 
available in greater quantities by 1869 than in 1830 when Amory was decided. 
Woodruff J had little doubt that government bonds would retain their value and 
continue to be a safe means of trust investment.51 Second, the American Civil War, 
fought in the United States from 1861 to 1865, caused the destruction of many 
private companies, which encouraged the view that purchasing shares in a company 
was not safe.52 
In summary, Talbot dramatically narrowed the traditional prudent man rule. 53 
Trustees had to place a greater emphasis on safety in selecting investments. The 
                                                            
48 King v Talbot 40 N.Y. 76 (1869) 86. 
49 89. 
50 88. 
51 Laurino (1977) St John’s LR 719 footnote 15. 
52 Phillips (1997) Wash & Lee LR 340-341; Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on the Law of 
Trusts (1984) Volume 1 207. 




court in effect restricted trustees’ choice of investments to government bonds and 
mortgages,54  and forbade investment in corporate stocks.55 
2 4 Legal lists 
The decision in Talbot, setting forth court-sanctioned investments, subsequently 
led to the passage of a New York statute in 1889 governing permissible trust 
investments.56 This marked the beginning of so-called “legal lists”. Legal lists were 
essentially “lists of investments that a legislature has deemed prudent”.57 Designed 
to protect trust beneficiaries from inexperienced or ignorant trustees,58 the legal lists 
contained mainly government bonds59 and mortgages.60 
By 1900, only a handful of states continued to follow the traditional prudent man 
rule.61 Thus, only a few states permitted trustee investment in common stocks.62 
Settlors who wanted their trustees to invest in stocks or other types of property had 
to provide so in their trust instruments.63 The restrictive New York position soon 
became dominant among the states. For example, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, 
Illinois, California and all Northwest territory jurisdictions developed legal lists that 
specified which classes of investments were eligible for trust portfolios.64 
                                                            
54 PG Haskell “The prudent person rule for trustee investment and modern portfolio theory” (1990) 69 
North Carolina LR 87 89; Tralins (1983) U Baltimore LR 211. 
55 Langbein (1996) Iowa LR 643 footnote 24. 
56 Tralins (1983) U Baltimore LR 211-212. 
57 Johnson (1993) Syracuse LR 1176. 
58 Tralins (1983) U Baltimore LR 212. 
59 Blair & Heggestad (1978) Law Forum 86. 
60 A Fleming “Prudent investments: the varying standards of prudence” (1977) 12 Real Prop Prob & Tr 
J 243 224. 
61 Blair & Heggestad (1978) Law Forum 86. It should be pointed out that there is no “American law of 
trusts”. Instead, the law of trusts is governed by each separate state as a matter of property law: Ruce 
(2012) South Texas LR 677; New Zealand Law Commission Review of the Law of Trusts – 
Introductory Issues Paper (2010) Issues Paper 19 47; BR Hauser “United States” in A Kaplan, BR 
Hauser & P Ogden (eds) Trusts in Prime Jurisdictions 2 ed (2006) 315 319. 
62 Haskell (1990) North Carolina LR 90. 
63 Fleming (1977) Real Prop Prob & Tr J 244. 




3 Scott’s prudent man rule 
3 1 The restrictive nature of legal lists 
By 1930, most states followed the legal list approach. 65 However, two factors 
became operative, which focused attention upon the restrictive nature of the legal list 
approach and led to its decline: first, the stock market crash of 1929 showed that 
many of the apparently “safe investments” did not offer adequate protection to 
beneficiaries’ capital. 66  The markets collapsed in October 1929 and the United 
States descended into the Great Depression.67 Equities were the first to be affected 
by the depression. 68  For example, In re Chamberlain’s Estate 69  (“Chamberlain’s 
Estate”) involved an estate settlement in which the testator died immediately before 
the great market collapse. The bulk of the assets in the estate were stocks listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange. Between the death of the testator and the date of the 
court hearing, the estate reduced from $258 000 to less than $200 000. 70  Bond 
values held up fairly well during this initial period.71 But eventually, and without much 
delay, all types of investments were grievously affected. For example, “guaranteed” 
mortgage bonds stood in default and railroad bonds declined with disheartening 
rapidity.72 
Second, after 1933, states that operated under the prudent man concept (in one 
form or another) provided beneficiaries with a greater return on investments. With 
the emergence of a new financial scene, the investment options in these states were 
much wider, which created an opportunity to maintain a much higher yield on trust 
portfolios.73 For example, the yield on portfolios limited to legal list investments did 
not exceed 2% on average, while it was comparatively easy to maintain a 4% yield in 
the states that followed a prudent man standard.74 
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The combined effect of these two factors led to a movement to abandon the legal 
list approach and to replace it with a broader, more flexible standard. The pressure in 
the legal list states mounted, not for wider lists, but for trustees to have the right to 
choose “the best investments for their particular trust”.75 Out of the movement came 
the Model Investment Statute developed by the Trust Division of the American 
Bankers Association. From 1940, the statute was adopted (with minor variations) 
over the next two decades in the majority of the states. The statute picked up the key 
phrases in Amory and thus reflected the traditional prudent man rule. However, the 
standard was too general and did not provide trustees with the necessary 
guidelines:76 
“The certainty of the old ‘legal list’ had been replaced by an amorphous standard which 
read well on first impression and seemed to sanction flexibility and selection according to 
concepts current at the time of investment but which, in fact, created problems because 
the standard was so very general and devoid of specific guidance to the trustee.” 
Consequently, the courts turned to Scott’s work for guidance. Scott is the reporter 
of the first Restatement of Trusts (“Restatement (First)”), published in 1935, and the 
second Restatement of Trusts (“Restatement (Second)”), published in 1959.77 The 
relevant sections on trustee investing in these two restatements are virtually 
identical. He is also the author of the leading treatise on trusts, namely The Law of 
Trusts, first published in 1939 (first edition), and revised and updated in 1956 
(second edition), and 1967 (third edition). The third edition was updated with pocket 
parts until his death in 1981. The publisher has continued the updates.78 Hereafter, 
the first three editions of Scott’s Treatise on trusts is referred to as “Scott’s Treatise”.  
Scott’s work has played a pivotal role in the legal understanding of trustees’ 
investment functions. In this area, most cases and commentaries cited either Scott’s 
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Treatise or the Restatements of Trusts as authoritative sources, or relied on 
formulations derived from these two sources.79 Therefore, from 1940 to 199280 what 
was ordinarily understood as the “prudent man rule”,81 was in fact the traditional 
prudent man rule as influenced by the work of Scott.82 This version of the prudent 
man rule is hereafter referred to as “Scott’s prudent man rule”. 
3 2 The position in New York 
Despite the majority of the states adopting Scott’s prudent man rule, New York’s 
1889 statute (with various amendments) continued in effect in New York until 1950.83 
Responding to pressures from the New York State Bankers Association,84 the first 
break from the legal list approach came with a statute permitting investment up to 
50% of the total market value of the trust fund in corporate stocks.85 Tralins states 
that this was a significant change for New York, the leading legal list jurisdiction.86 
However, relatively few equities were eligible under the new statute since they had to 
meet stringent fixed requirements such as high ratings by investment services, and 
excellent earnings and dividend records.87 The final break from the rigid legal list 
approach came in 1970.88 New York legislated New York’s version of the prudent 
man rule. The rule is hereafter referred to as New York’s prudent man rule. 
3 3 The main features of New York’s prudent man rule 
This section discusses the main features of New York’s prudent man rule and 
compares it with the corresponding features of Scott’s prudent man rule. 
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3 3 1 No duty to protect against inflation 
In 1970, no authority existed to suggest that trustees had to invest to protect trust 
capital from erosion by inflation. In fact, Matter of Kilmer89 (“Kilmer”) signalled quite 
the opposite by denying the existence of a general duty to invest with an eye to 
inflation. 
In Kilmer, the capital beneficiaries of a testamentary trust claimed that the trustees 
had a duty to invest in common stocks to preserve the value of the capital of the 
trust.90 The surrogate held for the trustees for two reasons:91 first, the words of the 
will that established the trust showed that the testator’s main concern was the 
welfare of his widow, the income beneficiary. This justified a course of investment 
that favoured her.92 Second, the surrogate denied the existence of a general duty to 
invest to protect against inflation.93 
Scott’s Restatement (Second) recognised that inflationary concerns were a proper 
consideration when making investment decisions. The “likelihood of inflation” was 
listed in the comments to section 227 of the Restatement (Second) as the last of ten 
factors that trustees should consider in selecting investments. 94  However, 
recognising that inflationary concerns are a proper consideration when making 
investment decisions is very different from imposing a duty to invest in a manner that 
compensates for inflation.95 
3 3 2 No speculative investments 
In making investments, trustees were not authorised to make or retain trust 
investments that were speculative, even where the investments were “of such 
promise and character that a prudent person might make them for himself”.96 The 
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antecedents of the rule can be traced to Talbot, in which the New York State Court of 
Appeals stated:97 
“[T]he trustee is bound to employ such diligence and such prudence in the care and 
management as in general, prudent men of discretion and intelligence in such matters, 
employ in their own like affairs. This necessarily excludes all speculation, all investments 
for an uncertain and doubtful rise in the market, and, of course, everything that does not 
take into view the nature and object of the trust, and the consequences of a mistake in 
the selection of the investment to be made.” 
Speculative investments were also forbidden under the Restatement (Second).98 
3 3 3 The isolation approach 
New York’s prudent man rule required trustees to evaluate prudence one 
investment at a time. The Restatement (Second) also required that the prudence of 
each investment is assessed without regard to the context of the whole portfolio.99 
This requirement can be referred to as the “individual asset rule”,100 the “item-by-
item approach”,101 or the “isolation approach”.102 The rule is hereafter referred to as 
the isolation approach. Opposite to the isolation approach is the “total portfolio 
approach”.103 This approach determines the prudence of trustees’ performance by 
analysing the performance of the total portfolio rather than by considering each 
individual investment in a portfolio separately.104 
The isolation approach derives from In re Bank of New York (Spitzer) 105 
(“Spitzer”). 106  In Spitzer, a guardian ad litem was appointed to represent the 
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beneficiaries of a bank’s common trust fund. 107  The guardian challenged the 
prudence of four of the bank’s investment decisions.108 Although the entire fund 
recorded a gross gain of $1 700 000, there were losses amounting to $238 000. The 
Surrogate’s Court held for the bank on two of the four investments. Both sides 
appealed. The Appellate Division held for the bank on all four investments on the 
basis that the nett gain to the trust precluded any need for objections.109 The New 
York State Court of Appeals affirmed the determination of the Appellate Division110 
but rejected the basis for the Appellate Division’s ruling. Referring to Talbot and 
Scott’s Treatise as authority, the court stated:111 
“The fact that this portfolio showed substantial overall increase in total value during the 
accounting period does not insulate the trustee from responsibility for imprudence with 
respect to individual investments for which it would otherwise be surcharged.”  
The Court of Appeals explained that nett increases should not insulate trustees 
from being held accountable for all of their investment decisions; the reasoning being 
that if trustees had this kind of immunity in rising markets, it might encourage 
unwarranted risk-taking in an effort to recover other losses.112 The Court of Appeals 
held that with respect to each investment the trustee acted prudently.113 
Academics interpreted the dictum of Spitzer to determine that each individual 
investment in a trust portfolio must be justified independently. In their 1976 article, 
Langbein and Posner state:114 
“The courts characteristically apply the prudent-man standard to each investment 
decision of the trustee rather than to the trust portfolio as a whole.”  
Fleming in his 1977 article states:115 
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“As recently as 1974, the New York Court of Appeals in Matter of Bank of New York 
(Spitzer), affirmed, again, the rule of individual, rather than total, performance.” 
Laurino writing in 1977 and referring to Spitzer and a 1949 case as authority 
states:116 
“New York courts, to a large extent, have determined the prudence of a trustee’s 
performance by examining each investment in question rather than by considering the 
performance of the fund portfolio as an entirety.” 
Bobo writing in 1984 and referring to Spitzer as authority states:117 
“At common law, the fiduciary was required to defend the performance of each individual 
investment in the portfolio.” 
In contrast to the interpretation of these academics, a 1997 New York State Court 
of Appeals case, Matter of Janes118 (“Janes”), found that New York common law was 
entirely consistent with the total portfolio approach. The position was stated to be as 
follows:119 
“…the various factors affecting the prudence of any particular investment must be 
considered in the light of the ‘circumstances of the trust itself rather than merely the 
integrity of the particular investment’.” 
Notwithstanding the finding in Janes, it is submitted that the correct interpretation 
of the dictum of Spitzer indeed correlates with that of the four academics above. The 
academics wrote their findings shortly after the case was decided, whereas the 
judges in Janes wrote their judgment 23 years after Spitzer. In addition, as discussed 
in paragraph 6 5 below, the judges in Janes were influenced by the Restatement 
(Third) of Trusts (“Restatement (Third)”) and the New York Prudent Investor Act that 
was promulgated in 1994. 
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3 3 4 No duty to diversify  
In the 1970s, it was a well-established rule in New York trust law that there was no 
absolute duty to diversify. 120  In other words, prudence did not require 
diversification.121 This was known as “the optional diversification principle”.122 
In contrast, the Restatement (Second) required diversification; 123  albeit a very 
specific form of diversification. Trustees were required to evaluate the prudence of 
each investment separately in a diversified portfolio.124 Thus, trustees could only 
diversify among non-speculative investments 125  because none other was 
permitted. 126  This approach to diversification had two implications for the way 
trustees invested: first, trustees could not make use of passive investment 
strategies.127 For example, investing in a market index fund was prohibited because 
it exposed beneficiaries to the potentially speculative aspects of some of the stocks 
within the fund.128 Second, the Restatement (Second) encouraged investments in 
low-risk, low-return securities that were strongly positively correlated, and therefore, 
according to Blair, achieved little risk reduction regardless of portfolio 
diversification.129 
3 3 5 Delegating investment functions not allowed 
The delegation of trustees’ investment functions was prohibited under New York’s 
prudent man rule, unless the governing instrument expressly authorised it. 130 
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Trustees were allowed to obtain investment advice from professionals, but the 
trustees themselves had to make investment decisions.131 
This was also the view adopted in the Restatement (Second). Section 171 of the 
Restatement placed trustees under a duty to beneficiaries not to “delegate to others 
the doing of acts which the trustee can reasonably be required personally to 
perform”. 132  Courts widely interpreted section 171 to mean that trustees had to 
personally perform any duty that required the exercise of discretion, including the 
power to select investments.133 
4 Criticism of Scott’s prudent man rule 
The findings in economic and financial theory detailed in chapter 3 of the research 
developed independently of Scott’s prudent man rule. Trustees did not appear to be 
influenced by these findings.134 However, from 1976 to 1987, a group of authors and 
academics began to draw attention to the relevancy of MPT to trust investment 
practices and called for reform in trustee investing. The criticisms of these authors 
and academics are discussed in the paragraphs that follow. 
4 1 John Langbein and Richard Posner  
4 1 1 Introduction 
In 1976, two law professors, John Langbein and Richard Posner, then at the 
University of Chicago,135 published an article that brought the learning of economic 
and financial theorists to the attention of practicing attorneys and legal academics.136 
Langbein and Posner embraced the lessons of MPT and wanted to integrate those 
lessons into trust law. 137  Begleiter gives Langbein and Posner the credit for 
beginning the integration of economic and financial theory into the law of trust 
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investments.138 Their article contains two significant observations with respect to the 
legal standards that governed trustee investing: first, regarding the isolation 
approach and, second, regarding the delegation of investment decision-making. 
4 1 2 The isolation approach 
Langbein and Posner wanted to answer the question whether trustees could 
invest in a market index fund without thereby violating the legal standards that 
governed trustee investing.139 Suppose that the investment strategy of the trustees 
of a particular trust is to hold a market index fund. The isolation approach determines 
that the trustees must evaluate the merits of the individual securities in the fund.140 
Should the trustees find securities that are speculative, they must exclude them from 
the fund.141  However, such weeding out of speculative components of a market 
index fund is inconsistent with the fundamental premises of the market-fund 
approach.142 Langbein and Posner suggest that the trustees should be able to invest 
in the market index funds without having to inquire into the prudence of the individual 
securities constituting the fund. The only condition being that the risk/return 
characteristics of the market index fund are at least as attractive as those of an 
individual security that would be considered a prudent investment for the trustees.143 
From their discussion of market index funds, it is clear that Langbein and Posner 
endorse the total portfolio approach rather than the isolation approach. Further proof 
of their preference for the total portfolio approach is found in their discussion of the 
design of a trust portfolio. While discussing how to combine specific assets to form a 
trust portfolio, they state that the emphasis must be on the overall portfolio rather 
than the individual investments comprising the portfolio:144 
“… from the beneficiary’s standpoint – which is, of course, the relevant standpoint – what 
counts is the performance of the portfolio rather than the performance of its individual 
components. If the value of the portfolio rises from $500 000 to $600 000, what does it 
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matter to the beneficiary whether this increase resulted from a uniform 20 percent 
increase in the value of all of the assets in the portfolio or from larger gains in a few of the 
assets partially offset by losses in others? Conversely, if the portfolio has declined in 
value, it is of small comfort to the beneficiary to know that one of the components did 
spectacularly well rather than that all had declined. From the beneficiary’s standpoint, the 
portfolio is the relevant security.” 
4 1 3 Delegation of investment decision-making 
Langbein and Posner illustrate that when trustees invest in mutual funds,145  they 
are in actual fact violating the duty of non-delegation. By investing in mutual funds, 
trustees are delegating the selection of the individual securities that constitute the 
portfolio of the mutual fund to the mutual fund’s manager. The manager then 
engages in conventional stock picking.146 
Under Scott’s prudent man rule, trustees were not allowed to delegate investment 
decision-making. In response to the issue of trustees possibly being held to have 
violated the non-delegation rule, two solutions arose in practice: first, nearly half of 
the states passed legislation authorising trustees to invest in mutual funds; and 
second, settlors, testators and their attorneys included clauses authorising such 
investments into standard-form trust instruments.147 
Langbein and Posner offer a simpler solution. Their solution is that trustees should 
invest in a market index fund.148 The manager of such a fund buys or sells securities 
according to a predetermined plan and does not exercise discretion by evaluating 
specific securities in order to decide whether to buy or sell them.149 Accordingly, 
there is actually less delegation of a decision-making function by the trustees than in 
the case where they purchase shares in a conventional mutual fund. In effect, the 
manager of the market index fund simply executes the trustees’ decision to hold a 
market portfolio.150 
                                                            
145 Mutual funds are known in South Africa as collective investment schemes or unit trusts: see 
chapter 2 para 2 2 10. 
146 Langbein & Posner (1976) Am B Found Res J 23. 
147 22. 
148 23 
149 See chapter 3 para 5.  




In summary, the duty of non-delegation discouraged trustees from investing in 
mutual funds that invested in shares. Three possible solutions have been identified: 
passing legislation authorising investment in mutual funds; authorising such 
investments in trust instruments; or investing in market index funds instead of 
conventional mutual funds. Another solution, discussed in paragraph 6 3 below, is to 
change the law regarding the delegation of trustees’ functions in its entirety. 
4 2 Austin Fleming 
4 2 1 Introduction 
At about the same time as Langbein and Posner’s article, Austin Fleming, an 
attorney with a major bank, gave a presentation to a meeting of the largest 
organisation of trust and estate attorneys in the United States. 151  Fleming later 
published an article based on his remarks at the meeting.152 
4 2 2 A return to the traditional prudent man rule 
Fleming believes that the traditional prudent man rule was constrained by Scott’s 
Treatise and the Restatement (Second).153 In order to restore the rules regarding 
trustee investment standards, he advocates a return to the traditional prudent man 
rule:154 
“The language of Justice Putnam in Harvard College [Amory] that all that can be 
expected of a trustee is that he ‘conduct himself faithfully and exercise a sound 
discretion’, without being either a guarantor or a magician, comes hauntingly to mind and 
with it a hope that sensible courts in the land will yet harken to it and restore to a 
bewildered and frightened industry a rule of reason for trust investment action …” 
Fleming criticises Scott’s work as being primarily responsible for alterations to the 
traditional rule. For instance, Scott stated that the standard which a trustee must 
observe is not that which he would use in dealing with his own property, but that of 
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one who is a trustee of another’s property. This change in emphasis led courts to 
emphasise conservation, rule that the primary duty was to safeguard the trust fund, 
and distinguish between speculation and investment.155 
Furthermore, Fleming views the standard of prudence reflected in Scott’s work as 
static. Static means that the standard was not capable of adapting to “changing 
times”156 (eg rising inflation)157 and “changing notions of investment opportunity and 
risk-taking”158 (eg the findings of MPT).159 “Changing times” and “changing notions of 
investment opportunity and risk taking” are examples of general circumstances. 
(General circumstances should be distinguished from specific circumstances, which 
refer to the circumstances relevant to a particular trust.)160 Scott’s prudent man rule 
could thus not adjust to general circumstances. In contrast, the traditional prudent 
man rule could adjust to general circumstances.161 Therefore, trustees operating 
under the traditional prudent man rule were able to evaluate newer categories of 
investment on their merits, and determine if and how these categories might fit into a 
trust portfolio.162 
4 2 3 Deficiencies in Scott’s prudent man rule 
Fleming’s article emphasises a number of deficiencies in Scott’s prudent man rule: 
first, the isolation approach forces trustees to hold on to poor-performing 
investments. Fleming’s approach to the isolation approach differs from Langbein and 
Posner’s approach. Since Fleming’s focus is not on market index funds, he 
recognises a different problem with the rule. The emphasis of Scott’s prudent man 
rule on the individual investment compelled trustees to hold on to poor-performing 
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investments well beyond when a normal investor would sell them. 163  A normal 
investor, knowing that some losses are unavoidable, would sell poor performers at a 
loss and invest in securities that offer a better recovery prospect. 164  However, 
trustees concerned with being held liable for a loss, regardless of the overall 
performance of the portfolio, would retain such investments hoping that their 
performance will improve. The isolation approach contributed to trustees’ already 
conservative posture because it made trustees prone to avoid risky assets and only 
invest in “safe” securities. Fleming states that the isolation approach:165 
“…tends to make trustees overly conservative; their portfolios underdiversified; their 
policy one of concentrating on a small number of ‘safe’ securities; and their general 
approach one of adhering to predetermined bond-stock ratios regardless of market trends 
or conditions.” 
Second, Scott’s prudent man rule did not adequately deal with diversification. In 
particular, Fleming’s critique is that with regard to diversification, Scott’s rule did not 
deal with “the necessity for it, the meaning of it and how far a trustee is subject to 
liability if he fails to heed it”. For instance, Fleming states that section 228 of the 
Restatement (Second) complicated the diversification principle. 166  The section 
required the following:167 
“Except as otherwise provided by the terms of the trust, the trustee is under a duty to the 
beneficiary to distribute the risk of loss by a reasonable diversification of investments, 
unless under the circumstances it is prudent not to do so.” 
That diversification was required “unless under the circumstances it is prudent not 
to do so”, suggests, according to Fleming, that diversification was not necessarily 
always prudent or required. 168  Fleming did not suggest that the Restatement 
(Second) had to change in order to provide for an absolute duty to diversify. Instead, 
he suggested that subsequent legislation dealing with trustee investing should be 
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drafted without any reference to diversification and that diversification should rather 
be left as a “general principle of law for court application”.169 
A third major deficiency of Scott’s prudent man rule was that the rule did not 
impose any duty on trustees to protect trust assets from inflation.170 Historically, 
inflation in the United States has outpaced the returns available from fixed-income 
investments.171 Fleming warns that the loss of purchasing power through inflation 
presents a serious threat to every investment portfolio. 172  If the rate of inflation 
consistently exceeds a portfolio’s rate of return, it will deplete the trust capital over 
time.173 He raises the question whether or not trustees should have a duty to protect 
their trusts against inflation and mentions that some academics had expressed the 
opinion that trustees should be held liable for failure to do so.174 
Fourth, Scott’s prudent man rule did not allow for newer categories of 
investment. 175  Fleming acknowledges that investment in newer categories of 
investment may, of course, be authorised in the trust instrument. In other words, the 
trust instrument may give the trustees the power to invest in such investments. 
However, as a trust officer with a major bank, he observed that corporate trustees 
ordinarily did not pay much attention to such authorisations unless the investment 
category could be found in the language of the prudent man statute in effect in the 
particular state. 176  Corporate trustees feared that, despite the language of the 
governing instrument, a court would label such investments as speculative.177 
4 3 Bevis Longstreth  
The next major step in trust investment reform came in 1986. Bevis Longstreth, at 
the time a partner at a leading New York City law firm, authored a book titled 
“Modern Investment Management and the Prudent Man Rule”. Begleiter suggests 
that because of the position of the author, it is likely that the information contained in 
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the book was more widely read than previous criticisms of Scott’s prudent man 
rule.178 
In 1986, Scott’s prudent man rule governed, in one form or another, the 
overwhelming majority of the funds held by trustees in the United States.179 The 
importance of Longstreth’s book is that it collects aspects of Scott’s prudent man rule 
and MPT in one place; aspects which had previously been separately treated. More 
specifically, it combines descriptions of the history and the status of Scott’s prudent 
man rule180 with an explanation of the lessons of MPT.181 
Longstreth believed that a gap existed between what was permitted under 
traditional legal notions of prudence and what trustees in their best judgment wanted 
to do. 182  To test his proposition, he undertook to survey 200 trustees on their 
investment practices. The trust departments of fifty of the largest banks in the United 
States were included in the survey. 183  The survey revealed that many trustees, 
particularly corporate trustees, believed that existing doctrine prohibited or rendered 
questionable many new or unconventional investment products or techniques.184 The 
details of the survey gave great weight to Longstreth’s conclusion that the rules 
governing trust investments needed modernisation. Referring to the gap that existed 
between what was permitted under traditional legal notions of prudence and what 
trustees in their best judgment wanted to do, he states:185 
“A modern interpretation of prudence is needed to reconcile these differences. It should 
draw upon the broadest possible currents of change. It should recognize the important 
and established principle of finance economics that nothing useful can be said about an 
investment in the abstract; it can only be judged in terms of its impact on the whole 
portfolio and the purposes for which the portfolio is held. A modern paradigm for 
prudence, then, would shift the focus from the disembodied investment to the fiduciary, 
the portfolio, and its purpose.” 
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Longstreth recommended major changes to Scott’s prudent man rule, 186  and 
called for the American Law Institute to formulate a new Restatement of Trusts that 
would elaborate and refine the recommendations that he made.187 The changes that 
Longstreth recommended are analogous to Gordon’s recommendations discussed 
below.188 
4 4 Jeffrey Gordon 
4 4 1 Introduction 
Jeffrey Gordon, a professor of law who collaborated with Longstreth and wrote 
one of the appendices to Longstreth’s book, published an influential article 
expanding on that appendix. Gordon criticises Scott for transforming the traditional 
prudent man rule into a more constraining and less flexible rule.189 Gordon refers to 
the traditional prudent man rule as the “unconstrained prudent man rule”,190 and to 
Scott’s prudent man rule as the “constrained prudent man rule”.191 
Gordon argues that what counts as prudence must be “understood in light of our 
best current understanding of market and investor behavior”.192 According to him, 
prudence does not mean conservative investing, but rather embodies the idea of 
“earning the maximum possible return for the chosen level of risk”.193 Gordon states 
that the constrained prudent man rule denied trust beneficiaries effective investment 
management that could raise returns and lower risks.194 In simpler terms, the rule 
deterred trustees from doing the best possible job they were capable of doing for 
beneficiaries.195 Consequently, because of the rule’s evolution, it actually prevented 
trustees from acting prudently.196 Gordon believed that MPT offered a better account 
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of risk and safety, and thus a better guide to prudent investment.197 In his article, he 
presents the case for an investment rule in terms of MPT. 
Gordon’s article is important in the development of trustee investment 
management in the United States for three reasons: first, he identifies three key 
decisions made by Scott that led to the development of a more constraining prudent 
man rule; second, he explains why Scott’s prudent man rule has survived over the 
years; and third, Gordon discusses those elements of Scott’s rule that required 
change in order to accommodate MPT. 
4 4 2 Scott’s key decisions 
Gordon identifies three key decisions made by Scott in his treatise and as the 
reporter of the first two restatements, which led courts to develop and apply the 
constrained prudent man rule rather than the original, more flexible rule stated in 
Amory. 
4 4 2 1 Preservation of the estate 
Scott altered the traditional prudent man rule to require a more conservative 
benchmark of prudence than was previously required.198 Putnam J in Amory required 
the prudence of persons seeking “permanent disposition of their funds”. 199  But, 
instead, Scott prescribed the prudence of one seeking primarily the “preservation of 
the estate”. The Restatement (Second) provided:200 
“In making investments of trust funds the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary… to 
make such investments and only such investments as a prudent man would make of his 
own property having in view the preservation of the estate and the amount and regularity 
of the income to be derived.” 
The concept of permanent disposition of funds (or “permanence of investment”) 
referred to transactions that were not entered into for a quick turnover or profit.201 An 
investment strategy aimed at permanent disposition could, for example, include “a 
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buy-and-hold portfolio of common stocks at a higher level of risk and expected 
return”. On the other hand, an investment strategy intended to preserve capital 
would be more cautious than one aimed at permanent disposition.202 
4 4 2 2 Safeguarding the property of others 
Instead of an investment standard based on how prudent men conduct their own 
affairs, Scott prescribed the more constraining standard of how prudent men 
safeguard the property of others. In Amory, Putnam J spoke of the care that men of 
prudence exercise in the management of “their own affairs”.203 Fleming interprets 
this to mean that:204 
“[I]f a trustee conforms his actions to what other people in the financial community are 
currently doing and saying in regard to the investment of their own investable funds and if 
he uses his best judgment in what he does, he will be doing all that can reasonably be 
expected of him.” 
With regard to general trust administration, Scott charged trustees with a duty to 
administer their trusts with such care and skill as men of ordinary prudence would 
exercise in dealing with their own property.205  However, the standard governing 
investment decisions added a further requirement of caution to trustees’ general 
duties of care and skill. In Scott’s work, the concept of managing their own affairs 
became “safeguarding the property of others”.206 As a result of the change, the 
“prudent investor test” became the “prudent trustee test” – the implication being that 
trustees had to use “especially safe means” to attain a desired level of investment 
safety, rather than “ordinarily prudent means”.207 
Why did Scott make this doctrinal change? Gordon suggests that Scott made the 
assumption that the preservation of the trust estate ought to be trustees’ primary 
goal. Based on this assumption, Scott concluded that prudent trustees may not 
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pursue this goal in ways which were otherwise acceptable to prudent investors.208 It 
was thus no longer sufficient to ask how prudent men would deal with their own 
property since “men of prudence may well take risks in making investments which 
trustees are not justified in taking”.209 
4 4 2 3 Prudent and imprudent investments  
Scott’s work drew a distinction between prudent and imprudent investments.210 
Scott’s Treatise and the Restatements permitted the following investments: 
government bonds; first mortgages on land; and corporate bonds of certain classes 
that are supposed to be especially free from risk. 211  Generally impermissible 
investments included: margin purchases of securities; speculative shares of stock; 
bonds selling at a large discount owing to uncertainty of payment at maturity; 
securities in new and untried enterprises; and land or other things purchased for the 
purpose of resale.212 The effect of the prudent/imprudent distinction was that trustees 
were unwilling to invest in certain securities because of the likelihood that a Scott-
influenced court would regard such investments as speculative.213 
This unwillingness of trustees to invest in certain securities created a special 
problem for a financial model such as MPT. One of the lessons of MPT is that no 
security is inherently good or bad or prohibited per se as too risky. MPT further 
teaches that it is possible to reduce a portfolio’s risk by adding to it a risky asset that 
moves inversely to the other investments of the portfolio.214 Therefore, in order to 
attain optimal portfolio diversification, trustees should mix risky assets with relatively 
risk-free assets. 215  The problem with the prudent/imprudent distinction was that 
because it prohibited certain securities, it prevented trustees from attaining optimal 
diversification.216 
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4 4 3 The persistence of the constrained rule 
When one considers Gordon’s criticism of the constrained prudent man rule, the 
question can be raised: why has the rule persisted over the years? Gordon’s article 
offers an explanation for the persistence of the constrained rule. Moreover, Gordon 
believes that if the courts came to understand why the rule has persisted, they would 
be more receptive to the argument for its modernisation.217 
4 4 3 1 The authoritative commentary  
Gordon blames the authoritative commentary for having a constraining influence 
on the development of the common law. Gordon explains that judges regularly 
consulted the authoritative commentary, such as Scott’s Treatise and the 
Restatements,218 in order to justify their decisions:219 
“Judges presumably want to justify their decisions through a cogent analysis of the 
applicable law. But even an energetic judge, aided by energetic law clerks, would face an 
impossible workload if she had to synthesize complex bodies of law from scratch for 
every opinion. Rather than rely on an account of the law provided by one of the parties, a 
judge is likely to turn to a disinterested source.” 
The authoritative commentary claimed to present the legal rules properly derived 
from the cases and that these rules are simply there to be applied.220 However, 
Gordon highlights the limitation of these rules:221 
“These rules, divorced from the factual context that gives them shading and texture, stand 
as an abstract set of instructions.” 
The danger of continuously resorting to the authoritative commentary was that it 
prevented changes in outmoded legal rules. The reason for this is that judges were 
relying on previously established legal doctrine without “examining the rationale for 
the creation of the doctrine or considering whether that rationale remains valid in 









changed circumstances”. 222  The authoritative commentary thus inhibited the 
common law process of reinterpretation and change”.223 
4 4 3 2 Unwillingness to litigate 
Litigation is the means by which parties attempt to persuade judges that a 
particular rule is adverse to their interests. Gordon provides the following example:224 
“Imagine that a particular group of beneficiaries feels that management of their trust is 
hampered by a narrow conception of prudence that bars investment of part of the portfolio 
in a promising venture capital pool.” 
The beneficiaries in the example will assess their chances of success. If they 
believe that their chances of success are positive, they will press the court to re-
examine its narrow conception of prudence. Gordon states that if judges are 
repeatedly pressed on a rule, the rule might change:225 
“Even if a particular challenge fails, a steady drumbeat of litigation may have a cumulative 
effect; important distinctions and qualifications may emerge, eventually leading to a new 
rule.” 
Therefore, the possibility exists that new rules may emerge out of litigation. 
However, the authoritative commentary reduced the “variation in individual estimates 
of success”.226 In other words, it reduced the extent to which the parties to a dispute 
disagreed as to the probable outcome. Litigants are significantly influenced by the 
probable outcome of a case. Litigation challenging the established rule becomes less 
likely if all parties to a dispute are in close agreement as to the probable outcome.227 
Consequently, the ability of the courts to change trust investment law was restricted 
because litigants were unwilling to press suits to judgment. 
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4 4 3 3 Contracting around limitations  
Settlors of large trusts usually receive sophisticated legal advice and are most 
likely to contract around investment limitations otherwise set by law. Indeed, at the 
time of Gordon’s article, well-advised settlors employed such provisions with 
increasing frequency. Therefore, beneficiaries of large trusts had no need to apply to 
the courts for a better investment rule. As a result, the class of beneficiaries with the 
“most substantial economic stake” were excluded from the pool of potential 
litigants.228 
4 4 3 4 Unresponsiveness to MPT 
Gordon states that the education of courts is often accomplished through 
litigation.229 Unfortunately, lawyers did not argue the gains of MPT to the courts:230 
“… not one of the reported surcharge cases in the 1970s or 1980s seems to have been 
argued on portfolio theory grounds, even where such an argument might have been 
decisive.” 
Under these circumstances and given the complexity of MPT, it is hardly 
surprising that the courts did not adopt a MPT approach sua sponte.231 
4 4 4 Changes to the constrained prudent man rule  
Gordon discusses those elements of the constrained prudent man rule (Scott’s 
prudent man rule) that required change to accommodate MPT as well as those that 
did not require change. First, trustees should be permitted to use any investment 
vehicle or technique reasonably expected to achieve maximum return at the 
appropriate level of risk. Assuming due caution in selecting the portfolio risk level 
and due care in managing the portfolio consistent with the permitted risk, the 
trustees’ investment decisions would be regarded as prudent.232 
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Second, trustees’ investment decisions regarding individual assets should be 
evaluated not in isolation but in the context of the entire trust portfolio and as a part 
of an overall investment strategy. 233  Gordon thus called for the total portfolio 
approach to replace the isolation approach. 
Third, Gordon proposed that diversification became mandatory (except in special 
circumstances). Through his proposal, he rejected the optional diversification 
principle that was in force in New York. The prevailing view at the time was that the 
purpose of diversification was merely to “avoid the risk of loss”; a view also rejected 
by Gordon. Rather, for him, the importance of diversification is that it “increases 
expected return at the chosen risk level”.234 
Fourth, the “anti-netting rule” should be retained.235 The rule pertains to balancing 
losses arising from one or more breaches of trust against gains from other 
sources.236 Gordon states that the rule is not inconsistent with MPT.237  
Fifth, the traditional rules governing how trustees allocate the receipts from trust 
investments between income and capital beneficiaries had to change. Gordon views 
these allocation rules as profoundly inconsistent with MPT.238 The solution for him 
was to make “total return investing” readily available to trustees. The term “total 
return investing” requires explaining. 
At the time of Gordon’s article, it was settled law that when trustees made 
investment decisions, they had to keep in mind that the law required income to be 
allocated to income beneficiaries and capital to be allocated to capital 
beneficiaries.239 This rule is hereafter referred to as the “traditional distribution rule”. 
This aspect of trust law is cast into doubt by the acceptance of MPT.  A key principle 
of MPT is that it is artificial to distinguish between income and capital when 
investing. 240  MPT assesses investment options based on its overall total return 
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regardless of whether the investments are correctly categorised as income or 
capital.241 Hereafter, this approach is referred to as “total return investing”.  
When total return investing is incorporated into trust law, the investment decision-
making of trustees is separated from distributional issues.242 Trustees following a 
MPT-driven regime must follow a two-step procedure. The first step is to invest for 
the maximum total return at a given level of risk,243 and then, in a separate and 
subsequent step, to allocate the return fairly between the beneficiaries.244 Several 
authors have noted that this two-step procedure could create a conflict between 
income and capital beneficiaries.245 Solutions to this potential conflict are discussed 
in chapter 7.246 
Without being able to use total return investing, trustees are unable to invest for 
maximum total return at a given level of risk.247 Therefore, total return investing is 
necessary for trustees to be in the best position to employ the risk/return analysis 
effectively to obtain the maximum advantage for their trusts:248 
“[Total return investing] gives trustees greater flexibility in assessing tradeoffs between 
risk and reward by providing a much broader view of what constitutes return and, 
consequently, what justifies increased risks for the portfolio.” 
4 5 The critics’ influence 
Schwartzel provides a good summary of the changes the critics called for:249 
“… the critics argued that those aspects of the prudent man rule which discourage 
trustees from adopting generally accepted portfolio management strategies and from 
devoting more attention to preservation of the purchasing power of the trust principal 
needed to be reformed and updated and that the focus of fiduciary investment policy 
                                                            
241 Gordon (1987) N Y U LR 99-100. 
242 British Columbia Law Institute Total Return Investing by Trustees (2001) Report 16 8. 
243 Begleiter (1999) Maine LR 59. 
244 JC Dobris “The probate world at the end of the century: is a new Principle and Income Act in your 
future?” (1993) 28 Real Prop Prob & Tr J 393 412. 
245 Begleiter (1999) Maine LR 59. 
246 See chapter 7 para 5. 
247 British Columbia Law Institute Total Return Investing 8. 
248 Phillips (1997) Wash & Lee LR 335. 




should not be on the ‘avoidance of risk by trustees but for their prudent management of 
risk’.” 
The critics greatly influenced the development of trustees’ investment standards. 
The criticisms of Scott’s prudent man rule from Langbein and Posner, Fleming, 
Longstreth, and Gordon, together with other academics,250 led to the formulation and 
adoption of the Restatement (Third) and later the promulgation of the Uniform 
Prudent Investor Act (“UPIA”).251 Also, an entirely new rule developed – the “prudent 
investor rule”. 
4 5 1 The Restatement (Third) 
When the American Law Institute began the process of preparing the Restatement 
(Third), it first covered the “prudent investor rule”. Sterk states that this reflected the 
importance of the topic to trust lawyers at the time. 252  The volume in the 
Restatement (Third) on the prudent investor rule was approved by the American Law 
Institute at its 1990 meeting and published in 1992. 253  The reporter of the 
Restatement (Third) is Professor Edward C Halbach.254 The aim of the volume is to 
“modernize trust investment law and to restore the generality and flexibility of the 
original prudent man rule”. 255  The Restatement (Third) implements many of the 
changes advocated by Scott’s critics.256 Importantly, the prudent investor rule as 
described in the Restatement (Third) includes all of the major principles of MPT.257 
Hereafter, the rule is referred to as the “prudent investor rule of the Restatement 
(Third)”. 
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4 5 2 UPIA 
In 1991, the National Conference on Commissioners for on Uniform State Law 
(“NCCUSL”) began a three-year project to draft a codified version of the revised 
principles of the Restatement (Third) into a uniform law.258 In 1994, the NCCUSL 
promulgated the UPIA,259 incorporating many of the concepts from the Restatement 
(Third).260 The UPIA also includes the tenets of MPT. Ruce states that the UPIA:261 
“…applies a broad set of reforms to the prudent man investment doctrine, reflecting the 
changes and a new understanding of the functions and roles of investment portfolios in 
fiduciary accounts, including efficient markets and MPT.” 
5 New York’s prudent investor rule 
5 1 Promulgation of the Prudent Investor Act 
Although the Restatement (Third) was promulgated in 1992, 262  New York’s 
prudent man rule continued to be applied to investments until 31 December 1994. In 
1991, the Estate, Powers and Trusts Law Advisory Committee (“EPTL Committee”) 
recommended an examination and revision of the articles of the Estate, Powers and 
Trusts Law and the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act (“SCPA”). The EPTL 
Committee later changed into the EPTL-SCPA Legislative Advisory Committee 
(“EPTL-SCPA Committee”). Led by former surrogate C Raymond Radigan, the 
EPTL-SCPA Committee in its Third Report proposed legislation that would serve to 
codify a prudent investor rule for trustees. Upon the committee’s recommendations, 
the New York State Legislature enacted the Prudent Investor Act.263 The enacted 
statute is effective as to investments made or held by trustees on or after 
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1 January 1995.264 Based on the Restatement (Third), the Act includes all major 
principles of MPT.265 The Act codifies a prudent investor rule for New York, thereby 
replacing New York’s prudent man rule. The new rule is hereafter referred to as 
“New York’s prudent investor rule”.  
5 2 Standard of care and loyalty 
The elements of care, skill, and caution are the essence of New York’s prudent 
investor rule. Trustees meant to satisfy the prudent investor standard under the 
Prudent Investor Act are required to:266 
“…exercise reasonable care, skill and caution to make and implement investment and 
management decisions as a prudent investor would for the entire portfolio, taking into 
account the purposes and terms and provisions of the governing instrument.” 
It is worth pointing out that the wording of the section intentionally avoids the 
controversy over whether trustees are to invest as prudent investors would in 
managing their own funds or in managing the funds of others.267 
The Act changes the standard of care from that of an ordinary prudent man to that 
of an ordinary prudent investor.268  Trustees must invest in those investments in 
which a prudent investor would invest.269 New York’s prudent investor rule requires 
trustees to only choose an investment strategy that is appropriate to the skills that 
they possess.270 In many cases, trustees of ordinary skills, such as family members 
and friends, will lack the knowledge and expertise required to comply with the new 
rule. This does not mean that trustees lacking special investment skills are prevented 
from serving as trustees. However, family members and friends acting as trustees 
will have to do much more than before in order to meet the obligations under the 
prudent investor rule. Most trustees will have to seek outside professional help to 
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meet their duty of care as prudent investors.271 The appropriate and necessary skills 
are available to trustees through competent advice or proper delegation. For this 
reason, the Act makes dramatically broader provision for obtaining advice and 
delegating investment functions than traditional trust doctrine.272 
In addition to the duties of reasonable care, skill and caution, trustees in New York 
owe a duty of loyalty to beneficiaries.273 The duty is not imposed upon trustees 
through any requirement of the trust document, but through the relationship between 
trustees and beneficiaries.274 The duty of loyalty requires trustees to administer trust 
property solely in the interest of trust beneficiaries.275 In modern times it has been 
construed to apply primarily to instances of self-dealing by trustees.276 
5 3 The major changes to existing law 
The Prudent Investor Act made five major changes to trustee investment 
management in New York: first, New York’s prudent investor rule applies as to the 
entire portfolio rather than to a particular investment viewed in isolation. The rule 
thus sanctions the total portfolio approach. Authority for the total portfolio approach is 
found in three sections in the Act. The Act requires a trustee to: 
“… make and implement investment and management decisions as a prudent investor 
would for the entire portfolio, taking into account the purposes and terms and provisions 
of the governing instrument.”277 
“…pursue an overall investment strategy… in accordance with risk and return objectives 
reasonably suited to the entire portfolio.”278 
“… [consider] the role that each investment or course of action plays within the overall 
portfolio.”279 
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Second, New York’s prudent investor rule authorises trustees to invest in any type 
of investment since no particular investment is prudent or imprudent per se. 280 
Trustees are given greater flexibility in choosing investments, provided that the 
investment advances the overall investment plan and that the investment plan is 
prudent.281 
Third, a duty to diversify trust assets is imposed on trustees unless the trustees 
reasonably determine that it is in the interests of the beneficiaries not to diversify:282 
“The prudent investor standard requires a trustee to: … diversify assets unless the trustee 
reasonably determines that it is in the interests of the beneficiaries not to diversify, taking 
into account the purposes and terms and provisions of the governing instrument…” 
The Act further requires that trustees must within a reasonable time after the 
creation of the trust relationship determine whether to retain or dispose of initial 
assets.283 Before the Act, trustees had no absolute duty to diversify. The reform 
regarding the duty of diversification is thus a significant broadening of New York trust 
law. 
Fourth, New York’s prudent investor rule requires trustees to consider “the 
expected total return of the portfolio (including both income and appreciation of 
capital)”.284 Since “return” in MPT means total return,285 this reform makes explicit 
the connection between New York’s prudent investor rule and MPT. The operation of 
total return investing in New York is discussed in detail in chapter 7.286 
Fifth, New York’s prudent investor rule permits trustees to delegate investment 
and management functions in certain instances. 287  Before the Act, investment 
decision-making was seen as personal, and trustees could not divest it.288 Begleiter 
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states that the criticism from Langbein and Posner’s 1976 article laid the groundwork 
for the revision of this power fifteen years after their article.289 In terms of the change, 
delegation is appropriate where the investment expertise of trustees is limited. 
Trustees are allowed to delegate investment decisions to an individual or institution 
with the necessary knowledge.290  
There is one change that the Prudent Investor Act did not make that is worth 
pointing out: the Act does not abolish the anti-netting rule.291 This is in accordance 
with the Restatement (Third), which preserves the anti-netting rule of the 
Restatement (Second).292 
5 4 Key features of New York’s prudent investor rule 
5 4 1 Duty of caution 
New York’s prudent investor rule transforms the role of a trustee from that of a 
wealth conservator (who avoids risk) to that of a wealth manager (who consciously 
assumes and manages risk). 293  Two changes to existing law contributed to the 
transformation of the trustee’s role: first, the Prudent Investor Act disavows the 
emphasis in older law on avoiding “speculative” or “risky” investments; 294  and 
second, in addition to the duties of reasonable care and loyalty, trustees owe a duty 
of caution.295 The duty of caution requires trustees to assure a suitable risk level in 
light of the needs of the trust they are administering.296 
The change from wealth conservator to wealth manager is important because 
trusts differ considerably in their risk-bearing capacities.297 Low levels of risk may be 
appropriate in some trust settings but inappropriate in others.298 For example, a trust 
whose main purpose is to support an elderly widow of modest means has a low risk 
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tolerance.299 An example of a somewhat higher risk tolerance is a trust for a middle-
aged man with an adequate income flow and a desire to provide for his retirement. 
Such a person would be well-served if the trustees invest in long-term growth 
securities. 300  The circumstances of some trusts might even justify a strategy of 
seeking not merely to preserve but even to enhance the real value of capital. For 
example, a young scion of great wealth seeking a potentially higher rate of return 
would be best served by a high risk-reward strategy.301 
5 4 2 Cost consciousness 
The Prudent Investor Act provides that a trustee is authorised to incur costs only 
to the extent that the costs are “appropriate and reasonable in relation to the 
purposes of the governing instrument, the assets held by the trustee and the skills of 
the trustee”.302 Halbach refers to this duty as “the duty to be cost conscious in 
investing”.303 The duty to be cost conscious is at least partially derived from both the 
increased requirement of diversification,304 and the ECMH.305 
The Restatement (Third) elaborates on the scope of the duty and provides that 
trustees must weigh up the costs of different products:306 
“[I]t is important for trustees to make careful cost comparisons, particularly among similar 
products of a specific type being considered for a trust portfolio.”  
In the context of the debate on active versus passive management,307 the duty 
requires that trustees ought to consider the cost of using an active manager as 
opposed to buying a (presumably less expensive) market index fund. Admittedly, 
active management strategies are necessary in certain situations.308 Trustees who 
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apply active management are required to justify the increased costs by showing that, 
at the time the decision was made, the advantages of active management 
outweighed those of a passive strategy.309 
5 4 3 Protecting against inflation 
New York’s prudent man rule did not impose a duty on trustees to protect against 
inflation. Trustees had to preserve trust capital – defined in nominal as opposed to 
real terms.310  The loss of purchasing power through inflation presents a serious 
threat to every trust estate. If the rate of inflation consistently exceeds a portfolio’s 
rate of return, it will deplete the trust capital over time. This threat to the trust capital 
affects both income and capital beneficiaries. The preservation of real value has 
obvious importance to capital beneficiaries, but it is also important to income 
beneficiaries as a means of protecting the purchasing power of their income flow 
over the years.311 
At first sight, it might appear that the Prudent Investor Act does not change the 
position. The section that lists the requirements of the prudent investor standard only 
requires that trustees consider the possible effect of inflation or deflation.312 The 
section should, however, not be read in isolation. It is submitted that the position in 
New York concerning inflation has in fact changed. In terms of New York’s prudent 
investor rule, trustees owe a duty of caution to beneficiaries:313 
“A trustee shall exercise reasonable care, skill and caution to make and implement 
investment and management decisions as a prudent investor would for the entire 
portfolio…” 
The Restatement (Third) discusses the necessity of preserving the purchasing 
power of the trust property as part of the requirement of the duty of caution:314 
“[T]his requirement of caution requires the trustee to invest with a view both to safety of 
the capital and to securing a reasonable return. ‘Safety’ of capital includes not only the 
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objective of protecting the trust property from the risk of loss of nominal value but, 
ordinarily, also a goal of preserving its real value – that is, seeking to avoid or reduce loss 
of the trust estate's purchasing power as a result of inflation.” 
As mentioned above, New York’s prudent investor rule has changed the trustee’s 
role from that of a wealth conservator who avoids risk to that of a wealth manager 
who manages risk.315 The Restatement (Third) stresses that risk management is 
concerned with more than the loss of dollar value. Risk management takes account 
of all hazards, including the danger of inflation.316 
In summary, the Prudent Investor Act does not impose an affirmative duty on 
trustees to invest with a view to protect against inflation. Rather, because of the duty 
of caution, trustees must consider the objective of the particular trust and then use 
their best judgment to decide whether or not the objective of the trust constitutes the 
preservation of the trust estate in nominal or real terms. Furthermore, considering 
that the new role of a trustee is that of wealth manager, the expectation is that a 
court will justify an investment strategy only aimed at preserving the estate in 
nominal terms, such as investing solely in fixed-income investments, in very few 
circumstances. 
5 5 The effect of the new standard 
In Janes, the New York State Court of Appeals dealt with the question whether or 
not a trustee acted imprudently. Even though the case does not refer to the 
Restatement (Third) or the Prudent Investor Act as authority,317 it appears that the 
court was influenced by these sources. 
In Janes, the testator died in 1973, survived solely by his wife (“Mrs Janes”) who 
was then 72 years of age. Among the assets in the estate were securities worth over 
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$3 million, with almost $1.8 million of the securities consisting of stock of Eastman 
Kodak Company (“Kodak stock”).318 
The testator bequeathed most of his estate to three trusts. First, the testator 
created a marital deduction trust consisting of approximately 50% of the estate’s 
assets, the income of which was to be paid to Mrs Janes for her life. Second, the 
testator established a charitable trust of approximately 25% of the estate’s assets 
that directed annual distributions to selected charities. Finally, a third trust comprised 
the balance of the estate’s assets and directed that the income therefrom be paid to 
Mrs Janes for her life, with the remainder pouring over into the charitable trust upon 
her death.319 
In 1981, the trustee of the trusts, Lincoln First Bank, sought a judicial settlement of 
its account. The value of the Kodak stock had dropped to about one-third of its date-
of-death value. Objections to the accounts were originally filed by Mrs Janes in 1982, 
and subsequently by the charitable beneficiaries of the trusts. The charitable 
beneficiaries alleged that the trustee acted imprudently in failing to sell at least some 
of the Kodak stock.320 
The case was decided under New York’s prudent man rule stated in the prior 
version of its trusts investment statute. The Prudent Investor Act did not apply since 
all investments in this case were made prior to 1 January 1995.321 The New York 
State Court of Appeals held that the high concentration in Kodak stock was 
imprudent and held the trustee liable for losses.322 
As already mentioned, the case does not refer to the Restatement (Third) or the 
Prudent Investor Act as authority. However, it does seem as if the court was 
influenced by these sources. Begleiter states that:323 
“The major focus of the opinion of the Court of Appeals is the relation of the asset to the 
total portfolio and the failure of the executor to develop, implement, and monitor an 
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investment plan for the estate. The opinion is consistent with the Restatement [Third] and 
modern portfolio theory and represents a sharp departure from prior analysis.” 
6 Criticism of the prudent investor rule 
A major criticism of the prudent investor rule of the Restatement (Third) is that it 
establishes too permissive a standard for the evaluation of trustee behaviour. 
Because of the similarities between the prudent investor rule of the Restatement 
(Third) and New York’s prudent investor rule, the criticism discussed here is relevant 
to both rules. The claim is that the prudent investor rule resembles the Business 
Judgment Rule (“BJR”). Such a standard of review shields trustees from liability for 
their investment decisions.324 Properly understood, however, the prudent investor 
rule does not resemble the BJR since the prudent investor rule includes a duty of 
caution. Contrasting the approach in corporate law and trust law is instructive. 
The BJR can be understood in light of the particular duties of a corporate director. 
Gordon provides the following definition of the BJR:325 
“A disinterested director who exercises reasonable care in informing himself about a 
business decision, and who rationally believes the decision to be in the corporation’s best 
interests, cannot be held liable if the decision turns out badly.” 
The Companies Act 71 of 2008 (“Companies Act”) codifies the BJR into South 
African law and lists the requirements for the BJR to operate. These requirements 
are similar to the requirements found in Gordon’s definition. The BJR will operate if 
the following requirements are met:326 the decision must be an informed one; the 
director must have no financial interest in the decision; and the director must have a 
rational basis for believing (and the director must in fact believe) that the decision is 
in the best interests of the company. 
In the corporate context, one of the rationales for the BJR is that it encourages 
directors to take business risks.327 Business risk-taking is essentially beneficial to 
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shareholders since well-chosen risks regularly generate greater returns. 328  Thus, 
from a shareholder’s perspective, it makes sense to protect corporate management 
from liability where they have made a business decision that rationally (but wrongly) 
assessed the risks and rewards, but the decision turned out to be the wrong one.329 
On the other hand, a rule that encourages a high degree of risk-taking would not 
serve trust beneficiaries. 330  A comparison of the parties to be protected – 
shareholders and trust beneficiaries – shows that the parties have very different 
expectations regarding risk. First, shareholders can hold diversified portfolios of 
investments to reduce the risk of being exposed to any particular investment.331 
Gordon explains that the situation of a typical beneficiary is quite different from that 
of a shareholder:332 
“The typical beneficiary may have a large portion of his wealth tied up in the trust. If so, 
he will be unable to diversify against a trust portfolio that is exposed to a high degree of 
risk. No matter how wisely the trustee has selected the risks, such a beneficiary will 
regard the portfolio as too risky for his interests.” 
Second, shareholders can monitor the performance of directors and dispose of 
those directors whose performance is substandard, or shareholders can simply sell 
off their shareholding. In contrast, beneficiaries do not normally select trustees, and 
the settlor who had selected the trustees, has likely passed away. Furthermore, even 
if the beneficiaries have sufficient financial sophistication to identify poor risk-taking, 
they may find it onerous to remove the trustees.333 
Risk-averse beneficiaries would rather prefer a duty that counsels caution than a 
rule that counsels business risk-taking. Appropriately, both the prudent investor rule 
of the Restatement (Third) and New York’s prudent investor rule impose a duty of 
caution on trustees. The duty of caution requires trustees to assure an appropriate 
risk level in light of the needs of the trust.334 
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The prudent man rule derives from the Amory case. In 1830, the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts rejected the English rule requiring investment in government 
securities only. The original formulation of the rule, the traditional prudent man rule, 
is a model of flexibility. The rule was adopted in New York up until 1869. 
In 1869, Talbot dramatically narrowed the traditional prudent man rule. The New 
York State Court of Appeals restricted trustees’ choice of investments to government 
bonds and mortgages, and proscribed investment in corporate stocks. The decision 
in Talbot led to the passage of a New York statute in 1889 governing permissible 
trust investments. This marked the beginning of so-called legal lists. 
The break from legal lists came in 1970 when New York adopted its own version 
of the prudent man rule – referred to in this chapter as New York’s prudent man rule. 
New York’s prudent man rule closely resembled Scott’s prudent man rule. Gordon 
refers to Scott’s rule as the constrained prudent man rule. The principal problem with 
the constrained prudent man rule was that it could not adapt to general 
circumstances. In other words, the rule was not capable of adapting to changing 
times (eg rising inflation) and changing notions of investment opportunity and risk-
taking (eg the findings of MPT).  
MPT makes it possible for trustees to earn the maximum possible return for a 
chosen level of portfolio risk. Since the constrained prudent man rule discouraged 
trustees from adopting generally accepted MPT strategies, beneficiaries were denied 
effective investment management. Stated in simple terms, the rule deterred trustees 
from doing the best possible job they were capable of doing for beneficiaries. 
Consequently, the constrained prudent man rule, as well as New York’s prudent man 
rule, prevented trustees from acting prudently. 
Reform did not come through a series of court cases. Rather, the criticism from 
authors such as Langbein and Posner, Fleming, Longstreth, and Gordon set the 
stage for the evolution from the prudent man rule to the prudent investor rule. The 
critics argued that those aspects of Scott’s prudent man rule (the constrained 
prudent man rule) that discouraged trustees from adopting generally accepted MPT 
strategies needed to be reformed and updated, and that the focus of trustees’ 
investment policies should not be on the avoidance of risk but on the prudent 




Following the criticism of Scott’s prudent man rule, the American Law Institute 
embraced MPT by promulgating the prudent investor rule of the Restatement (Third). 
Shortly thereafter, the New York State Legislature enacted the Prudent Investor Act 
on 31 December 1994. Based on the Restatement (Third), the Act includes the major 
principles of MPT. New York codified its own version of the prudent investor rule 
(New York’s prudent investor rule) and in doing so, replaced New York’s prudent 
man rule. 
The Prudent Investor Act made five important changes to existing law: first, New 
York’s prudent investor rule applies to the entire portfolio rather than to a particular 
investment viewed in isolation; second, the rule authorises trustees to invest in any 
type of investment since no particular investment is prudent or imprudent per se; 
third, the Act imposes on trustees a duty to diversify trust assets; fourth, New York’s 
prudent investor rule requires trustees to consider the expected total return of a trust 
portfolio; and fifth, the rule permits trustees to delegate investment and management 
functions in certain instances. It should also be noted that the Act does not abolish 
the anti-netting rule. 
The following are some of the key features of New York’s prudent investor rule: 
first, the rule transforms the role of a trustee from a wealth conservator (who avoids 
risk) to a wealth manager (who consciously assumes and manages risk). This 
transformation is important because trusts differ considerably in their risk-bearing 
capacities. Low levels of risk may be appropriate in some trust settings but 
inappropriate in others. Second, the rule includes a duty to be cost conscious in 
investing. Trustees should thus incur costs only to the extent that the costs are 
appropriate and reasonable in relation to the purposes of the governing instrument, 
the assets held by the trustee and the skills of the trustee. Third, the rule does not 
impose an affirmative duty on trustees to invest with a view to protect against 
inflation. Rather, because of the duty of caution, trustees must consider the objective 
of the particular trust and then use their best judgement to decide whether the 
objective of the trust constitutes the preservation of the trust estate in nominal or real 
terms. However, considering that the new role of a trustee is that of wealth manager, 
the expectation is that a court will justify an investment strategy only aimed at 
preserving the estate in nominal terms in very few circumstances. 
The next chapter examines the development of trustees’ investment standards in 










CHAPTER 5 – THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRUSTEES’ INVESTMENT STANDARDS 
IN ENGLAND 
1 Introduction 
This chapter describes and analyses the development of trustees’ investment 
standards in England. The theoretical underpinnings of trustees’ investment 
standards over the centuries can be reduced to two doctrines – the “authorised list 
principle”1 and the “prudent man standard”.2 The English Law Commission and the 
Scottish Law Commission (hereafter referred to as the “two Law Commissions”) 
illustrated in their joint 1999 report (hereafter referred to as the “joint Law 
Commissions’ report”) that the authorised list principle was out of step with modern 
thinking. 3  Furthermore, according to Moffat, the prudent man standard as 
traditionally understood was incompatible with modern portfolio theory (“MPT”) in 
some respects.4 
The enactment of the Trustee Act 2000 led to extensive reform of the law of trust 
investment. Most notably, it did away with the authorised list principle. Further 
examination of the position after 2000 indicates that most of the changes that the Act 
made are consistent with the tenets of MPT. 
The purpose of the chapter is to provide answers to four important questions: first, 
why was it necessary to replace the authorised list principle with wider powers of 
investment? Second, what was the standard of care required of trustees under the 
prudent man standard in the case of powers of investment? Third, from an 
investment perspective, what are the main features of the Trustee Act 2000? Fourth, 
how has trust investment law changed in England after 2000? In answering these 
questions, the chapter illustrates the problem with being restricted to an authorised 
list of investments; the difficulties trustees face when trustee investment standards 
do not take MPT into account; how English law balances wider powers of investment 
with appropriate safeguards; and what obstacles had to be eliminated in order to 
implement MPT. 
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Following this introduction, the chapter is divided into four sections, which are 
summarised in the conclusion at the end of the chapter. Section 2 discusses the 
origin of the authorised list of investments, what the initial acceptable securities 
were, and how the range of acceptable securities was extended over time. Following 
this discussion, the section describes what was expected from trustees under the 
prudent man standard – both in general trust administration and when making 
investments. Section 3 explores the background to the Trustee Act 2000. More 
specifically, the section investigates the development of trustees’ investment 
standards in the 40-year period before the Act came into force. The first part of the 
section explains why there was a demand for reform in the 1960s and discusses the 
purpose, central features and criticisms of the Trustee Investments Act 1961. The 
second part of the section explains how the traditional investment policy of avoiding 
all investments of a hazardous nature was modified in the 1980s. Section 4 
discusses trustees’ power of investment under the Trustee Act 2000 and the 
safeguards put in place to protect the interests of trust beneficiaries. Section 5 
examines trust investment law before and after 2000 in order to determine the 
obstacles to implementing MPT, to determine which of these obstacles were 
removed, and to establish how they were removed. 
2 The early development of trust investment law 
2 1 The statutory legal list of authorised investments 
The English fiduciary doctrine for trust fund investment begins with the South Sea 
“Bubble” of 1720.5 In 1719, the British Parliament authorised trustees to invest in the 
shares of the South Sea Company.6 The South Sea Bubble burst the following year 
and share prices declined by 90%. Public confidence in company stock was 
destroyed. 7 Investments that were lost included the funds of many trust 
beneficiaries.8 
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In response to the collapse of the South Sea Company, the English Court of 
Chancery developed a court-made list of investments that were presumptively proper 
for trustees.9 Originally, trustees were limited to Bank of England consolidated bank 
annuities (also known as “consols”).10 This was unless the trustees were specifically 
authorised by the trust instrument to invest beyond the court-made list.11 
The range of acceptable securities broadened as a result of statutory changes in 
the mid-nineteenth century. The first statutory legal list of authorised investments 
appeared in what was known as Lord St Leonard’s Act, passed in 1859.12 The list 
permitted investment in stock of the Bank of England and the Bank of Ireland, the 
highly successful East India Company, and mortgages of real property in England, 
Ireland, and Wales.13 In later years, the list underwent further change. Successive 
statutes between 1859 and 1925 added various local and colonial government 
issues, and certain railway debentures were added in 1889.14 The securities of the 
statutory legal list were all of the same type: fixed-income securities.15 During that 
period, corporate stock was not considered good security for trustee investing:16 
“Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, court and Parliament alike 
considered equity stock to be too speculative and too risky for trustee investment.” 
The Trustee Act 1925 consolidated the statutory legal list but did not extend it.17 
The inclusion of corporate stock in the Act was considered, but was rejected in 
favour of the established policy of permitting only fixed-income securities.18 Trustees 
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without a wide express power of investment were therefore still limited only to narrow 
categories of investment.19 
2 2 Trustees’ duty of care at common law 
The law describing trustees’ duty of care derives from the case of Speight v 
Gaunt20 (“Speight”).21 Isaac Gaunt was the trustee of a testamentary trust, which 
was set up in the will of a textiles manufacturer named John Speight. Gaunt, also a 
local textiles manufacturer, had no professional investment expertise but accepted 
trusteeship out of friendship with Speight. Gaunt employed a stockbroker, John 
Cooke, to invest the bulk of the assets of the trust fund in the purchase of 
corporation bonds. Cooke presented Gaunt with a forged bought note as evidence 
that he had procured the securities. Gaunt paid the money over to Cooke without 
enquiring why no account date appeared on the note. Cooke, being nearly insolvent, 
promptly applied the money to his debts and vanished.22 
The beneficiaries of the trust sued Gaunt for failing in his duty of care as trustee. 
They alleged imprudence on his part in “choosing and trusting a dishonest agent, 
and failing to enquire into the veracity of the bought note before tendering 
payment”.23 Bacon VC in the Court of Chancery found Gaunt liable and ordered him 
to make good the loss of £15 275. Gaunt appealed from the decision of the Court of 
Chancery. The Court of Appeal was not persuaded by the Vice-Chancellor and 
reversed the decision in Gaunt’s favour.24 Jessel MR held that, because the trustee 
acted in the ordinary course of business, he was not liable to make good the loss 
occasioned by the misappropriation of the trust fund by Cooke. The key part of his 
judgment stated as follows:25 
“... what is the liability of a trustee who undertakes an office which requires him to make 
an investment on behalf of his cestui que trust? It seems to me that on general principles 
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a trustee ought to conduct the business of the trust in the same manner that an ordinary 
prudent man of business would conduct his own, and beyond that there is no liability or 
obligation on the trustee. In other words, a trustee is not bound because he is a trustee to 
conduct business in other than the ordinary and usual way in which similar business is 
conducted by mankind in transactions of their own. It never could be reasonable to make 
a trustee adopt further and better precaution than an ordinary prudent man of business 
would adopt, or to conduct the business in any other way. If it were otherwise, no one 
would be trustee at all.” 
Lindley LJ and Bowen LJ gave concurring judgments,26 and the House of Lords 
upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal.27 
Oakley refers to the standard laid down in Speight as the “normal common law 
duty”,28 and Moffat refers to it as the “common law position” or the “prudent person of 
business standard”.29 Getzler describes the standard as follows:30 
“... trustees are to be held to the standard that an ordinary prudent man would follow in 
running his own business.” 
Hereafter the standard is referred to as the “prudent man standard”.31 
2 3 Modification of the prudent man standard in the case of powers of investment 
In Learoyd, the prudent man standard was modified in the case of powers of 
investment. 32  Benjamin Whiteley, by his will in 1874, appointed Learoyd (an 
accountant) and Carter (a schoolmaster) as his executors and trustees. Whiteley 
died in 1876. In his will, he directed the trustees to invest £5 000 and pay the income 
to Elizabeth Whiteley during her life, and to hold the investments in trust for her 
children after her death. The investment clause in the will contained a power to 
invest “in or upon real securities in England or Wales”. The trustees invested £3 000 
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in a mortgage of a brickfield, and the remaining £2 000 in mortgages of four small 
houses.33 Later, the mortgagors of the brickworks went bankrupt. As regards to the 
mortgages on the houses, the mortgagor never paid any interest on the £2 000. He 
filed a petition for liquidation in 1879.34 
The action was brought by Elizabeth Whiteley and her children (“the 
beneficiaries”) against the executors and trustees of the estate of Benjamin Whiteley. 
The beneficiaries sought to make the trustees answerable for the loss of the legacy 
of £5 000, which, it was alleged, had been invested by them in insufficient 
securities.35 Bacon VC held in the Chancery Court that the brickfield investment was 
unauthorised and the trustees were responsible for its failure. As regards to the 
mortgages on the houses, Bacon VC held that the trustees were not responsible for 
the insufficiency of that investment. The trustees appealed from this judgment so far 
as related to the mortgage of the brickfield, and the beneficiaries gave cross notice 
of appeal from the judgment so far as related to the mortgage of the houses.36 
The appeal regarding the houses was dismissed.37 The first question on appeal 
regarding the brickfield investment was whether the investment was an authorised 
investment. In other words, was the investment within the terms of the trust in fact a 
real security?38 Assuming the investment to be technically a real security, the second 
question was whether it was a proper real security. That is, whether it was such an 
investment as an ordinary prudent man of business would select if he was acting for 
himself and others.39 
The Court of Appeal affirmed Bacon VC’s decision that the trustees were liable for 
repayment of the £3 000 invested in the brickfield. 40 Lopes LJ considered the 
investment to be technically a real security. He stated that:41 
“... if only £500 had been advanced, no objection could have been taken to the character 
of the investment”. 
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However, regarding the question whether the investment was a proper real 
security, he was of the opinion that the investment did not answer that description. 
Lopes LJ explained that the value of the piece of land by itself, being a brickfield, 
was not worth more than £1 500. Any value beyond that sum was attributable to the 
plant and machinery, and more especially to the trade to be carried on upon the 
land. He further regarded the investment as having a hazardous nature:42 
“[The investment’s] value mainly depends on the success of a speculative and fluctuating 
business, a business for which it is difficult to find customers, a business largely 
dependent on the energy and solvency of those working it, a business of necessity of 
precarious duration, which cannot be carried on without such an excavation and 
destruction of the soil as must eventually leave what remains nearly useless for 
agricultural and other purposes.” 
Lopes concluded that no prudent man investing money for the benefit of himself 
and others would have invested so large a sum as £3 000 upon such a hazardous 
security.43 Therefore, although the will authorised the trustees to invest beyond the 
statutory legal list, they were still under a general duty to use care and skill44 in 
investing trust funds.45 Cotton LJ and Lindley LJ gave concurring judgments,46 and 
the House of Lords confirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision that the trustees 
invested the trust fund in a very insufficient security.47 
An especially significant point to be taken from Learoyd is the fact that it was 
found that trustees were required to exercise caution in investing. When Speight 
came before the House of Lords, Lord Blackburn held that the general duty of 
trustees was to act honestly and fairly and to “take all those precautions which an 
ordinary prudent man of business would take in managing similar affairs of his 
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own”. 48  In Learoyd, Lindley LJ refined this dictum when it comes to making 
investments.49 He stated that:50 
“The duty of a trustee is not to take such care only as a prudent man would take if he had 
only himself to consider; the duty rather is to take such care as an ordinary prudent man 
would take if he were minded to make an investment for the benefit of other people for 
whom he felt morally bound to provide.” 
This was because:51 
“[b]usiness men of ordinary prudence may, and frequently do, select investments which 
are more or less of a speculative character; but it is the duty of a trustee to confine 
himself to the class of investments which are permitted by the trust, and likewise to avoid 
all investments of that class which are attended with hazard”.  
In other words, whereas individual investors could be as reckless or as careful as 
they please in selecting their own investments, trustees always had to adopt a more 
cautious investment policy.52 
3 Background to the Trustee Act 2000 
3 1 The criticism of two Law Commissions of the Trustee Investments Act 1961 
The weakness of the legal list philosophy began to emerge in the 1930s. 53 
Several factors appeared that contributed to the disenchantment with fixed-income 
securities. These were post-war inflation, the devaluation of the pound sterling, rising 
taxes, the nationalisation of major industries, and the increasing sophistication and 
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expansion of investment markets throughout the world. 54  However, the most 
important factor was inflation.55 
In the commercial recovery after two successive world wars in the 1950s, it was 
corporate stock that provided the best hedge against inflation.56 Throughout most of 
the twentieth century, trusts that were restricted to the statutory legal list tended to 
underperform compared with trusts that invested in the security market.57 Most well-
advised settlors “contracted out” of conservative investment limitations by conferring 
upon their trustees considerably greater investment freedom than was authorised by 
the Trustee Act 1925.58 
Consequently, as a result of several studies, debates, and requests for reform, the 
Trustee Investments Act 1961 received royal assent on 3 August 1961. 59  The 
purpose of the Act was to allow trustees to “invest in assets with a greater potential 
for return, in particular in shares, without taking an undue risk with the trust capital”.60 
The Act made three changes to trustee investment: first, it imposed on trustees a 
limited statutory duty to obtain and consider advice about whether an investment is 
satisfactory. 61  Second, it required trustees to have regard to the need for 
diversification of investments so far as appropriate to the circumstances of the 
trust.62 Third, it provided for the division of the trust fund into two parts, known as the 
narrower-range and wider-range parts. The narrower-range part was available for 
investment in narrower-range investments and the wider-range part was available for 
investment in narrower-range or wider-range investments.63 Originally these parts 
had to be of equal value, but the proportion of the wider-range part was increased to 
three-quarters in 1996. 64  Narrower-range investments were restricted to fixed-
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income securities, including investment in mortgages of land and a diverse range of 
bonds, debentures and the like. 65  Wider-range investments consisted mainly of 
shares (subject to a number of restrictions) and authorised unit trusts.66 
When the Trustee Investments Act 1961 was enacted, it was well-known that 
investing in shares carried a degree of risk of capital loss and that this type of risk 
was not present with assets such as fixed-income securities. It was for this reason 
that Parliament considered it appropriate, in the absence of express powers, to 
ensure that trusts contained a core of investments in fixed-income securities.67 
The two Law Commissions accepted that the Act was a significant step forward. 
The Act did, for example, give trustees wider default powers of investment than they 
had previously enjoyed. However, the two Law Commissions found that the 
provisions of the Act operated in a way that was not only needlessly restrictive, but 
was also positively detrimental to most trusts to which it applied.68 First, the need to 
conform with the requirements of the Act, especially the requirement to divide the 
trust fund, was administratively burdensome and increased administrative costs. 
Second, the definition of wider-range investments was quite restrictive. It did not 
include investments in the purchase of land and permitted trustees to invest only in 
shares that meet certain qualifying conditions.69 For example, a company had to 
have paid regular dividends on all of its shares. 70  A practical result of the 
requirement to meet certain conditions was that trustees could not invest in many 
well-known public companies:71 
“... in the 1980s and 1990s, many prudent investors were purchasing shares in 
denationalized utilities, trustees were unable to do so, because the new public limited 
companies (such as British Gas plc and British Telecom plc) had no track record and 
therefore failed to meet the stringent criteria laid down by the Trustee Investments Act 
1961 for investment in quoted companies.” 
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Third, the frequent exclusion of the provisions of the Act in trust instruments 
meant that its application became more the exception than the rule. Most trusts 
usually conferred wide investment discretion on the trustees. Evidence submitted to 
the Law Reform Committee suggested that the provisions of the Act most commonly 
applied in practice only to older trusts, trusts made without professional advice, and 
statutory trusts that arose on intestacy.72 
Consequently, the two Law Commissions recommended reform that would lessen 
the administrative burden and associated costs of the Trustee Investments Act 1961 
and facilitate the use of modern investment services in trusts.73 
3 2 Modification of the traditional investment policy of avoiding all investments of a 
hazardous nature 
Hudson states that in Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust74 (“Bartlett”), Brightman J 
modified the old approach found in Learoyd.75 The material facts of the case were as 
follows: a trust corporation, Barclays Bank Trust, was the sole trustee of the Bartlett 
trust, set up by Sir Herbert Bartlett in 1920.76 The sole asset of the trust was 99.8% 
of the issued shares in a private company. 77  There were two directors – an 
accountant and a solicitor – on the board of directors; no member of the Bartlett 
family was on the board.78 
In 1961, the board announced their plans to change the company’s policy of 
investment. The board wanted to expand the company’s business from managing 
property to also developing property. The trustee, through one of its trust managers, 
agreed to this policy on condition that the income available to the beneficiaries was 
not affected.79 Accordingly, the “main objects clause” of the company was redefined 
at the annual general board meeting to allow for the development of property.80 
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From 1961 until 1973, the board embarked on speculative development in 
property; the trustee neither being consulted nor requiring to be consulted. The 
primary development scheme became known as the Old Bailey project.81 The project 
ended in disaster when planning permission could not be obtained for the 
development and the trust suffered a significant loss.82 By “loss”, the following is 
meant:83 
“... the depreciation which took place in the market value of the BT [the company] shares, 
by comparison with the value which the shares would have commanded if the loss on the 
Old Bailey project had not been incurred, and reduction of dividends through loss of 
income.” 
The plaintiffs, being the grandchildren of Sir Herbert Bartlett, claimed that the 
defendant trustee was liable to make good to the trust fund the loss accruing by 
reason of it having permitted the company to engage in property development.84 
Brightman J found that the Old Bailey project was “imprudent and hazardous and 
wholly unsuitable for a trust whether undertaken by the trustee direct or through the 
medium of its wholly owned company”,85 and allowed the claim.86 Brightman J held 
that the trustee had not discharged its duty as trustee in that it failed to supervise the 
new ventures of the company. It was not sufficient for the trustee to have relied 
merely on the supply of information that it received in the ordinary course as a 
shareholder.87 The trustee, being a majority shareholder, should have “required the 
board to inform and consult it so that it could intervene if necessary to safeguard the 
interest of the trust.”88 
Under the old authority of Learoyd, when a trustee is investing trust property, he 
must not only act as a business man of ordinary prudence, but he must also avoid all 












investments of a hazardous nature.89 The difficulty with this approach is that all 
investments necessarily involve some risk and it is thus impossible for trustees to 
make investments that are entirely risk-free.90 As Molloy states it:91 
“Life presents many dangers. Not the least of them is safety. As the faithless servant in 
Matthew’s Parable of the Talents discovered, totally risk-free investment is an oxymoron. 
Not even burying the trust estate affords protection against loss...” 
So, Brightman J modified the approach slightly by drawing a distinction between a 
prudent degree of risk on the one hand and a hazard on the other.92 The former, a 
prudent degree of risk, would be acceptable, whereas the latter, to put the trust in 
hazard, would be unacceptable. 93 According to Moffat, where the balance lies 
between “prudence” and “hazard” depends on the characteristics of the trust fund.94 
4 The Trustee Act 2000 
The Trustee Act 2000 Act came into force on 1 February 2001.95 In response to 
the criticisms of the Trustee Investments Act 1961, section 3 of the Trustee Act 2000 
confers the widest possible investment powers on trustees:96 
“... a trustee may make any kind of investment that he could make if he were absolutely 
entitled to the assets of the trust.” 
The Act refers to the power under section 3 as the “the general power of 
investment”. 97  The general power of investment is a default power and is thus 
subject to any restriction or exclusion imposed by the trust instrument.98 According to 
Reed and Wilson, the fact that a trustee can only make such investments as he 
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could if the assets belonged to him, makes little difference in practice. They mention 
that one exception might be the case of a corporate trustee with restricted powers of 
dealing with its own assets.99 
4 1 Balancing the introduction of wider powers of investment with appropriate 
safeguards 
4 1 1 General duties applicable to trustees 
The two Law Commissions proposed that safeguards for the protection of 
beneficiaries should balance the introduction of wider statutory powers of 
investment.100  The two Law Commissions accepted that the proposals for wider 
powers of investment did not affect the general duties that the law imposes on 
trustees. Therefore, trustees must continue to act in the best interests of the 
beneficiaries and must avoid any conflict between their duties as trustees and their 
own personal interests.101 They must also act impartially; hence they must seek to 
strike a balance, so far as is possible, between the competing interests of income 
and capital beneficiaries. The two Law Commissions also considered that trustees 
must be subject to a statutory duty of care when exercising their powers of 
investment.102 The latter duty, the statutory duty of care, requires explaining. 
Section 1 of the Trustee Act 2000 introduces a new statutory duty of care:103 
“Whenever the duty under this subsection applies to a trustee, he must exercise such 
care and skill as is reasonable in the circumstances ...” 
A further reading of section 1 reveals that the statutory duty of care, whilst 
creating an objective standard of care, does have a subjective element to it. In other 
words, the standard is variable according to the subjective characteristics of the 
trustees. According to Chukwu, the subjective characteristics of a trustee should be 
considered only in order to “raise, but never to lower, the bar”.104 Factors that might 
lead to a stricter standard would include: where a trustee is acting in a professional 
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capacity; or where an individual trustee claims to have special knowledge or 
experience and skill.105 In Bartlett, Brightman J expressed the view that professional 
trustees have a higher standard of care than ordinary prudent men or women. 
Therefore, a trust corporation is expected to exercise the care of a specialist in trust 
administration, reflecting the fact that it holds itself out as having such specialist skill. 
In Bartlett, the court found that the bank trustee failed in its duty whether judged by 
the standard of the prudent man of business or by the standard of the skilled trust 
corporation.106 
Schedule 1 to the Trustee Act 2000 outlines the situations in which the statutory 
duty of care applies.107 Of importance here is the fact that it applies to trustees when 
“exercising any power of investment”. It is also worth mentioning the other situations 
in which the statutory duty of care applies. It applies to trustees when exercising any 
power in relation to land; entering into arrangements under which a person is 
authorised to exercise functions as an agent, nominee or custodian; exercising any 
power of compromise; exercising the power to insure property; and exercising the 
power to do valuations.108 
Since the statutory duty of care is not of general application, the prudent man 
standard continues to apply to certain other duties and powers.109 The prudent man 
standard broadly continues to apply in relation to the duties of trustees concerning 
custody of the trust property and its management;110 dispositive powers of trustees 
such as discretion to select from a class of beneficiaries;111 and where trustees are 
exercising a power under a trust instrument to carry on a business.112 
4 1 2 Specific duties applicable to trustees 
In addition to the three general duties – the duty to act in the best interests of 
beneficiaries, the duty to act impartially, and the statutory duty of care – the Trustee 
Act 2000 imposes two specific duties on trustees in the performance of their 
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investment functions: first, trustees must have regard to what is termed the standard 
investment criteria and, second, they are under a duty to obtain and consider advice. 
4 1 2 1 The standard investment criteria 
The Trustee Act 2000 requires trustees exercising a power of investment to have 
regard to what is described as the standard investment criteria.113 These criteria are 
not new; they first appeared in the Trustee Investments Act 1961.114 There are two 
such criteria: first, trustees must have regard to the suitability of the investment 
concerned and, second, to the need for diversification.115 Trustees must have regard 
to these standard investment criteria both in making investments and also in 
periodically reviewing the investments.116 The provision to keep the investments of 
the trust under review is in effect a codification of the common law position.117 
The suitability requirement means that it is the duty of the trustees to consider 
whether a particular investment is appropriate for the trust in question.118 From the 
Explanatory Notes that accompany the Trustee Act 2000, it appears that the size of 
the investment; the risk of the investment; the need to produce an appropriate 
balance between income and capital growth; and “ethical considerations” are 
relevant in judging whether the investment is suitable. 119  Hudson explains the 
second consideration, the risk of the investment, as follows:120 
“Where the trust is a small family trust with a comparatively weak risk appetite, the 
investments to be made should be safe, whereas investments made on behalf of a trust 
fund created by two corporations who are expert in financial services ... could be 
considerably more adventurous, and so intended to take greater risks.” 
                                                            
113 S 4(1) of the Trustee Act 2000. 
114 Pearce & Stevens Trusts and Equitable Obligations 622 footnote 81. 
115  SR Chowdhury “Whether or not the law relating to modern trustees’ power and duties have 
achieved a balance between managing the trust assets and protecting the interest of the 
beneficiaries: a critical analysis” (2015) 6 Mediterr J Soc Sci 386 388. 
116 S 4(2) of the Trustee Act 2000. 
117 Moffat Trust Law 493. 
118 Chowdhury (2015) Mediterr J Soc Sci 388. 
119 Note 23 of the Explanatory Notes accompanying the Trustee Act 2000. 
120 Hudson Equity and Trusts 439. See also Hudson’s comparison of a trust created by a billionaire 




Other factors that might be taken into account when looking at the issue of 
suitability are considerations as to the expected duration of the trust; the 
beneficiaries’ tax position;121 and the probable timing of distribution of income or 
capital to specific beneficiaries.122 
The second criteria requires trustees to pay heed to “the need for diversification of 
investments of the trust, in so far as is appropriate to the circumstances of the 
trust”.123 Strictly speaking, trustees are not obliged to diversify but they are duty-
bound to consider diversification. Nevertheless, if the trust fund is substantial and the 
power of investment is unrestricted, the trustees would need good reason not to 
diversify. As Le Poidevin states it:124 
“... a trustee would need to have some good reason for putting all its eggs in one basket.” 
Diversification is not defined in the Trustee Act 2000, but it means maintaining a 
good spread of investments.125 The rule speaks of diversification as a need; it is 
needed in order to reduce risk.126 By holding a combination of assets, known as a 
portfolio, trustees are able to minimise the risk to which the trust fund is exposed. 
Some combinations of assets will be more effective than others in reducing the 
overall risk on the portfolio. Take the following simplified example:127 
“... if two assets are likely to perform well under opposite market conditions or at different 
times, then dividing the fund between these two would substantially reduce the degree of 
risk; on the other hand, dividing the fund between two investments which will tend to track 
each other and perform well under similar conditions would be less effective at reducing 
overall risk.” 
Therefore, in order to reduce risk, it is more effective to choose investments that 
have offsetting risks.128 
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Special circumstances that can legitimately be taken into account to reduce or 
remove any need for diversification is the smallness of the fund129 or if the trustees 
are instructed by the settlor (or testator) to retain particular assets within the trust.130 
4 1 2 2 Duty to obtain and consider proper advice 
A further requirement of the Trustee Act 2000 is that trustees must take proper 
advice on investment decisions.131 On the question as to the sort of advice that 
qualifies as being proper advice, Hudson suggests that the following would constitute 
such advice:132 
“It is suggested that consulting a professional in the field in which the investment is to be 
made would definitely constitute ‘proper advice’ if the professional was consulted on 
ordinary business terms and paid in the ordinary manner.” 
There is no statutory requirement that any advice received should be in writing. 
However, Moffat encourages trustees to put investment advice in writing. He views 
written advice as a sensible precaution and argues that it is best practice for 
trustees.133 
Trustees can dispense with seeking advice if they reasonably conclude that it is 
unnecessary or inappropriate to do so in all circumstances. 134  For instance, the 
trustees may consider the trust fund to be too small or one or more of the trustees 
might already possess the appropriate skill and knowledge.135 
5 Significant changes to trust investment law after 2000 
The two Law Commissions determined that modern trustees acting within their 
investment powers should be entitled to be judged by the standards of MPT.136 
However, in some respects the prudent man standard as traditionally understood 
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was incompatible with MPT.137 Stated differently, the English law of trusts presented 
a number of obstacles to the implementation of MPT.138 In this section, the law 
relating to trustee investment before and after 2000 is examined to show which 
areas of trustee investment changed, and explain how these areas changed in order 
to accommodate MPT.  
5 1 The limitation to certain types of investment 
The Trustee Act 2000 introduces a new wide general power of investment:139 
“... a trustee may make any kind of investment that he could make if he were absolutely 
entitled to the assets of the trust.” 
Almost any form of investment is thus permissible,140 provided the safeguards 
discussed earlier in the chapter are employed.141 Under the Trustee Investments Act 
1961, trustees were limited to certain types of investment.142 Hudson explains that 
what has changed is that trustees are now presumed to be free to make any suitable 
investments in the absence of any express provision to the contrary, whereas before 
trustees were presumed to be capable only of making a limited range of investments 
in the absence of any provision to the contrary.143 
5 2 The isolation approach 
The historical assumption of the prudent man standard was that each investment 
should be evaluated separately, rather than be considered as part of a portfolio of 
investments.144 This approach is referred to as the isolation approach in chapter 4.145 
In contrast, MPT emphasises the evaluation of the investment portfolio “holistically 
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rather than on an asset-by-asset basis”. 146  The isolation approach is thus 
incompatible with MPT.147 
When the opportunity arose through the pleadings in Nestle v National 
Westminster Bank Plc148 (“Nestle”), the court was prepared to modify the prudent 
man standard. Before discussing the facts of the case, attention is drawn to an 
important paragraph in the court of first instance where Hoffmann J stated the 
following:149 
“Modern trustees acting within their investment powers are entitled to be judged by the 
standards of current portfolio theory, which emphasises the risk level of the entire 
portfolio rather than the risk attaching to each investment taken in isolation.” 
In support of his proposition that trustees are entitled to be judged by the 
standards of MPT, Hoffmann J cited the American academic Gordon’s influential 
article on MPT.150  
5 2 1 The facts of the Nestle case 
The testator, William Nestle, died in 1922 and left his estate on trust for various 
descendants. The trustee of the trust was National Westminster Bank. 151  The 
testator held a substantial portfolio of investments worth about £54 000. The portfolio 
was reasonably well balanced for the time: it comprised 26% fixed interest securities 
and 74% equities.152 The plaintiff, Miss Nestle, was the remainder beneficiary under 
the trust of her grandfather, William Nestle. Miss Nestle became solely and 
absolutely entitled to the trust fund in 1986, by which date the nominal capital value 
of the fund had increased to around £269 000.153 The increase in the value of the 
trust fund from £54 000 to £269 000 might be thought to be a substantial 
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improvement; however, during the same period, the cost of living had multiplied by a 
factor of 20. 154  Miss Nestle complained that, after adjusting the 1922 value for 
changes in the retail prices index to date, it should have been worth more or less 
£1 million.155 What is more, she alleged that if the original portfolio balance between 
equities and fixed interest securities had been maintained until 1986, the fund would 
have been worth over £1.8 million.156 
There were four main strands to the Miss Nestle’s case: first, the trustee 
misunderstood the investment clause in the will; second, the trustee failed to conduct 
a regular and periodic review of the investments; third, throughout the trust period, 
but in particular in the later stages when there were income beneficiaries domiciled 
abroad, the trustee retained or bought too high a proportion of fixed interest 
securities and too few ordinary shares; and four, to the extent that the trustee did 
invest in ordinary shares, it concentrated too heavily on shares in banking and 
insurance companies to the exclusion of other sectors.157 
The Court of Appeal found that the first complaint was proved. Miss Nestle alleged 
that the trustee had failed to understand the investment clause, largely because it 
had failed to seek legal advice as to its meaning. 158  Consequently, the trustee 
believed that its investment options were much narrower than was the case.159 The 
evidence showed that the trustee continually misunderstood the investment clause, 
and there is nothing to show that it ever understood it correctly.160 
Regarding the second complaint, the court found that the trustee failed to conduct 
regular and periodic reviews of the trust’s investments before 1959.161 However, the 
court held that the misunderstanding of the investment clause and the failure to 
conduct periodic reviews do not by themselves, whether separately or together, 
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afford the plaintiff a remedy.162 In order for Miss Nestle to discharge her burden of 
proof, she had to show that:163 
“... through one or other or both of those causes, the trustees made decisions which they 
should not have made or failed to make decisions which they should have made. If that 
were proved, and if at first sight loss resulted, it would be appropriate to order an enquiry 
as to the loss suffered by the trust fund.” 
Miss Nestle also complained that after 1960 the trustee’s investment favoured the 
income beneficiaries at the expense of herself, the capital beneficiary.164 After 1960, 
the trustee invested a substantial portion of the trust fund in fixed-income 
securities.165 The court found that, after taking the savings in estate duty and capital 
transfer tax into account, the investment policy did not produce a less satisfactory 
result for the capital beneficiary than an investment in equities. The trustee’s 
investment policy still had the effect of preserving trust capital.166 It followed that 
Miss Nestle had suffered no loss and the court held that the claim of discrimination in 
favour of the income beneficiaries failed on the facts.167 
The final complaint was in regard to the diversification of the fund. Miss Nestle did 
not suggest that the proportion of equities should at any stage back to 1960 have 
been higher than it was. Her complaint was rather that the equities should have been 
diversified. The fund in 1960 was of a total value of around £105 000, of which 
£16 000 (or 15%) was in fixed interest securities and £89 000 (or 85%) was in 
equities. All the equities were, however, bank or insurance shares.168 The onus was 
on Miss Nestle to prove that she had suffered a loss because the equities were only 
concentrated in bank and insurance shares. The court found that she did not provide 
such proof:169 
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“She has not even provided any material which would enable the court to assess the 
strength of, or value, the chance which she claims she has lost.” 
Consequently, all of Miss Nestle’s claims were dismissed because she had failed 
to show that a breach of trust resulting in actual loss had occurred.170 
There are two possible explanations for the approach taken by the court in Nestle. 
The first is that the result very much turned on the defendant trustee winning the 
battle of the experts as to the investment expertise to be expected of trustees.171 The 
second is a more sophisticated explanation for the Court of Appeal’s decision. The 
explanation is that it applied the Hastings-Bass rule to determine whether a trustee 
should be liable for imprudent investment.172 The general principle of the rule is as 
follows:173 
“If trustees make a decision on wholly wrong grounds, and yet it subsequently appears, 
from matters which they did not express or refer to, that there are in fact good and 
sufficient reasons for supporting their decision, then I do not think that they would incur 
any liability for having decided the matter on erroneous grounds; for the decision itself 
was right.” 
Applied to the Nestle, it means that:174 
“... while the bank was clearly ‘in breach’ to the extent that it woefully misunderstood the 
scope of the investment clause, it was not ‘in breach’ in so far as the investment 
decisions that it did make were held not to cause loss, because they could have been 
justified as valid investment decisions had they known their actual investment powers.” 
[Penner’s emphasis.] 
Watt states that the Hastings-Bass rule is not appropriate for reviewing the 
prudence of the investment process adopted by trustees. Therefore, according to 
Watt, the court mistakenly applied the rule in Nestle. 175  Watt rather prefers an 
approach where a breach of trust is determined by reference to trustees’ conduct 
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and not by reference to “the outcomes that their conduct happened to produce”.176 
The focus of this dissertation does not warrant further discussion of the Hastings-
Bass rule.  
There are conflicting opinions on whether the judges in the Court of Appeal 
endorsed Hoffmann J’s approach.177 Reed and Wilson are of the opinion that the 
approach taken by Hoffmann J was approved by the Court of Appeal.178 However, 
Duckworth does not share this view:179 
“The Nestle case went to the Court of Appeal where, sadly, none of the judges endorsed 
Hoffmann J’s acceptance of modern portfolio theory.” 
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the total portfolio approach should be regarded 
as part of English trust law, at least from 1996. There are three reasons for this 
submission: first, the total portfolio approach was adopted by Her Majesty’s Treasury 
in its Consultation Paper on the Investment Powers of Trustees published in 1996.180 
Therefore, according to Oakley, from this date the total portfolio approach must be 
regarded as part of the general law.181 Second, writing extra-judicially, Lord Nicholls 
endorsed the approach as put forward by Hoffmann J in Nestle at first instance. In 
his 1995 article, Lord Nicholls states the following:182 
“Investment policy is aimed at producing a portfolio of investments which is balanced 
overall and suited to the needs of the particular trust. Different investments are 
accompanied by different degrees of risk, which are reflected in the expected rate of 
return. A large fund with widely diversified portfolio of securities might justifiably include 
modest holdings of high risk securities which would be imprudent and out of place in a 
smaller fund. In such a case it would be inappropriate to isolate one particular investment 
out of a vast portfolio and enquire whether that can be justified as a trust investment. 
Such a 'line by line' approach is misplaced. The inquiry, rather, should be to look at the 
particular investment and enquire whether that is justified as a holding in the context of 
the overall portfolio. Traditional warnings against the need for trustees to avoid 
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speculative or hazardous investments are not to be read as inhibiting trustees from 
maintaining portfolios of investments which contain a prudent and sensible mixture of low 
risk and higher risk securities. They are not to be so read, because they were not directed 
at a portfolio which is a balanced exercise in risk management.” 
Third, when the authors of Lewin on Trusts state that modern trustees are entitled 
to be judged by “the standards of current portfolio theory, which emphasises the risk 
level of the entire portfolio rather than the risk attaching to each investment taken in 
isolation”,183 they do not refer to the Trustee Act 2000 as authority but rather to Lord 
Nicholls’ article and to the lower court decision of Hoffmann J in Nestle.184 
The Trustee Act 2000 does not mention MPT or the total portfolio approach 
directly. However, according to the Explanatory Notes that accompany the Act, the 
Act does take account of MPT indirectly. The Explanatory Notes state that the 
definition of the “standard investment criteria” accords with MPT:185 
“The definition of the standard investment criteria in section 4(3) is closely 
modelled on section 6(1) of the Trustee Investments Act 1961 and accords with 
modern portfolio theory.” 
5 3 The inability to diversify effectively 
Trustees have long recognised the importance of diversification through the 
holding of a varied portfolio of investments.186 For instance, the Trustee Investments 
Act 1961 required that trustees had to have regard to the need for diversification of 
investments so far as appropriate to the circumstances of the trust. 187  One 
commentator believes that trustees have been recognising the importance of 
diversification from as far back as 1886. Lofthouse argues that the desirability of 
diversification has been known since the Learoyd case. He states that:188 
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“Diversification seems an essential course of action for a prudent trustee mindful of his 
duty to make an investment for the benefit of other people for whom he felt morally bound 
to provide.” 
However, it seems from the findings of Nestle that diversification is a modern 
notion in the English law of trusts.189 One specific complaint in Nestle was that the 
trustee failed to diversify the investments in equities away from the original 
investments in bank and insurance shares during the period from 1922 to 1960.190 
Hoffmann J in the trial judgment was of the view that the allegation was unfounded. 
He regarded that it was unreasonable for the virtues of diversification to have been 
appreciated in the first half of the twentieth century.191 Staughton LJ in the Court of 
Appeal noted that there should have been diversification in the1950s, rather than 
from 1960 onwards. However, he went on to state that he could not accept that 
failure to diversify between 1950 and 1960 “was a course which no prudent trustee 
would have followed”.192 
The Trustee Act 2000 in effect re-enacts the section in the Trustee Investments 
Act 1961 that deals with diversification.193 But this does not mean that the Trustee 
Act 2000 did not bring about any changes. It is submitted that after 2000 trustees 
have been able to diversify trust investments quite differently than before. As 
discussed above, from a diversification perspective, it is more effective to choose 
investments that have offsetting risks.194 A major improvement of the Act is that it 
better equips trustees to choose investments with offsetting risks since trustees can 
now make any kind of investment. Furthermore, as a consequence of the Nestle 
case, trustees are entitled to be judged by the total portfolio approach as opposed to 
the isolation approach. The end result is that trustees have been able to diversify 
more effectively since 2000. 
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5 4 The rule against the delegation of investment functions 
The Trustee Act 2000 confers on trustees acting collectively a power to authorise 
any person to exercise as their agent any or all of what are termed their “delegable 
functions”.195 The delegable functions of trustees are any function other than:196 
“(a) any functions relating to whether and in what way any assets of the trust should be 
distributed, (b) any power to decide whether any fees or other payments due to be made 
out of the trust funds should be made out of income or capital, (c) any power to appoint a 
person to be a trustee of the trust, or (d) any power conferred by any other enactment or 
the trust instrument which permits the trustees to delegate any of their functions or to 
appoint a person to act as a nominee or custodian.” 
Since the section does not exclude the power to delegate the management of 
trust investments, trustees are able to delegate their investment functions to an 
agent, in this case, an investment manager.197 
Before the Act, trustees had to decide personally not merely on an investment 
policy but also on individual investment transactions. No general provision existed 
enabling trustees to delegate to others their discretionary trust functions.198 Trustees 
were, therefore, not entitled to delegate the selection of trust investments; they were 
only permitted the delegation of administrative functions.199 Trustees could appoint a 
stockbroker to carry out transactions, but it was the trustees who were required to 
decide which shares were to be bought and sold.200 Therefore, in the absence of 
express powers in the trust instrument to do so, trustees could not employ 
discretionary fund managers.201 
The limitation on trustees’ powers of delegation constituted a serious impediment 
to the administration of trusts. Trusteeship is a specialised task that often requires 
professional skills that a particular trustee might not have. For example, portfolio 
                                                            
195 R Wilson “The tension between trustees and investment managers: part 1” (2003) 1 PCB 31 34. 
196 S 11(2) of the Trustee Act 2000. 
197 S Panesar “The Trustee Act 2000” (2001) 12 ICCLR 151 154. 
198 154; Le Poidevin (2009) T & T 596. 
199 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission Trustees’ Powers and Duties 45; F 
Barlow “The flexibility of family trusts” (2013) 19 T & T 255 256. 
200 Wilson (2003) PCB 34. 
201 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission Trustees’ Powers and Duties 46; Hayton 




management might be too intricate for some trustees and they will be compelled to 
engage experts.202 The two Law Commissions found that it is essential for trustees 
of larger trusts to delegate investment functions:203 
“In practice, for any trust that has substantial investments, the employment of a 
discretionary fund manager is a necessity.” 
Wilson describes the fact that trustees can now employ an investment manager 
with the discretion as to which investments are bought and sold as the main 
innovation of the Trustee Act 2000.204 
5 5 The unavailability of total return investing 
The Trustee Act 2000 significantly widened trustees’ investment powers. 
However, trustees continue to be constrained in their investment decisions in one 
area. Trustees are restricted by the combination of the rules that classify trust 
receipts as income or capital, and the overarching duty to balance the interests of 
income beneficiaries (also called life tenants) and capital beneficiaries (also called 
remaindermen).205 
In a trust where there is only one class of beneficiaries with identical rights, the 
source of investment returns is generally immaterial.206 However, where there are 
successive beneficial interests, such as the fairly common scenario in which one 
beneficiary has a life interest that is followed by a transfer of the trust capital to 
another beneficiary, the character of the different sources of revenue becomes 
significant.207 The governing principle in the English law of trusts is that the life 
tenant is entitled only to income and the capital beneficiary is entitled only to 
capital.208 This rule is referred to as the traditional distribution rule in chapter 4.209 
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Another common feature of the English law of trusts is that trustees are under a 
duty to balance the competing interests of income and capital beneficiaries. 
Therefore, trustees must maintain the value of the trust capital while providing a 
proportionate income; they cannot invest entirely for capital growth, nor can they 
invest entirely for income return.210 
Investing without being constrained by the traditional distribution approach is 
known as total return investing.211 This important feature of MPT focuses on all the 
returns generated from a portfolio of assets regardless of whether the returns take 
the form of income or capital.212 Total return investing potentially delivers a higher 
rate of return than one that isolates income returns from capital returns, because it 
“facilitates the spreading of investments and removes restrictions from trustees’ 
choices”.213 
There are different ways of facilitating total return investing. One method is to use 
a “power of allocation”. A power of allocation gives trustees a power to allocate 
capital receipts to income, and income receipts to capital in order to establish a 
balance between income and capital beneficiaries. 214 Another method is the 
“percentage trust”. A percentage trust enables total return investing by requiring 
trustees to distribute a certain percentage of the value of the trust to the income 
beneficiary each year. What a fair percentage would be is determined either by the 
settlor or by legislation.215 
Concerns regarding the law governing the treatment of capital and income in 
trusts were raised in 2000 during the parliamentary debates on the Trustee Bill. The 
matter was referred to the English Law Commission. The Law Commission 
commenced work on the project in 2003, published a Consultation Paper in 2004, 
and made recommendations in 2009.216 Six points were clear from the consultation 
exercise: first, the Law Commission in its 2009 report noted that the law does not 
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prohibit a settlor from establishing a power of allocation in the trust instrument217 or 
constituting a percentage trust.218 Second, total return investing was, however, not 
being employed in private trusts. Settlors and their advisers are usually unwilling to 
venture into an unfamiliar model.219 Third, despite it not being employed, there are 
considerable support for total return investing within the trust industry.220 Fourth, of 
the two total return investing models, the Law Commission preferred the percentage 
trust:221 
“We would add that in our view, the model for total return investment that we think most 
likely to be successful is not the power of allocation, as originally envisaged ..., but the 
percentage trust.” 
Fifth, the Law Commission explained that there are, however, significant obstacles 
to the widespread adoption of total return investing in England and Wales. A major 
technical impediment to the adoption of total return investing is that the tax system 
for trusts is based exclusively on the traditional income/capital dichotomy. Therefore, 
from a tax perspective, the structure of the two models of total return investing does 
not map onto the current tax system.222 Consequently, tax considerations prevented 
the Law Commission from recommending that total return investing be made 
available to private trusts:223 
“We share the inevitable disappointment of many in the trust industry that in the light of 
current tax law and policy we have decided not to make any recommendations for total 
return investment for private trusts.” 
Sixth, despite the tax issues, the Law Commission remained of the view that total 
return investing is an important step for England and Wales.224 Accordingly, the 
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commission recommended that more work be done in order to enable trustees to 
use total return investing somewhere in the future:225 
“Accordingly, we conclude this Part with a recommendation that HMRC [Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs] and HM Treasury [Her Majesty’s Treasury] work with the trust 
industry to devise a mechanism for total return investment in a way that facilitates 
investment while remaining satisfactory from the point of view of taxation.” 
Up until today, further work has only been done in relation to charitable trusts but 
not in the private trust space. In 2009, the Law Commission noted that trustees were 
already investing profitably on a total return basis in the charitable sector. 226  A 
number of large charitable trusts in England and Wales adopted an approach similar 
to the approach under percentage trusts. Of course, for charitable trusts, unlike 
private trusts, the distinction between capital and income has no tax implications.227 
In order to adopt a total return approach, the only requirement for trustees was to 
seek prior approval from the Charity Commission. 228  The Law Commission 
recommended in its 2009 report that this restriction should be removed. 229 
Accordingly, from 1 January 2014, charitable trusts have been able to adopt a total 
return investment strategy without securing approval from the Charity 
Commission.230 
Taking the above-mentioned into consideration, it is submitted that trustees of 
private trusts in England face a similar problem than trustees in South Africa. 
Trustees in England are under an obligation to preserve the real value of a trust fund 
(as opposed to merely seeking to protect its nominal value) and, because of trustees’ 
duty of impartiality, they are also obliged to produce adequate income for income 
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beneficiaries.231 The problem for trustees, however, is that it is extremely difficult to 
achieve this goal without having total return investing at their disposal.232  
5 6 The anti-netting rule 
The anti-netting rule (or the rule against set-off)233 has been part of English law 
since the nineteenth century.234 The rule provides that where the court finds that the 
trustees have invested imprudently, the trustees cannot offset the loss from such an 
investment against a gain from another breach of trust,235 or against a gain from an 
investment not involving a breach of trust.236 The rule has an exception: losses from 
a breach of trust can be offset by gains from other breaches of trust if those other 
breaches are not separate and distinct.237 
At first glance it would seem that the anti-netting rule constitutes an uneasy fit with 
the concept of portfolio-wide assessment of investment performance, in other words, 
the total portfolio approach.238 Yet, the Trustee Act 2000 does not abolish the rule. 
One can thus assume that the anti-netting rule is not viewed in English law to be in 
conflict with the total portfolio approach. The question whether the rule is indeed in 
conflict with the total portfolio approach is discussed in chapter 7.239 
6 Conclusion 
After the South Sea Bubble burst in 1720, the English Court of Chancery 
developed a court-made list of investments that were presumptively proper for 
trustees. The broadening of the range of acceptable securities occurred as a result 
of statutory changes in the mid-nineteenth century. The securities of the statutory 
legal list were all fixed-income securities. During the same period, corporate stock 
was not considered good security for trustee investing. The 1925 Act consolidated 
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the statutory legal list but did not extend it to company stock. Trustees without a wide 
express power of investment were thus limited only to narrow categories of 
investment. 
The level of care and skill required of trustees was the same whether they were 
choosing from the statutory legal list or from a wider range of investments authorised 
by the trust instrument. The general duty of trustees was to act honestly and fairly 
and to “take all those precautions which an ordinary prudent man of business would 
take in managing similar affairs of his own”. This standard is referred to as the 
prudent man standard. The standard was later modified in the case of powers of 
investment. It was stated that: 
“The duty of a trustee is not to take such care only as a prudent man would take if he had 
only himself to consider; the duty rather is to take such care as an ordinary prudent man 
would take if he were minded to make an investment for the benefit of other people for 
whom he felt morally bound to provide.” 
As a consequence, trustees had to adopt a more cautious investment policy than 
individual investors. More specifically, trustees were required to avoid all investments 
that were attended with hazard. 
The weakness of the legal list philosophy began to emerge in the 1930s. Several 
factors appeared that contributed to the disenchantment with fixed-income 
investments, inflation being the most important factor. As a result of several studies, 
debates, and requests for reform, the Trustee Investments Act 1961 was enacted. 
The purpose of the Act was to allow trustees to invest in assets with a greater 
potential for return, in particular in shares, without taking an undue risk with the trust 
capital. The two Law Commissions in their joint Law Commissions’ report accepted 
that, at the time, the Trustees Investment Act 1961 was a significant step forward. 
However, they found that the provisions of the Act operated in a way that was not 
only needlessly restrictive, but also positively detrimental to most trusts to which it 
applied. By perpetuating the old approach of a list of investments, the Act was out of 
step with modern thinking. Consequently, the two Law Commissions recommended 
reform that would lessen the administrative burden and associated costs of the Act 
and facilitate the use of modern investment services in trusts. 
Other developments also took place in the period before the enactment of the 




the old authority of Learoyd. The difficulty with this approach was that all investments 
necessarily involve some element of risk and it is thus impossible for trustees to 
make investments that are entirely risk-free. Brightman J modified the approach 
slightly in Bartlett by drawing a distinction between a prudent degree of risk on the 
one hand and hazard on the other. 
The Trustee Act 2000 broke with the past by doing away with the authorised list 
principle and instead conferring the widest possible investment powers on trustees. 
Appropriately, these wide powers of investment are coupled with adequate 
safeguards. In addition to three general duties – the duty to act in the best interests 
of beneficiaries, the duty to act impartially, and the statutory duty of care – the Act 
imposes two specific duties on trustees in order to protect the interests of 
beneficiaries: first, trustees must have regard to what is termed the standard 
investment criteria and, second, they are under a duty to obtain and consider advice. 
The two Law Commissions determined that modern trustees acting within their 
investment powers should be entitled to be judged by the standards of MPT. 
However, the English law of trusts presented a number of obstacles to the 
implementation of MPT. The Trustee Act 2000 removed most of these obstacles, 
either directly or indirectly, while the Nestle case played a significant role in 
eliminating one obstacle in particular. First, by permitting investment in any type of 
investment, the Act removed the primary obstacle to trustees, namely being limited 
only to certain types of investment. Second, by virtue of the Nestle case, modern 
trustees are not judged by the isolation approach anymore, but are entitled to be 
judged by the total portfolio approach. Third, since the Act permits any type of 
investment and since trustees are entitled to be judged by the total portfolio 
approach, trustees are better equipped to choose investments with offsetting risks. 
As a consequence, trustees are able to diversify more effectively. Fourth, a major 
innovation of the Act is that trustees can employ an investment manager with the 
discretion as to which investments are to be bought and sold. Before 2000, in the 
absence of express powers in the trust instrument to do so, trustees were not able to 
delegate their investment functions. Unfortunately, one obstacle was not removed. 
Tax considerations prevented the English Law Commission from recommending the 
use of total return investing. Trustees are thus unable to take full advantage of MPT. 
The Law Commission did however recommend that more work be done in order to 




Finally, the two Law Commissions gave no indication suggesting that the anti-
netting rule is in conflict with the total portfolio approach. Accordingly, the Trustee 
Act 2000 does not abolish the rule. 
The next chapter examines the development of trustees’ investment standards in 
New Zealand. Chapter 6 will show that New Zealand has also modernised trustee 
investing by integrating MPT principles into its trust law. Thereafter, chapter 7 will 
review, compare and analyse the development of trustees’ investment standards in 





CHAPTER 6 – THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRUSTEES’ INVESTMENT STANDARDS 
IN NEW ZEALAND 
1 Introduction 
This chapter describes and analyses the development of trustees’ investment 
standards in New Zealand. Prior to 1988, trustee investment was governed by a 
number of rules that effectively prevented trustees from following a modern portfolio 
theory (“MPT”) approach to investing. Thereafter, amendments were made to 
legislation that were designed to permit trustees to use MPT techniques. In fact, this 
was the first legislative attempt to design legislation that is favourably disposed 
towards MPT, preceding enactments in New York by a few years.1  
In 2013, the New Zealand Law Commission (referred to in this chapter as the 
“Law Commission”) found that the 1988 changes did not go far enough to permit 
trustees to adopt the full MPT approach. Consequently, the Law Commission 
recommended that any obstacles that pose difficulties to the full integration of MPT 
into trust law should be removed. Based on the Law Commission’s 
recommendations, the Trusts Act 2019 obtained royal assent on 30 July 2019, the 
final stage in becoming an act of Parliament. The Act will enter into force eighteen 
months after royal assent, thus on 30 January 2021. 
The purpose of the chapter is to provide answers to four important questions: first, 
why was it necessary for the 1988 changes to have taken place? Second, what 
changes were made to trust investment law? Third, what further changes will the 
Trusts Act 2019 make once it enters into force? Fourth, is MPT the new standard of 
prudence in New Zealand trust law? In answering these questions, the chapter 
explains the problems that trustees face when they are unable to rely on a rule 
based on MPT, describes how certain areas of trustee investing must change in 
order for MPT to be fully integrated into trust law, discusses the advantages of the 
full integration of MPT, and provides a better understanding of New Zealand’s 
current and future position with respect to MPT. 
Following this introduction, the chapter is divided into four sections, which are 
summarised in the conclusion at the end of the chapter. Section 2 discusses trust 
investment law before 1988. The section first states what the initial acceptable type 
                                                            




of investments was; and second, it describes the standard of care that was required 
of trustees and illustrates its application by discussing a well-known New Zealand 
court case. Section 3 discusses the position after 1988. The section starts by 
providing the reasons why there was a need for reform and then examines how trust 
investment law was changed. The first part of section 4 provides background to the 
Law Commission’s full-scale review of the law of trusts and summarises the 
conclusion that it reached regarding trustees’ investment functions in particular. The 
second part of section 4 discusses the areas of trustee investing that the Law 
Commission recommended must change and the provisions in the Trusts Act 2019 
that correspond to the proposed changes. Section 5 investigates whether New 
Zealand has moved from permitting the use of MPT to perhaps requiring investing in 
accordance with MPT and whether this position will remain after the Trusts Act 2019 
enters into force. 
2 Trust investment law before 1988 
2 1 The legal list approach 
Like other common law jurisdictions, New Zealand has traditionally followed 
English trustee legislation and has generally adopted English case law in the area of 
trust investment law.2 Following the practice in England, trustee investment in New 
Zealand was based on a list of approved forms of investment prior to 1988.3 This is 
hereafter referred to as the “legal list approach”. Trustees were permitted to invest 
only in investments specifically authorised by the Trustee Act 1956. The will or trust 
deed could allow for a wider range of investments, but if it did not, the trustees could 
only invest in one of the forms of investment prescribed by law.4 
Initially, the classes of authorised investment were essentially confined to fixed-
income investments such as government stock, local authority stock, bank and 
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building society deposits, and first mortgages of land.5 A 1974 change to the Trustee 
Act 1956 expanded the list of authorised investments to include a limited range of 
equities.6 Unlike England’s Trustee Investments Act 1961, the Trustee Act 1956 did 
not classify the authorised investments into narrower-range and wider-range 
investments.7 However, similar to English law, the Act permitted trustees to invest 
only in shares that met certain qualifying conditions. It confined trustee investment to 
investment in companies that were incorporated in New Zealand, had a paid-up 
share capital of $2 500 000, and had paid a dividend of at least 5% on all its issued 
shares in each of the five years preceding the investment.8 In spite of the 1974 
change, in practice, many trustees continued to invest predominantly in fixed-income 
investments.9 
2 2 The standard of care 
In Jones v AMP Perpetual Trustee Company10 (“Jones”), the court confirmed that 
when a trustee exercises his powers of investment, he must “take such care as an 
ordinary prudent man would take if he were minded to make an investment for the 
benefit of other people for whom he felt morally bound to provide”.11 The standard of 
care imposed on New Zealand trustees thus reflected the development of the law in 
England.12 This standard was required whether trustees invested in terms of the trust 
instrument or the Trustee Act 1956.13 
In Jones, the trustee of a company pension plan was sued by the members of the 
pension plan. 14  The trustee, AMP Perpetual Trustee Company (“Perpetual”), 
invested in a unitised investment-linked fund, which was referred to in the case as 
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“A Unit”. A Unit was established and managed by Perpetual’s parent company.15 The 
trust deed specifically authorised investment in this type of investment.16 Although 
A Unit included diversified forms of investment, it was heavily weighted towards 
investment in shares. With the trust fund heavily weighted towards equities due to its 
investment in A Unit, it was left exposed to the share market crash in October 1987 
and lost substantial value.17 
Changes were made to the Trustee Act 1956 on 1 October 1988 and the 
obligation to have an investment strategy arose indirectly from these changes.18 
Perpetual, however, did not complete a formal investment strategy until 
6 December 1990. In its formal investment strategy, Perpetual reconfirmed the 
decision to invest in A Unit.19 
The members of the pension fund – Jones and the other trust beneficiaries – sued 
Perpetual to recover the loss they had suffered from having their money invested in 
Unit A. The beneficiaries alleged that Perpetual breached its obligation to act 
prudently in the exercise of its powers of investment.20 
Much of Perpetual’s conduct had to be judged in accordance with the law prior to 
October 1988. 21  Thomas J took the view that the same standard of care was 
required and applicable to the conduct before and after 1988, and he applied this 
standard in order to decide whether A Unit was a proper investment. In terms of this 
standard of care, when exercising a power of investment, trustees should seek 
advice on matters that they might not understand and act prudently on that advice.22 
It was held that Perpetual had met the standard of care expected of it throughout 
the period under consideration.23 In particular, Perpetual had made proper inquiries 
and had taken advice; directed its mind to the critical question of what was in the 
best interests of the trust; kept the investment under review; invested the trust fund 
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with a reputable company that had performed relatively well as a fund manager; and 
had chosen an investment suitable for the size of the trust fund.24 Perpetual was thus 
held not liable to compensate the members for loss.25 
One of the complaints by the beneficiaries was that, although changes to the 
Trustee Act 1956 had come into force on 1 October 1988, no investment strategy 
was adopted until 6 December 1990. They argued that Perpetual was in breach of its 
duty to act with care because it waited over two years after the changes to legislation 
have been made before instituting an investment strategy.26 Thomas J held that the 
failure to adopt an investment strategy in 1988 was not in dereliction of Perpetual’s 
duty as trustee for two reasons: first, the concept of “investment strategy” only 
assumed significance in the formation of trust portfolios during the 1990s. It was thus 
not appropriate to fault Perpetual for a failure to do something that was not practice 
at the time that the investment was made.27  Second, Thomas J considered the 
investment strategy adopted by Perpetual in 1990 did not do much more than record 
what had always been its latent or tacit investment strategy. In other words, “[i]t 
made formal that which had been informal”.28 
3 Trust investment law after 1988 
In 1986, the Working Party on Trust Investment Powers (hereafter referred to as 
the “Working Party”) considered the benefits of replacing the legal list approach with 
the prudent person approach.29 Under the prudent person approach, trustees are not 
confined to a list of investments but may invest in any asset, including equities.30 In 
considering the prudent person approach as a possible replacement option, the 
Working Party made frequent reference to United States material and took the 
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developing concept of MPT into account.31 In the course of its report, the Working 
Party noted that the legal list approach acted as an obstacle to the use of MPT.32 
The need to replace the legal list approach was made acute by the continuing 
effects of inflation during the period before 1988. High inflation eroded the funds of 
capital beneficiaries, and payments from the trusts of income beneficiaries 
depreciated substantially every year. 33  Experience has shown that fixed-income 
investments present minimal risk but provide low returns.34 On the other hand, a 
prudent and informed investment in equities often provides a suitable means of 
escaping inflationary pressures.35 
After a thorough investigation, the Working Party recommended the abolition of 
the legal list approach and the adoption of the prudent person approach.36 Moreover, 
because the Working Party took the view that the use of MPT techniques would soon 
become an accepted (or perhaps required) feature of trustee investment practices, it 
suggested that new legislation ought to attempt to facilitate the use of MPT by 
trustees.37 
Following the Working Party’s recommendations, the provisions of the Trustee Act 
1956 dealing with investment of trust funds were rewritten by the Trustee 
Amendment Act 1988. 38  The changes came into force on 1 October 1988. 39 
Hereafter, the Trustee Act 1956 as amended by the Amendment Act 1988 is referred 
to as the “Trustee Act 1956 (as amended)”. Interestingly, the changes in 1988 are 
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the earliest attempt to include MPT into trust legislation,40 preceding enactments in 
New York by a few years.41 
The Amendment Act 1988 made four changes to trust investment law that were 
designed to assist trustees to follow a MPT approach to investment. The following 
constitutes a brief summary of these changes. 
3 1 Wide powers of investment 
The Amendment Act 1988 abolished the legal list approach and replaced it with a 
provision that empowers trustees to “invest any trust funds, whether at the time in a 
state of investment or not, in any property”.42 This encourages those trustees who 
would like to pursue a MPT approach since “no pre-conceptions are expressed 
about the suitability of a particular investment vehicle for trust investment 
purposes”.43 
The word “property” is defined in section 2 of the Trustee Act 1956 (as amended). 
Property includes: “real and personal property, and any estate, share, and interest in 
any property, real or personal, and any debt, and any thing in action, and any other 
right or interest, whether in possession or not”. 44  The term would even include 
futures and hedge contracts and the like, 45  which differs significantly from the 
cautious approach that was taken before 1988.46 
Establishing high standards to regulate investment selection acts as a 
counterbalance to trustees’ wide powers of investment. Accordingly, the Trustee Act 
1956 (as amended) declares all property in principle open to consideration for 
investment, but investment is subject to trustees’ overriding duty of prudence.47 The 
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duty of prudence is found in section 13B and section 13C of the Act. According to 
section 13B, when exercising any power of investment, a trustee must “exercise the 
care, diligence and skill that a prudent businessperson would exercise in the 
management of another’s affairs”. 48  An even higher standard is imposed on 
professionals who are employed to manage trusts. In terms of section 13C, their 
conduct must conform to the standard of a prudent person who is engaged in that 
profession.49 
Within the broad terms of the duty to invest prudently, section 13E of the Act 
provides some guidance on how the duty should be applied. The section sets out a 
list of factors that trustees may have regard to when investing trust property:50 
“Without limiting the matters that a trustee may take into account, a trustee exercising any 
power of investment may have regard to the following matters so far as they are 
appropriate to the circumstances of the trust: (a) the desirability of diversifying trust 
investments; (b) the nature of existing trust investments and other trust property; (c) the 
need to maintain the real value of the capital or income of the trust; (d) the risk of capital 
loss or depreciation; (e) the potential for capital appreciation; (f) the likely income return; 
(g) the length of the term of the proposed investment; (h) the probable duration of the 
trust; (i) the marketability of the proposed investment during, and on the determination of, 
the term of the proposed investment; (j) the aggregate value of the trust estate; (k) the 
effect of the proposed investment in relation to the tax liability of the trust; (l) the likelihood 
of inflation affecting the value of the proposed investment or other trust property.” 
It is worth noticing that the section does not limit the factors that trustees may take 
into account; other relevant matters may also be considered. According to Kelly and 
others, the factors are not listed in order of priority. They also state that while the list 
of factors is helpful, there is still a need for trustees to consider which factors are 
relevant and exercise judgement and discretion when making investment 
decisions.51 
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3 2 The total portfolio approach 
MPT emphasises that an investment portfolio must be evaluated “holistically 
rather than on an asset-by-asset basis”.52 When this principle of MPT is applied to 
trust investment law, it means that a trustee’s performance should be evaluated in 
light of the performance of the total portfolio rather than by evaluating each individual 
investment in a portfolio separately.53 In chapter 4, this approach is referred to as the 
total portfolio approach.54 The approach that assesses the decisions of trustees on 
an investment-by-investment basis, thus the opposite of the total portfolio approach, 
is referred to in chapter 4 as the isolation approach.55 
To some extent, the acceptability of the total portfolio approach is hinted at in 
section 13E of the Trustee Act 1956 (as amended). Relevant for present purposes 
are points (a) and (b) of the section:56 
“… a trustee exercising any power of investment may have regard to the following 
matters so far as they are appropriate to the circumstances of the trust: (a) The 
desirability of diversifying trust investments; (b) The nature of existing trust investments 
and other trust property …” 
Butler states that both these considerations go to the heart of the total portfolio 
approach: first, because diversification is the means by which a portfolio achieves its 
stability; and second, because portfolio diversification can only be made in light of 
the current holdings of the trust fund. These provisions, when considered in 
conjunction with section 13M of the Act (which states that a court may take any 
investment strategy in an action for breach of trust into account), tend to support the 
conclusion that following the total portfolio approach is an acceptable trustee 
investment strategy.57 
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3 3 The recognition of the desirability of diversification 
As discussed above, section 13E of the Trustee Act 1956 (as amended) sets out a 
list of factors that trustees may have regard to in exercising powers of investments.58 
The desirability of diversification is expressly recognised in the list.59 While arguably 
there is no duty to diversify under the Act,60 trustees who do not diversify act at their 
own peril. For example, if it is believed that trustees have failed to meet the standard 
of prudence expected of them, beneficiaries may claim for consequential loss. In 
such cases, the court will consider all relevant circumstances, including any of the 
factors listed in section 13E. Moreover, section 13M of the Act directs the attention of 
the court specifically to the issue of diversification.61 The section allows the court to 
have regard to two matters in determining whether trustees have acted prudently: 
first, the court may have regard to whether the trust investments have been 
diversified; and second, it is open to the court to consider whether the investment 
was made pursuant to an investment strategy.62 Since diversification is the only 
factor that is mentioned in both section 13E and section 13M, one cannot help to feel 
that the legislator saw diversification as paramount to the interest of beneficiaries. 
A factor that can legitimately be considered to reduce or remove any need for 
diversification is if the trustees are instructed by the settlor (or testator) to retain 
particular assets within the trust. For example, a prudent drafter can affirmatively 
state that the trustees are under no duty to diversify with respect to a family farm or 
shares in a family business.63 
3 4 The first attempt at abolishing the anti-netting rule 
The anti-netting rule has always operated under general trust law. The rule 
provides that in an action for breach of trust, the court may not set off a loss arising 
from one investment against a gain from another investment.64 For example, assume 
that the trustee of a particular trust imprudently invests half of the trust fund in 
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investment “A” and the other half in investment “B”, and that the investment results in 
a substantial profit on the first investment but a loss on the second. In terms of the 
anti-netting rule, the beneficiaries are entitled to “the profit arising from investment A; 
and may insist that the trustee must make good the loss on investment B”.65 
In its report, the Working Party recommended that the rule should be abolished. 
The Working Party took the view that abolishing the rule would be more in line with 
the application of the general principles of damages.66 As a result, section 13Q of the 
Trustee Act 1956 (as amended) was introduced, which is designed to overcome the 
effect of the anti-netting rule.67 Section 13Q is clear authorisation for the court to 
consider offsetting the losses that accrue from an individual investment against gains 
made on other investments:68 
“In considering any action for breach of trust arising in respect of or in relation to any 
investment by a trustee as a result of which any loss or losses have been, or are 
expected to be, sustained by the trust, the court may set off, as it thinks just, all or any 
part of the loss or losses resulting from that investment against all or any part of the gain 
or gains resulting from any other investment, whether in breach of trust or not.” 
Whether this section has been successful in eliminating the anti-netting rule is 
discussed later in the chapter.69 
4 The Law Commission’s recommendations and the Trusts Act 2019 
In 2009, the Law Commission decided to commence a full-scale review of the law 
of trusts.70 Since 2009, the Law Commission published a series of five issues papers 
on different aspects of the law of trusts followed by a sixth issues paper, the so-
called “Preferred Approach”, which outlines its approach to reform in each of the 
areas covered.71 Following the six issues papers, the Law Commission delivered its 
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report in August 2013. 72  The report concludes that the current legislation 
underpinning trusts is unsatisfactory and in need of reform. Accordingly, the Law 
Commission recommended that new legislation be enacted to replace the outdated 
Trustee Act 1956 (as amended).73 
Following the Law Commission’s recommendation, the Trusts Bill 2016 was 
introduced to the New Zealand Parliament. The official website of the New Zealand 
Parliament describes the purpose of the Bill as follows:74 
 “This bill will replace the Trustee Act 1956 and the Perpetuities Act 1964 to make trust 
law more accessible, clarify and simplify core trust principles and essential obligations for 
trustees, and preserve the flexibility of the common law to allow trust law to continue to 
evolve through the courts.” 
The lengthy legislative overhaul was complete 30 July 2019, the date that the 
Trusts Act 2019 obtained royal assent.75 It should be pointed out that the Act will only 
enter into force eighteen months after royal assent, thus on 30 January 2021.76 The 
reason for this transition period is to ensure that trustees align their practices with the 
provisions of the Act.77 
The Act will make important changes to trust law in New Zealand. For purposes of 
this dissertation, the focus falls on changes relating to trust investment law only. The 
Law Commission concluded that the Trustee Act 1956 (as amended) does not go far 
enough to permit trustees to adopt the full MPT approach.78 Accordingly, it identified 
four areas of trustee investing that pose particular difficulties to the adoption of the 
full MPT approach and recommended changes in these areas. The section below 
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discusses the Law Commission’s recommendations together with the changes the 
Trusts Act 2019 will make. The discussion below thus provides a view of New 
Zealand’s current position and further clarifies what the position will be once the 
Trusts Act 2019 enters into force.  
4 1 Adoption of the total portfolio approach 
As discussed above, section 13E of the Trustee Act 1956 (as amended) hints at 
the acceptability of the total portfolio approach.79 However, Butler argues that the 
section does not go far enough in permitting the adoption of the total portfolio 
approach. Butler suggests that in order to make the acceptability of the total portfolio 
approach more obvious, section 13E should rather state that when making 
investments, trustees must have regard to “the relationship of that investment to 
other investments in the investment package”.80 
The Law Commission decided not to follow Butler’s simple solution to the 
problem. Rather, it recommended the following two changes to the Act: first, section 
13E should be redrafted to provide that trustees may take their overall investment 
strategy into account when exercising their powers of investment;81 and second, new 
legislation should clarify that the rule of general trust law, which requires that the 
decisions of trustees are assessed on an investment-by-investment basis if their 
investment decisions are called into question, should be abolished.82 The Trusts Bill 
2016 reflected both these recommendations.83 
The second recommendation appears to indicate that the isolation approach 
should be abolished. However, somewhat confusingly, the Law Commission referred 
to the rule that it wished to abolish as the anti-netting rule rather than the isolation 
approach. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that what the Law Commission had in 
mind was that trustees should follow the total portfolio approach. 
The Trusts Act 2019 indicates the acceptance of the total portfolio approach in the 
following two ways: first, section 59(1)(n) of the Act requires trustees to consider 
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their “overall investment strategy” when exercising their power of investment. 84 
Second, in terms of section 128 of the Act, in an action for breach of trust, the court 
may take into consideration whether an investment was made in accordance with an 
investment strategy:85 
“In considering whether a trustee is liable, in respect of any investment made by that 
trustee, for any breach of trust in respect of any duty … to invest prudently … the court 
may take into account — (a) whether the trust investments have been diversified, so far 
as is appropriate to the circumstances of the trust; and (b) whether the investment was 
made in accordance with any investment strategy.” 
Once the Act enters into force, the inclusion of section 59(1)(n) in the Trusts Act 
2019 will make it easier for trustees to justify the total portfolio approach as a prudent 
investment strategy in terms of section 128.  
4 2 Delegation of trustees’ investment functions 
The general rule in New Zealand is that trustees must not delegate their duties or 
powers – not even to co-trustees.86 There are a few exceptions to the general rule: 
first, delegation is allowed where such delegation is specifically authorised by the 
trust instrument.87 Research by the Law Commission indicates that many modern 
trust deeds enable trustees to do this.88 Second, section 29 of the Trustee Act 1956 
(as amended) deals with the appointment of agents to carry out certain 
administrative functions.89  For example, a stockbroker may be instructed to buy 
authorised investments of a particular type, but the trustees must personally exercise 
discretion whether to purchase investments of that particular type.90 Trustees are 
declared not to be responsible for the default of agents if the agents are employed in 
good faith.91 Third, section 31 of the Act permits trustees to delegate their role in 
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circumstances where they will be absent from New Zealand or will be temporarily 
incapable of performing their duties because of physical infirmity.92 Cleary this type 
of delegation can only occur in strictly defined circumstances. 
Under the current default provisions, therefore, trustees are not able to delegate 
the entire responsibility of selecting and holding investments to an investment 
manager. Rather, trustees should normally seek expert advice on potential 
investments, personally assess such advice, and decide whether to accept or reject 
the advice.93 The trustees must make the final decision.94 
The Law Commission acknowledged that it requires considerable skill and 
judgement to make sound investment decisions in today’s world.95 It also accepted 
that all investors, whether private individuals or trustees, are faced with an 
extraordinary range of investment products and services when it comes to building 
and maintaining a portfolio.96 Generally, submitters to the Law Commission’s issues 
papers commented that it is not reasonable to expect trustees to possess the same 
degree of knowledge and expertise as professional investment managers. The Law 
Commission stated that, since trustees are not allowed to delegate their investment 
functions, they are not able to use the skill and judgement of professional investment 
managers fully when making investment decisions.97 Hence, this limits the ability of 
trustees to follow a MPT approach to investment. 98  Accordingly, the Law 
Commission recommended that trustees should be able to appoint investment 
managers with the authority to make investment decisions.99 The ability to allow for 
the appointment of investment managers would thus be the default position, but the 
terms of a trust can exclude or modify the power.100 In other words, settlors can 
contract out of the default position if they do not want trustees to delegate investment 
decisions in this way. 
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Section 67 and section 68 of the Trusts Act 2019 reflect the recommendations of 
the Law Commission relating to the appointment of investment managers. Section 
67(1) provides that trustees may:101 
“… (a) appoint a person to exercise, on behalf of the trustee, specified functions or 
powers in relation to the trust; (b) appoint a person to make specified decisions in relation 
to all or part of the trust property; (c) appoint an eligible person to hold or deal with all or 
part of the trust property as nominee or custodian and vest all or part of the trust property 
in that person.” 
Section 67(2) provides that there are certain powers and functions that may not be 
delegated. Trustees may not, among other things, delegate decisions on 
distributions, decisions as to whether payments received should be treated as 
income or capital, or powers to appoint or remove trustees or beneficiaries.102 
The Law Commission further recommended that the appointment of investment 
managers should be subject to legislative safeguards. 103 Based on this 
recommendation, the Trusts Act 2019 provides the following safeguards: first, it is 
mandatory for trustees to keep any delegation under review and consider whether 
they need to intervene at any point;104 and second, trustees must apply the general 
duty of care specified in section 29 of the Act in appointing an investment 
manager.105 
4 3 Total return investing 
A common feature under ordinary law is that income beneficiaries are entitled to 
income and capital beneficiaries are entitled to capital appreciation. 106  This is 
referred to as the “traditional distribution rule” in chapter 4.107 The default provisions 
of the Trustee Act 1956 (as amended) do not allow trustees to disregard the 
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distinction between capital and income.108 Trustees cannot, for example, distribute 
part of a trust’s capital return to income beneficiaries. In its report, the Working Party 
suggested that it might be desirable for trustees to be given wider powers of 
distributing receipts (whether income or capital) among beneficiaries. However, the 
Trustee Amendment Act 1988 did not make any alterations to the traditional 
distribution rule.109 
Another important aspect of trustees’ investment obligation is the duty of 
impartiality.110  This duty, preserved by section 13F of the Trustee Act 1956 (as 
amended), requires trustees to act impartially between the interests of different 
classes of beneficiaries. 111  In other words, trustees must be even-handed as 
between income and capital beneficiaries.112 
The traditional distribution rule, read together with the duty of impartially, means 
that trustees must invest with a view to balancing a trust’s capital and income 
returns; they cannot invest entirely for capital growth, nor can they invest entirely for 
income return.113 
According to the Law Commission, the traditional distribution rule and the duty of 
impartiality, when taken together, limit the ability of trustees to apply principles of 
MPT. 114  The Law Commission observed that, if trustees are free from the 
requirement to select investments with regard to the legal category of the returns 
received, they would be able to maximise the benefits able to be conferred on 
beneficiaries.115 Investing in such a way is known as total return investing.116 Total 
return investing enables trustees to do what non-trustee investors do, which is to 
invest for overall maximum total return.117 The Law Commission recommended that 
trustees should be free to decide to invest on a total return basis.118 
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The Law Commission considered two options of how legislation could facilitate 
total return investment. The first option was the “percentage trust” model. Under this 
model, trust assets are valued on a periodic basis and a percentage of that value is 
distributed to income beneficiaries. 119  The duty of impartiality continues to apply 
since income beneficiaries must receive a fair rate of return as measured by some 
external benchmark.120 
The second option that was considered can be referred to as the “power of 
allocation”.121 The power to allocate provides trustees with a discretion to determine 
whether a return is to be treated as income or capital for the purposes of 
distribution.122 Trustees are thus allowed to invest for total overall growth and then 
make a reasonable determination as to what portion should be distributed as 
income.123 The power to allocate is subject to certain safeguards, including the duty 
to be impartial and the duty to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries.124 
Of the two options available for a total return investment approach, the Law 
Commission recommended the power of allocation.125  
The Trusts Act 2019 reflects the recommendation of the Law Commission as it 
contains the following section:126 
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“For the purposes of distribution, and of preparing and completing a financial statement 
for a trust, a trustee may determine whether a return on an investment is to be treated as 
income or capital.” 
As discussed in chapter 5, the English Law Commission is of the view that for any 
model of total return investing to be successful, tax law has to be reformed.127 The 
New Zealand Law Commission, however, reached a different conclusion. In the Law 
Commission’s opinion, it is possible to implement the power to allocate without 
having to make any changes to tax law:128 
“The discretion of trustees to decide what is to be treated as income or capital is for the 
purposes of trust law and does not in any way alter or override the definitions and 
application of the revenue statutes, for the purposes of taxation.” 
4 4 Abolishment of the anti-netting rule 
In its 1986 report, the Working Party recommended that the anti-netting rule be 
abolished. As a result, section 13Q of the Trustee Act 1956 (as amended) was 
introduced, which is designed to overcome the effect of the rule.129 Admittedly, the 
rigour of the rule has been mitigated to some extent by the section. The section 
allows for set-off at the discretion of the court, and the discretion to set off is 
activated where the court “thinks just”.130 However, there is some uncertainty as to 
whether the rule has indeed been abolished successfully. Butler states that the 
problem is that section 13Q fails to describe the circumstances in which it will be just 
to relieve trustees of liability for losses suffered by an individually imprudent 
investment.131 
According to the Law Commission, the anti-netting is in conflict with MPT. 132 
Accordingly, to avoid any doubt, it recommended that future legislation should 
expressly clarify that the rule is abolished.133 Section 55 of the Trusts Bill 2016 gave 
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effect to the Law Commission’s recommendation. Two subsections were of particular 
relevance: first, the intention of section 55(2) was to re-enact section 13Q, but 
without the “court may set off, as it thinks just” part;134 and second, section 55(4) was 
intended to expressly abolish what was referred to as “the anti-netting rule”:135 
“The rule of law that requires the assessment of the decisions of a trustee on an 
investment-by-investment basis if the decisions are called into question (known as the 
anti-netting rule) is taken to have been abolished on 1 October 1988.” 
Section 55(4) is confusing because the rule of law it referred to was the isolation 
approach and not the anti-netting rule. 
Section 129 of the Trusts Act 2019, the section in the Act that deals with the anti-
netting rule, does not contain a provision similar to section 55(4) of the Trusts Bill 
2016. Nevertheless, section 129 of the Trusts Act 2019 signals quite clearly that the 
anti-netting rule will be abolished once the Act enters into force. Section 129(2) 
states that:136 
“The court may set off all or part of the loss resulting from the investment against all or 
part of any gain resulting from any other investment whether in breach of trust or not.” 
5 Is MPT the standard of prudence in New Zealand? 
This section raises the following important question: has trust investment law in 
New Zealand moved from permitting the use of MPT to perhaps requiring investment 
in accordance with MPT? The answer to the question is important because, if it is 
determined that trustees have an obligation to make investment decisions in line with 
the tenets of MPT, not doing so would amount to imprudent behaviour. 
In 1986, the Working Party did not yet believe that it was correct to hold all 
trustees to MPT techniques:137 
“[W]e do not suggest that every fund manager must embark on a scheme of portfolio 
management, irrespective of the size and the particular needs of the fund concerned. Nor 
                                                            
134 S 55(2) of the Trusts Bill. 
135 S 55(4). 
136 S 129(2) of the Trusts Act 2019. 




do we assert that techniques of portfolio management have as yet been as extensively 
developed in New Zealand as appears to have been the case in the USA …” 
However, the Working Party went on to state that this might change in the near 
future:138 
“… though we have no reason to doubt that the necessary expertise is becoming more 
readily available here, and that market forces would soon encourage financial institutions 
and other qualified persons to provide such services to trustees if portfolio management 
strategies were to become an accepted or required aspect of trustee investment 
practices.” 
It appears that the Working Party took the view that it was highly likely that the use 
of MPT techniques would become an accepted (or perhaps required) feature of 
trustee investment practices. Consequently, the Working Party recommended 
changes to legislation that would facilitate MPT-based trust investing.139 
In his 1995 article, Butler states that New Zealand’s financial services sector has 
rapidly grown more sophisticated since 1986 – the date that the Working Party 
published its report.140 Moreover, he states that MPT has established itself as an 
“orthodox theory of investment management with successful wide-spread 
application”,141 thus confirming what the Working Party had anticipated. In light of 
these developments, Butler spends some time determining whether the Trustee Act 
1956 (as amended) permits, encourages, or mandates the use of MPT. Butler 
concludes that the Act encourages the use of MPT for all trusts, and mandates the 
use thereof for professional trustees.142 
Since Butler’s 1995 article, a High Court decision has widened MPT’s application. 
According to Manns, the Re Mulligan (deceased) 143  (“Mulligan”) decision has 
essentially ruled that all trustees are required to use MPT techniques.144 Another 
academic, Getzler, shares this view. He states that Mulligan is a striking decision 
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that goes beyond Nestle, the well-known English trust law case.145 In Nestle, the 
Court of Appeal of England was prepared to state that the use of MPT may be 
permitted. In contrast, in Mulligan, the New Zealand High Court was prepared to 
make MPT the new standard of prudence.146 
The facts of the Mulligan case were as follows: Mr Mulligan died in 1949 and left 
his widow, Mrs Mulligan, a substantial sum of money and a life interest in a trust.147 
The capital of the trust was to pass to Mr Mulligan’s nephews and nieces on 
Mrs Mulligan’s death.148 The trustees of the trust were Mrs Mulligan and a trustee 
corporation, namely PGG Trust Limited (“PGG”).149 
Financial investment by the trust began in 1965.150 The major asset of the trust, a 
farm, was sold and the balance of the trust stood at about $108 000. The trustees, 
Mrs Mulligan and PGG, invested entirely in fixed-income securities.151 As a result 
Mrs Mulligan, as income beneficiary, enjoyed a good income.152  The investment 
favoured her, but at the expense of the capital beneficiaries:153 
“Investing in fixed-income securities cheats the remainder beneficiaries because the 
principal amount of the debt, the thing to which the remainder beneficiaries are entitled, 
remains constant while inflation whittles away its purchasing power.” 
PGG’s employees’ own testimony showed that they had recognised the risk of 
inflation and that they were well aware of the need to diversify.154 Moreover, their 
testimony established the industry practice of investing in equities to combat 
inflation. In evidence it was revealed that between 1965 and 1990 PGG tried to 
persuade its co-trustee, Mrs Mulligan, to invest in equities so as to counter 
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inflation.155  However, Mrs Mulligan adamantly refused any change in investment 
policy.156 Ultimately, PGG deferred to Mrs Mulligan’s demand that the trust capital 
remains solely invested in fixed-income investments.157 Yet, ironically, Mrs Mulligan 
was a skilled investor who at her death owned an extensive share portfolio.158 
Mrs Mulligan died 25 years after the trust began investing and left her estate of 
$686 000 to relatives on her side of the family.159 By contrast, the capital of the trust 
stood at a little under $102 000. While the nominal value of the capital of the trust 
was largely preserved ($108 000 in 1965 compared with $102 000 in 1990), inflation 
in New Zealand between 1965 and 1990 was substantial.160 The inflation equivalent 
value of $108 000 in 1965 was $1 368 000 at the time of trial. According to expert 
evidence on behalf of the capital beneficiaries, $108 000 could have bought fourteen 
average residential properties in Christchurch in 1965, but by 1990 it was not even 
enough to buy one such a property.161 
The capital beneficiaries – the nephews and nieces of Mr Mulligan – sued both 
PGG and Mrs Mulligan for breach of trust on the basis that investing in fixed-interest 
securities rather than shares did not treat the income and capital beneficiaries 
impartially. 162  The trustees denied breach of trust and raised section 73 of the 
Trustee Act 1956 (as amended) (the section provides that a trustee acting honestly 
and reasonably could be excused for breach of trust). The trustees also sought 
indemnities from each other.163 
Panckhurst J held that a trustee had to be strictly impartial between income and 
capital beneficiaries in the circumstances of the case. PGG was in breach of trust 
because it had appreciated the corrosive harm of inflation on the trust capital, but 
had nevertheless deferred to Mrs Mulligan’s wishes. PGG either should have 
persuaded Mrs Mulligan to invest in shares or, failing that, filed a court action 
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seeking direction. Panckhurst J further held that the trustees could not rely on 
section 73. PGG did nothing adequate to persuade Mrs Mulligan to invest in shares 
and did not seek the court’s directions. Furthermore, Mrs Mulligan did not act 
reasonably in her capacity as trustee as she understood the wisdom of investing in 
shares, yet she was hostile to diversification of the trust capital.164 Regarding the 
measurement of damages, Panckhurst J found that by 1972 a prudent trustee would 
have invested 40% of the trust fund in equities.165 On that basis, and making all the 
usual allowances for contingencies, the trustees’ failure to diversify into equities had 
resulted in a loss of $170 640.166 
Ultimately, both PGG and Mrs Mulligan were at fault and therefore jointly and 
severally liable to the capital beneficiaries for breach of trust and not entitled to an 
indemnity from another trustee.167 In the case of Mrs Mulligan, the liability to make 
restitution fell on her estate.168 
Mulligan thus shows that where trustees allow a trust fund to reduce in value by 
failing to use MPT techniques, they can be sued for breach of trust and will be 
ordered to make good any loss than can be proved.  
To summarise the position in New Zealand regarding the use of MPT, all trustees 
(including ordinary New Zealanders who become trustees or professional trustees) 
are required to invest in accordance with MPT unless the trust instrument states that 
the use of MPT techniques should be avoided – either totally or in part.169 
 It is submitted that this position will not change once the Trusts Act 2019 enters 
into force. None of the changes that the Act will make in the area of trustee investing 
suggest a movement away from MPT-based trust investing. On the contrary, the 
purpose of these changes is to better facilitate the use of MPT techniques when 
investing trust funds.  
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Prior to the enactment of the 1988 reforms, trustee investing in New Zealand trust 
law was based on the legal list approach. The trust instrument could allow for a wider 
range of investments, but if it did not, trustees were effectively prevented from 
following a MPT approach to investing. The standard of care expected of trustees 
was to take such care as ordinary prudent men would take if they were minded to 
make an investment for the benefit of other people for whom they felt morally bound 
to provide. 
The Trustee Amendment Act 1988 abolished the legal list approach and gave 
trustees wide powers of investment. This was the first of four changes that assisted 
trustees to invest in accordance with MPT. The Trustee Act 1956 (as amended) also 
hints at the acceptability of the total portfolio approach, expressly recognises the 
desirability of diversification, and contains a provision that is designed to overcome 
the effect of the anti-netting rule. The standard of care required of trustees remains 
basically the same as before 1988 – trustees must exercise the care, diligence and 
skill that a prudent businessperson would exercise in the management of another’s 
affairs – except that an even higher standard is imposed on professionals who are 
employed to manage trusts. 
There were two reasons why reform had to take place in New Zealand in 1988: 
first, to counter the depreciatory effect of inflation on trust capital; and second, 
because the Working Party anticipated that the use of MPT techniques would 
become an accepted feature of trustee investment practices. 
The Law Commission concluded in its 2013 report that the 1988 amendments do 
not go far enough in permitting trustees to adopt the full MPT approach. The Law 
Commission identified four areas of trustee investing that pose particular difficulties 
to the adoption of the full MPT approach and recommended the following changes in 
these areas: first, future legislation should require trustees to follow the total portfolio 
approach; second, legislation should allow trustees to appoint investment managers 
with the authority to make investment decisions; third, trustees should be allowed to 
invest on a total return basis; and fourth, legislation should expressly abolish the 
anti-netting rule. The Trusts Act 2019 reflects all of these recommendations. 
Regarding the question whether trust investment law permits or requires the use 




with MPT. This position will remain the same once the Act comes into force. In New 
Zealand, therefore, unless a contrary intention is expressed in the trust instrument, 
trustees have an obligation to make investment decisions in line with the tenets of 
MPT and not doing so would amount to imprudent behaviour. 
In summary, similar to New York and England, New Zealand has modernised its 
trust investment law by adopting an investment rule based on MPT. The next chapter 
compares and analyses the approaches taken in each of these jurisdictions with 
respect to the six areas of trustee investment that are most prominently affected by 
the integration of MPT principles into trust law. The purpose of the next chapter is to 






CHAPTER 7 – THE INTEGRATION OF MPT PRINCIPLES INTO SOUTH AFRICAN 
TRUST LAW 
1 Introduction 
As indicated in chapter 2 (“The development of trustees’ investment standards in 
South Africa”), trustees in South Africa are not judged by an investment rule based 
on modern portfolio theory (“MPT”). Chapter 2 further establishes that trustees in 
South Africa are obliged to protect the real value of trust capital and ensure that 
adequate income is produced continuously. Chapters 4 to 6 reveal that what is 
expected from trustees in this instance corresponds with the goals embodied in a 
rule based on MPT.  
Chapter 4 (“The development of trustees’ investment standards in New York”), 
chapter 5 (“The development of trustees’ investment standards in England”) and 
chapter 6 (“The development of trustees’ investment standards in New Zealand”) 
show why trustees subject to a traditional approach to trustee investing will find it 
exceedingly difficult – if not impossible – to meet this goal without being able to rely 
on a rule based on MPT. Hence, New York, England and New Zealand had to 
change their respective trust investment laws in order to meet this challenge. 
Chapter 3 (“Modern portfolio theory”) argues that MPT presents a better account 
of risk and safety than other popular models of investment behaviour. Chapter 3 
further states that MPT is the best possible investment strategy for people managing 
other people’s assets. Chapters 4 to 6 confirm what is stated in chapter 3 by 
demonstrating the benefits of using MPT strategies when investing trust funds. 
The main research questions posed for purpose of this dissertation are: first, 
should trustees’ investment functions in South African law be modernised through 
the implementation of an investment rule based on MPT? Second, if the answer to 
the first question is yes, what should the core features of such an investment rule 
be? The conclusion reached after the discussion in chapters 3 to 6 is that the first 
research question should be answered in the affirmative: trust investment law in 
South Africa should be modernised by integrating MPT principles into trust law. 
The purpose of this chapter is to answer the second research question by 
identifying and explaining the core features of an investment rule based on MPT. 




many areas of trustee investment; however, six particular areas are affected most 
prominently, namely, trustees’ choice of investments; the evaluation of a trust’s 
investment portfolio; diversification of trust assets; delegation of investment 
functions; the traditional capital and income allocation rules; and the balancing of 
gains against losses. This chapter reviews, compares and analyses the approaches 
taken in each of the comparable foreign jurisdictions with respect to each of the six 
areas, and formulates an investment rule based on MPT that is fit for the South 
African trust law context. 
Following this introduction, the chapter is divided into six sections, each section 
discussing one of the six areas affected by the implementation of MPT. 
2 Trustees’ choice of investments  
2 1 Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the first area that is affected by the 
implementation of MPT, namely trustees’ choice of investments. The section starts 
by sketching the problem that trustees face when the range of investment options 
open to them remains restricted. It then briefly reviews how each of the comparable 
foreign jurisdictions has widened trustees’ choice of investments. Next, the possible 
concern that might be raised with allowing trustees to invest in any type of 
investment is addressed. The section concludes with a summary of the discussion, 
which is accompanied by a proposal of how legislation should change in order to 
accommodate the implementation of MPT. 
2 2 The weakness of the current approach 
One of the tenets of MPT is that no asset or investment technique is regarded as 
inherently good or bad, or prohibited per se as being too risky. The basis for this 
tenet is the finding of MPT that it is possible to reduce a portfolio’s risk in appropriate 
circumstances by adding an investment that is risky in itself. 1  Integrating this 
principle of MPT into trust law requires trustees having wide powers of investment as 
opposed to trustees being limited to narrow categories of investment or trustees 
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being prohibited from investing in speculative investments.2 From the foregoing it 
follows that in order to conform to MPT, an investment rule based on MPT has to 
permit trustees to hold any investment and to use any investment technique.3 A good 
example of such a rule is the prudent investor rule of the Restatement (Third).4 This 
rule expresses no preconceptions about the suitability of a particular investment 
vehicle for trust investment purposes.5 
In South African trust law, not all assets are in principle open to consideration for 
trustee investment. The rule that governs how trustees should exercise their 
investment functions is the prudent and careful person rule.6 In terms of the rule, if 
trustees receive investments that are speculative, they should sell the investments 
and reinvest the proceeds in safer investments.7 This element of the rule – the duty 
to avoid speculative investments – was confirmed by Scott JA in Administrators, 
Estate Richards v Nichol8 (“Estate Richards”):9 
“He [a trustee] will accordingly avoid investments which are of a speculative nature.” 
In this respect, the prudent and careful person rule resembles a particular version 
of the prudent man rule, namely “Scott’s prudent man rule”. What was ordinarily 
understood as the “prudent man rule” in the United States from 1940 to 1992 was in 
fact the “traditional prudent man rule”10 as influenced by the work of Professor Austin 
W Scott (referred to in chapter 4 as “Scott”).11 Scott’s work has played a pivotal role 
in the legal understanding of trustees’ investment functions in the United States.12 
Under Scott’s prudent man rule, unless specifically authorised by the governing 
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instrument, any speculative investment was a breach of trust. 13  Forbidden 
investments under the rule included, among other things, margin purchases of 
securities, speculative stock, discount bonds, securities in new and untried 
enterprises, and second mortgages. Speculative stock referred to all companies 
except those “with regular earnings and paying regular dividends which may 
reasonably be expected to continue”. Shares in companies that did not pay 
dividends (what might be called “growth stocks”) were thus considered to be 
speculative investments.14 
Both the prudent and careful person rule and Scott’s prudent man rule thus 
prohibit speculative investments. However, the Estate Richards judgment does not 
provide a definition of speculative investments (nor do any of the cases discussed in 
chapter 2). This lack of a formal definition might coincide with a “you will know it 
when you see it” mentality. 
Scott’s prudent man rule’s ban of speculative investments discouraged trustees to 
use new investment vehicles and techniques regularly favoured by prudent 
investors.15 In particular, trustees were unwilling to use alternative investments and 
derivatives because of the likelihood that a Scott-influenced court would regard such 
investments as being speculative.16 This occurred despite the fact that alternative 
investments permit greater diversification across the investment spectrum,17 while 
derivatives can add significantly to the stability and long-term prospects of a 
portfolio.18 
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2 2 1 The benefits of adding alternative investments to a portfolio 
Alternative investments are “investments other than traditional investments in 
fixed income and publicly traded equity securities”. 19  These investments include 
hedge funds, private equity, commodities and collectables.20 A hedge fund can be 
described as an investment structure that pools capital from a number of investors 
and then employs several different strategies to earn a return for its investors.21 
Some of the strategies that hedge funds employ include using derivatives, leverage 
and short-selling.22 Private equity on the other hand is “a managed investment pool 
that typically makes long-term investments in private companies with the aim of 
obtaining a controlling interest and increasing the value of the companies through 
management and improved operations or innovation”.23 The benefit of combining 
alternative investments with a traditional portfolio of equities is that, because 
alternative investments often have low correlations with such a portfolio, allocating 
an exposure to it can be a good diversifier.24 
The latest alternative investment on the scene is cryptocurrency. The South 
African Revenue Service (“SARS”) identifies cryptocurrency (typified by bitcoin) as 
“an internet-based digital currency that exists almost wholly in the virtual realm”.25 
The invention of bitcoin by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008 spurred the creation of many 
new cryptocurrencies.26 Lee and others studied the co-movement between traditional 
asset classes and the cryptocurrency index, namely, CRIX. Their results are quite 
surprising. They observed that cryptocurrency as an asset class is a good diversifier 
in a traditional portfolio.27 However, they caution that cryptocurrency is still at the 
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experimental stage and that there are many issues that need to be addressed before 
it should be considered as an asset class of great interest to institutions.28 
2 2 2 The benefits of using derivatives 
A derivative is a financial instrument, or contract, between two parties that derives 
its value from some other underlying asset. The underlying asset is often a financial 
security such as a stock, but it can also be any asset that the contracting parties are 
interested in trading. 29 Common underlying assets include bonds, commodities, 
currencies, and market indexes. Examples of derivatives are forwards, futures, 
options, and swaps.30 According to Aalberts and Poon, futures and options are the 
two types of derivative that are the most suitable candidates for trustees to use in 
implementing trust hedging strategies.31 Futures refers to futures contracts, a type of 
derivative in which a party contracts for exchange of a specific asset at a future 
date.32 An option is a contract that gives the holder or owner of an option the right, 
but not the obligation, to buy or sell an underlying instrument at a predetermined 
price during a specific period or at a specific time.33 
The benefit of futures and options is that trustees can use them to hedge the risk 
of trust investments. The future price of an investment can, for example, be 
predetermined in a derivative contract, thereby reducing the uncertainty of the future 
price of the investment.34 Indeed, the appropriate use of futures and options may 
provide, at much lower cost (especially in light of tax considerations),35 the same 
economic protection as converting to a more conservative portfolio of assets.36 
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2 2 3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the weakness of an investment rule that prohibits speculative 
investments, such as the prudent and careful person rule and Scott’s prudent person 
rule, is that it prevents trustees from using investment vehicles and techniques that 
permit greater diversification across the investment spectrum and provide economic 
protection at a lower cost than conventional methods. 
2 3 The approach in each of the comparable foreign jurisdictions 
The respective legislative advisory committees and legal commissions in New 
York, England and New Zealand brought the advantages of the implementation of 
MPT under the attention of the legislatures in the different jurisdictions. Eventually, 
these legislatures responded by amending the statutes dealing with the investment 
of trust funds to reflect the new knowledge. 
The New York State Legislature enacted the Prudent Investor Act on 
1 January 1995.37 The Prudent Investor Act codifies a prudent investor rule for New 
York, thereby replacing New York’s prudent man rule. The new rule is referred to in 
chapter 4 as New York’s prudent investor rule.38 Whereas the old prudent man rule 
warned trustees to avoid speculative investments, New York’s prudent investor rule 
authorises trustees to:39 
“… invest in any type of investment consistent with the requirements of this paragraph, 
since no particular investment is inherently prudent or imprudent for purposes of the 
prudent investor standard …” 
In England, in response to the criticisms of the Trustee Investments Act 1961, 
section 3 of the Trustee Act 2000 confers the widest possible investment powers on 
trustees:40 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
strategies using financial derivative techniques” (2001) 36 Real Prop Prob & Tr J 127 157 footnote 
159. 
37  Radigan “Advisory Committee: Prudent Investor Act” (05-09-2010) Ruskin Moscou Faltischek 
<http://www.rmfpc.com/advisory-committee-prudent-investor-act/> (accessed 04-11-2016) 2; S 11-
2.3(a) of the Prudent Investor Act. 
38 For a discussion of New York’s prudent investor rule, see chapter 4 para 5. 
39 S 11-2.3(b)(4)(A) of the Prudent Investor Act. 




“... a trustee may make any kind of investment that he could make if he were absolutely 
entitled to the assets of the trust.” 
Before 1 February 2001, the date that the Trustee Act 2000 came into force,41 
trust funds were divided into two categories known as narrower-range and wider-
range categories. The narrower-range category was available for investment in 
narrower-range investments and the wider-range one was available for investment in 
narrower-range or wider-range investments. 42  The definition of wider-range 
investments was quite restrictive. It permitted trustees to invest only in shares that 
meet certain qualifying conditions.43 A practical result of the requirement to meet 
certain conditions was that trustees could not invest in many well-known 
companies. 44 According to Watt, the primary obstacle to implementing MPT in 
England was the fact that trustee investment was limited to only certain types of 
investment. Watt confirms that the Act has successfully removed this obstacle.45 
In New Zealand, the Trustee Amendment Act 1988 eliminated the old legal 
approach and replaced it with a provision that empowers trustees to “invest any trust 
funds, whether at the time in a state of investment or not, in any property”.46 The new 
provision encourages those trustees who would like to pursue a MPT approach since 
“no pre-conceptions are expressed about the suitability of a particular investment 
vehicle for trust investment purposes”.47 The word “property” is defined in section 2 
of the Trustee Act 1956 (as amended). Property includes: “real and personal 
property, and any estate, share, and interest in any property, real or personal, and 
any debt, and any thing in action, and any other right or interest, whether in 
possession or not”.48 According to Kelly and others, the term includes “futures and 
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hedge contracts and the like”, which differs significantly from the cautious approach 
that was taken before 1988.49  
It is worth mentioning that the Trusts Act 2019 (entering into force on 30 January 
2021) reaffirms the power to invest in any asset:50 
“A trustee may invest trust property in any property.” 
2 4 The concern with wide powers of investment 
One might raise the concern that allowing trustees to invest in any type of asset 
would lead to future trust portfolios only being filled with exceptionally risky assets.51 
In other words, the objection can be raised that trustees might exploit their wide 
investment powers by ignoring the hazardous nature of individual investments and 
investing in any enterprise that they deem profitable. This is a perfectly legitimate 
concern if there is nothing to act as a counterbalance to wide investment powers. 
Therefore, to balance the introduction of wide investment powers, it is recommended 
that legislation should contain two safeguards to regulate investment selection and 
ongoing investment management responsibilities. 
First, any form of investment should only be permissible provided that proper care, 
diligence and skill are employed.52 Consider, for example, the approaches developed 
in the comparable foreign jurisdictions. New York’s prudent investor rule requires 
trustees to act as prudent investors would and exercise reasonable care, skill and 
caution when making and implementing investment decisions.53 In England, trustees 
are subject to a statutory duty of care when exercising their powers of investment:54 
“Whenever the duty under this subsection applies to a trustee, he must exercise such 
care and skill as is reasonable in the circumstances ...” 
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According to section 13B of New Zealand’s, when exercising any power of 
investment, a trustee must “exercise the care, diligence and skill that a prudent 
businessperson would exercise in the management of another’s affairs”.55 
Broadly speaking, the duty to act with care, diligence and skill requires trustees to: 
invest only with reputable companies that have performed, and continue to perform, 
relatively well as fund managers;56 make a reasonable effort to verify facts relevant 
to the investment and management of trust assets;57 and only incur management 
and transaction costs that are appropriate and reasonable in relation to the assets 
and the purposes of the trust.58 
Second, trustees are given greater flexibility in choosing investments provided that 
the overall investment plan is prudent and that any additional investments advance 
the overall investment plan. Two questions arise from this second safeguard: when 
is an investment plan regarded as prudent, and when can it be said that an 
investment has advanced the overall investment plan? With regard to the first 
question, a trust’s overall investment plan is viewed as prudent if trustees invest at a 
level of risk-and-return that is suitable for the particular trust. In order to determine 
what would be regarded as a suitable level of risk-and-return, trustees will have to 
consider the prevailing circumstances.59 As discussed in chapter 2, circumstances 
can be divided into specific and general circumstances.60 The circumstances that 
trustees have to consider when making investment decisions are discussed later in 
the chapter.61 
As to the second question, new investments are viewed as advancing the overall 
investment plan if these investments are employed in a manner that reduces the 
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overall risk of the trust portfolio, or allow the trust to achieve a higher return 
expectation without a disproportionate increase in the overall level of portfolio risk.62 
There is one more point worth discussing regarding the issue concerning wide 
investment powers. While an investment rule based on MPT allows speculative 
investments to be included in a trust portfolio, such a rule continues to condemn 
speculating with trust assets. Speculation can be defined as the act of engaging in 
any business enterprise or transaction of a venturesome or risky nature that offers 
the chance of great or unusual gain.63 With speculation, the risk of loss is more than 
offset by the possibility of a huge gain; otherwise, there would be very little 
motivation to speculate. The following investments, taken on their own, might be 
regarded as constituting speculation: purchasing property for short-term resale;64 
investing in a speculative property development;65 and using derivatives not with an 
intention to reduce or eliminate a pre-existing risk, but with an intention to seek profit 
by willingly accepting increased risk. 66  Speculation should not be confused with 
gambling. The key difference is that speculation can sometimes involve taking a 
calculated risk, whereas gambling depends on totally random outcomes or chance. 
For example, the results of the lottery will be strictly ruled by random chance, and no 
amount of prudent investigation can alter the results.67 It goes without saying that 
trustees are not allowed to gamble with trust funds.68 
2 5 Conclusion and proposed changes to legislation 
The problem in South African trust law with restricting trustees’ choice of 
investments is that it prevents trustees from using investment strategies that are now 
regularly favoured by jurisdictions such as New York, England and New Zealand. In 
particular, trustees are inhibited from investing in alternative investments and using 
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derivatives despite alternative investments permitting greater diversification across 
the investment spectrum and derivatives having the potential to add significantly to 
the stability and long-term prospects of a trust portfolio. 
MPT teaches that no asset or investment technique is regarded as inherently 
good or bad, or prohibited per se as being too risky. Integrating this principle of MPT 
into South African trust law would require trustees to have wide powers of 
investment as opposed to them being prohibited from investing in speculative 
investments.69 Therefore, it is proposed that our current rule governing trustees’ 
investment functions, namely, the prudent and careful person rule, be replaced with 
an investment rule based on MPT. Hereafter, this new rule is referred to as “South 
Africa’s prudent investor rule”. 
An important point to highlight is that South Africa’s prudent investor rule will only 
find application when trustees are exercising their investment functions. The prudent 
and careful person rule will continue to govern all non-investment related functions. 
Accordingly, no changes to section 9 of the Trust Property Control Act are proposed, 
save for the section indicating that it is only applicable to non-investment related 
functions. 
It is proposed that a new section, section 9A, be inserted in the Trust Property 
Control Act with the heading “The prudent investor rule”. Subsection (1) of section 
9A codifies and clarifies trustees’ standard of care when investing: 
“In performing his investment related functions, a trustee must exercise the care, 
diligence and skill that a prudent investor would exercise in similar circumstances.” 
A prudent investor is someone familiar with contemporary practices in the 
investment industry.70 Investing in the same manner as a prudent investor would 
undoubtedly be a difficult task for a trustee with no training in finance or asset 
management. As discussed in a later section in the chapter, the solution that an 
investment rule based on MPT offers is not to lower the standard of care for unskilled 
trustees, but rather to make broad provision for the proper delegation of trustees’ 
investment functions.71 
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The wording of subsection (1) is intended to avoid the unnecessary controversy 
over whether trustees are to invest as persons would in managing their own funds or 
in managing the funds of others. 72  The matter seems more usefully stated by 
requiring trustees to take prevailing circumstances into account. Therefore, it is 
imperative that subsection (1) be read together with subsection (4), which is 
discussed in a later section in the chapter.73 Subsection (4) lists the specific and 
general circumstances that trustees should consider before making investment 
decisions. 
Subsection (2) of section 9A gives trustees wide powers of investment: 
“A trustee may make any kind of investment consistent with the prudent investment 
standard.” 
This provision achieves the objective of declaring all property in principle open to 
consideration for trustee investment. 
The concern that the proposed changes will lead to trustees only investing in 
exceptionally risky assets are put to rest by having the necessary safeguards in 
place. First, trustees are subject to a statutory duty of care when exercising their 
powers of investment. Second, trustees are given greater flexibility in choosing 
investments provided that the overall investment plan is prudent and that any 
additional investments advance the overall investment plan. This second safeguard 
is discussed in detail in the next section. 
3 The evaluation of a trust’s investment portfolio 
3 1 Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the second area affected by the 
implementation of MPT, namely the evaluation of a trust’s investment portfolio. The 
section starts by discussing the difference between evaluating a trust’s investment 
portfolio using the isolation approach versus the total portfolio approach. The 
problems associated with the isolation approach are also presented under this 
heading. Next, it is argued that South African trust law follows the isolation approach 
to trustee investing. Thereafter, the section briefly reviews how each of the 
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comparable foreign jurisdictions has moved from the isolation approach to the total 
portfolio approach. Following this discussion, the section describes how the 
prudence of a trust’s overall investment strategy is determined under an investment 
rule based on MPT, it lists the circumstances that trustees should consider when 
making investment decisions, and it addresses a possible concern with the 
acceptance of the total portfolio approach. The section concludes with a summary, 
which is accompanied by proposals of how legislation should change in order to 
introduce the total portfolio approach into South African trust law. 
3 2 The difference between the isolation approach and the total portfolio approach 
One of the most basic tenets of MPT is the maxim that the riskiness of an asset 
cannot be determined in isolation, but can be usefully determined only within the 
context of the overall risk of the portfolio to which the asset is added.74 This means 
that the true information that an investment manager has to consider when 
evaluating the desirability of investing in a particular asset is how the asset moves in 
relation with the other assets in the portfolio.75 According to MPT, it is possible for a 
given asset to be quite risky when held in isolation, but not that risky if held in a 
portfolio.76 Furthermore, MPT illustrates that it is also possible for an investment 
manager to use investments that are highly risky when viewed in isolation in order to 
assemble a portfolio that is safe.77 
Integrating this principle of MPT into trust law requires trustees’ investment 
decisions to be evaluated – not in isolation, but in the context of the trust’s 
investment portfolio as a whole and as a part of an overall investment strategy.78 The 
prudent investor rule of the Restatement (Third) is a good example of an investment 
rule that is consistent with MPT. The prudent investor rule states that it is to be 
applied to the entire portfolio rather than to a particular investment or investments 
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viewed in isolation from the overall investment strategy.79 This approach is referred 
to as the total portfolio approach. 
The total portfolio approach contrasts markedly with an approach that assesses 
the decisions of trustees on an investment-by-investment basis. For example, the 
prudent man rule of the Restatement (Second) required trustees to evaluate 
prudence one investment at a time:80 
“… only if each investment is safe, measured in isolation, will the collection of 
investments (the portfolio) be safe.” 
This approach is referred to as the isolation approach. 
The isolation approach creates the following two problems for trustees: first, 
judging investments in isolation tends to label broad categories of investments and 
techniques as speculative and, therefore, as inappropriate investment vehicles for 
trusts.81 For example, under the prudent man rule of the Restatement (Second), 
some of the investments and techniques that were either legally precluded or 
questionable were the following: certain uses of options and futures, margin 
purchases of securities, speculative stock, discount bonds, new and untried 
enterprises, venture capital pools, foreign stocks, and second mortgages.82 
Second, because the isolation approach concentrates on single investments 
without looking at the portfolio in its entirety, trustees are required to defend the 
performance of each individual investment in the portfolio.83 This practice exposes 
trustees to liability for a decline in the value of one investment even if that investment 
is part of a well-diversified portfolio. 84  In the American states that followed the 
prudent man rule, Scott-influenced courts tended to judge (in retrospect) investments 
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that performed poorly as too risky and held trustees liable for losses sustained by the 
trust fund.85 
3 3 The approach in South Africa for evaluating a trust’s investment portfolio 
There is no case law in South Africa indicating that trustees should follow the total 
portfolio approach. As a matter of fact, the following paragraph in Estate Richards 
signals quite the opposite:86 
“Nonetheless, it must not be overlooked that every investment in shares (and unit trusts) 
carries with it the inherent risk of capital loss. A trustee exercising due diligence and care 
will bear this in mind when purchasing shares both in regard to their selection and the 
balance of his share portfolio. He will accordingly avoid investments which are of a 
speculative nature. The extent to which it will be prudent to invest in the share market 
must necessarily depend on the circumstances of each case. Generally speaking, 
however, a trustee will as far as is practicable seek to spread the investments of the trust 
over various forms of undertaking in order to obtain a balance of stability and growth in 
the capital value of the trust and the income it produces.” 
Essentially what Scott JA is indicating here is that when constructing an 
investment portfolio, trustees should choose a mixture of higher risk investments 
(which could bring greater returns) and more secure investments (which would 
produce lower returns but expose the trust fund to less risk).87 An investment rule 
based on MPT, on the other hand, requires more than simply investing in different 
assets with different levels of risk.88 Investments must be selected based on their 
contribution to the overall portfolio rather than their individual risk attributes.89 The 
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goal for trustees is to find assets that complement one another.90 Trustees investing 
in accordance with MPT would thus combine assets that have a low correlation with 
each other.91 
An even stronger indication that Scott JA is not advocating that trustees should 
follow the total portfolio approach, is the fact that he states that trustees should avoid 
investments of a speculative nature. A requirement to avoid speculative investments 
is incompatible with the total portfolio approach, since in terms of this approach the 
riskiness of investments is considered only in light of the overall portfolio. This 
means that in terms of the total portfolio approach, an investment cannot be 
characterised as “safe” or “speculative” in abstract isolation. 92  Instead, before 
rejecting a risky asset as speculative per se, trustees should consider the possible 
role of that asset in the portfolio.93 
In conclusion, it is safe to state that the isolation approach is currently used in 
South African trust law to evaluate a trust’s investment portfolio. 
3 4 The current position in each of the relevant jurisdictions 
The Prudent Investor Act, effective as to investments made or held by trustees on 
or after 1 January 1995, codifies a prudent investor rule for New York, thereby 
replacing New York’s prudent man rule.94 In chapter 4, this rule is referred to as New 
York’s prudent investor rule. The rule requires trustees to:95 
“… pursue an overall investment strategy to enable the trustee to make appropriate 
present and future distributions to or for the benefit of the beneficiaries under the 
governing instrument, in accordance with risk and return objectives reasonably suited to 
the entire portfolio …” 
The rule also requires trustees to consider, among other things:96 
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“… the role that each investment or course of action plays within the overall portfolio …” 
New York’s prudent investor rule, therefore, clearly indicates the acceptance of 
the total portfolio approach. 
Chapter 5 illustrates that the total portfolio approach should be regarded as part of 
English trust law, at least as from 1996. In the Nestle case, Hoffmann J stated:97 
“Modern trustees acting within their investment powers are entitled to be judged by the 
standards of current portfolio theory, which emphasises the risk level of the entire 
portfolio rather than the risk attaching to each investment taken in isolation.” 
The English Trustee Act 2000 does not mention MPT or the total portfolio 
approach directly. However, according to the Explanatory Notes that accompany the 
Act, the Act does take account of MPT indirectly. The Explanatory Notes state that 
the definition of the “standard investment criteria” accords with MPT:98 
“The definition of the standard investment criteria in section 4(3) is closely 
modelled on section 6(1) of the Trustee Investments Act 1961 and accords with 
modern portfolio theory.” 
Existing law in New Zealand hints at the acceptance of the total portfolio 
approach. Section 13E of the Trustee Act 1956 (as amended) lists the matters that 
trustees should have regard to when investing. One of the matters that trustees 
should consider is “the nature of existing trust investments and other trust 
property”.99 However, Butler argues that section 13E does not go far enough in 
making the compatibility of the total portfolio approach and investment management 
obvious. He suggests that in order to make the acceptability of the total portfolio 
approach more apparent, section 13E should rather state that, when making an 
investment, trustees must have regard to “the relationship of that investment to other 
investments in the investment package”. 100  According to Butler, an express 
statement to this effect would satisfy any concerned trustee following a MPT style of 
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trustee investing that the total portfolio approach has statutory approval and that the 
trustee’s approach would be readily defensible before a court. Butler believes that 
current legislation fails to do this explicitly.101 
The New Zealand Law Commission also indicated that they are not satisfied with 
the law as it is currently operating and recommended two changes to the Trustee Act 
1956 (as amended): first, section 13E of the Act should be redrafted to provide that 
trustees may take their overall investment strategy into account when exercising 
their powers of investment; and, second, new legislation should clarify that the rule of 
general trust law, which requires that the decisions of trustees are assessed on an 
investment-by-investment basis if their investment decisions are called into question, 
should be abolished.102 It appears that the aim of the second recommendation is to 
place beyond all doubt that once the new legislation has been enacted, the isolation 
approach will effectively be abolished and trustees will have to follow the total 
portfolio approach.  
The Trusts Act 2019 indicates the acceptance of the total portfolio approach in the 
following two ways: first, section 59(1)(n) of the Act requires trustees to consider 
their “overall investment strategy” when exercising their power of investment. 103 
Second, in terms of section 128 of the Act, in an action for breach of trust, the court 
may take into consideration whether an investment was made in accordance with an 
investment strategy.104 Section 128 is a redraft of section 13M of the Trustee Act 
1956 (as amended). Section 59(1)(n) of the Trusts Act 2019 read in conjunction with 
section 128 of the Act support the conclusion that the total portfolio approach is a 
legitimate trustee investment strategy under the Trusts Act 2019. 
3 5 Determining the prudence of a trust’s overall investment strategy 
In place of a duty to avoid speculative investments, an investment rule based on 
MPT requires trustees to determine the risk/return trade-off that best suits the 
particular trust and then to tailor that trust’s overall investment strategy 
                                                            
101 148-149. 
102 New Zealand Law Commission Review of the Law of Trusts – A Trusts Act for New Zealand (2013) 
Report 130 131. 
103 S 59(1)(n) of the Trusts Act 2019. 




accordingly.105 A trust’s overall investment strategy will thus be viewed as prudent if 
the trustees invest at a level of risk-and-return that is suitable for that particular 
trust.106 In order to determine what would be regarded as a suitable level of risk-and-
return, trustees must take the circumstances of each particular case into account.107 
By comparing New York’s Prudent Investor Act and New Zealand’s Trusts Act 
2019, as well as taking the discussion regarding general and specific circumstances 
in chapter 2 into consideration, it is suggested that trustees should consider the 
following circumstances in investing and managing trust assets:108 
(a) the purpose and terms of the trust; 
(b) the size of the trust estate; 
(c) the estimated duration of the trust; 
(d) general economic conditions;109 
(e) the possible effect of inflation or deflation; 
(f) the need to maintain the real value of the capital of the trust and to ensure 
the production of adequate income; 
(g) the expected tax consequences of investment decisions or strategies; 
(h) the role that each investment or course of action plays within the overall 
trust portfolio;110 
(i) the expected total return of the portfolio (including both income and 
appreciation of capital);111 
(j) the needs of the beneficiaries (to the extent reasonably known to the 
trustees) for present and future distributions; 
(k) other resources of the beneficiaries; and 
(l) other relevant matters worth considering.112 
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A possible concern with the adoption of the total portfolio approach might be that it 
would lead to future trust portfolios only being filled with exceptionally risky assets.113 
However, any concerned beneficiary should find comfort in the fact that before 
investing in a particular investment, trustees following the portfolio approach must 
demonstrate that the investment advances the overall investment strategy. New 
investments are viewed as advancing the overall investment strategy if these 
investments are employed in a manner that reduces the overall risk of the 
investment portfolio, or allow the portfolio to achieve a higher return expectation 
without a disproportionate increase in the overall level of portfolio risk.114 
It follows from the foregoing that even in terms of the total portfolio approach it is 
possible that a particular investment might be regarded as imprudent. Gordon 
illustrates this point by applying the total portfolio approach to the cases that 
underpin Scott’s rule against investing in speculative investments. What is 
remarkable is that Gordon found that in applying the total portfolio approach to these 
cases, not one of them would come out differently.115 For example, in St. Germaine v 
Tuttle,116 the trustee invested more than one-third of an $8 000 fund in a heavily 
indebted company owned by his family. On the court’s theory, the investment was 
speculative. According to Gordon, under the total portfolio approach the investment 
of so large a percentage of a portfolio in such an investment would also be regarded 
as imprudent because it would make the portfolio as a whole too risky.117 Gordon 
points out that such an investment would be imprudent because of the risk it adds to 
the portfolio and not the risk of the investment per se.118 
3 6 Conclusion and proposed changes to legislation 
South African trust law requires trustees’ investment decisions to be assessed on 
an investment-by-investment basis if these decisions are called into question. This 
approach is referred to as the isolation approach. The problem with the isolation 
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approach is that, first, it tends to label broad categories of investments and 
techniques as speculative and thus as imprudent per se and, second, it exposes 
trustees to liability for a decline in the value of one investment even if that investment 
is part of a well-diversified portfolio. 
Jurisdictions such as New York and England have moved from the isolation 
approach to an approach that evaluates trustees’ performance in light of the 
performance of the entire portfolio (referred to as the total portfolio approach), while 
New Zealand is in the process of also making this shift. Currently, existing law in 
New Zealand does not go far enough in making the compatibility of the total portfolio 
approach and trustee investing obvious. The New Zealand Law Commission 
recommended that reforming legislation ought to require trustees to look at a trust’s 
investment portfolio as an interlocking whole and not just at its individual elements. 
Accordingly, the Trusts Act 2019 includes provisions that indicate the acceptance of 
the total portfolio approach. 
Before proceeding to consider how South Africa should adopt the total portfolio 
approach, a brief review of the discussion in the preceding section is in order. It is 
proposed above that the current rule governing trustees’ investment functions should 
be replaced with a prudent investor rule by inserting a new section, section 9A, into 
the Trust Property Control Act. Subsection (1) of section 9A codifies and clarifies 
trustees’ standard of care when investing, and subsection (2) gives trustees wide 
powers of investment. 
With regard to adopting the total portfolio approach, two further changes to the 
Trust Property Control Act are proposed: first, subsection (3) should be added to 
section 9A, requiring trustees to: 
“… pursue an overall investment strategy in accordance with the level of risk-and-return 
reasonably suited to the entire trust portfolio …” 
Second, in order to determine what would be regarded as a suitable level of risk-
and-return, trustees must take the circumstances of each particular case into 
account. Accordingly, subsection (4) of section 9A should list the specific and 




decisions. The contents of the list are listed above,119 but it is worth highlighting the 
provision that relates specifically to the total portfolio approach: 
“[Trustees should consider] the role that each investment or course of action plays within 
the overall trust portfolio.” 
It is submitted that these two proposals would give concerned trustees the 
necessary confidence that the total portfolio approach has statutory approval and 
that the approach would be readily defensible before a court. 
4 The diversification of trust investments 
4 1 Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the third area of trustee investment 
affected by the implementation of MPT, namely, the diversification of trust 
investments. The section starts by describing diversification from a MPT perspective. 
This first part also explains why an investment rule based on MPT generally compels 
trustees to use diversification. Next, the differences between the approach to 
diversification of the prudent man rule and the approach of the prudent investor rule 
are discussed. Following this discussion, the approaches to diversification in each of 
the comparable foreign jurisdictions are reviewed briefly. This is followed by a 
discussion of the position in South African trust law with regard to diversification. The 
second-last part of the section is devoted to answering the question: when will it be 
in the interest of beneficiaries not to diversify? The section concludes with a 
summary, which is accompanied by proposals of how legislation should change in 
order to make it possible for trustees to diversify in accordance with MPT. 
4 2 Diversification defined 
Most investment professionals use the term “diversification” to denote the 
spreading of one’s wealth over a variety of investments. MPT instructs that 
diversification entails more than simply investing in different investments.120 Instead, 
MPT illustrates that diversification should be implemented with “an eye to finding 
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assets that complement each other and eliminate uncompensated risk”. 121 This 
statement requires clarification. 
Uncompensated risk, or unsystematic risk as it is called in this dissertation, refers 
to the risk that surrounds an individual security and is peculiar to that security. The 
other component of risk, namely, systematic risk, is the risk common to all securities 
and reflects general economic, political and social conditions. 122  Systematic risk 
cannot be diversified away within a market.123 Unsystematic risk, by contrast, can be 
reduced greatly through diversification.124 
Investments complement each other when they do not go up and down in value at 
the same time. In technical terms, investors should combine investments that have a 
low co-variance with each other.125 Diversification, therefore, requires investors not 
to invest in a number of companies that all deal in the same market, for example, 
motor vehicle manufacturing, because if there is a fall in the market, the entire value 
of the portfolio will fall.126 According to Lofthouse, investing in similar companies, all 
of which are subject to the same external influences, is almost tantamount to putting 
all your money into one investment.127 
By finding investments that complement each other, investors can theoretically 
reduce all unsystematic risk since the setbacks experienced by one company are 
offset by the gains of another.128 The only risk remaining in the portfolio will be 
systematic risk.129 In contrast, there will be systematic and unsystematic risk in a 
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non-diversified portfolio. 130  Therefore, the risk of a non-diversified portfolio will 
always be higher than a diversified portfolio.131 
It is important to stress that diversification permits the risk of an investment 
portfolio to be reduced without lowering the portfolio’s return expectations:132 
“By holding a diversified portfolio of investments, trustees reduce the overall level of risk 
run by their beneficiaries without, however, reducing the total of their returns from the 
individual investments.” 
The fact that diversification enables trustees to reduce risk substantially while 
keeping expected returns constant makes diversification fundamental to risk 
management.133 Consequently, an investment rule based on MPT generally compels 
trustees, absent special circumstances, to use diversification to find investments that 
complement each other and eliminate unsystematic risk. 
4 3 The prudent man rule versus the prudent investor rule 
The prudent investor rule of the Restatement (Third) (in this section referred to as 
the “prudent investor rule”) is a good example of an investment rule based on 
MPT.134 The Restatement (Third) imposes on trustees an affirmative obligation to 
diversify trust investments.135 Similar to the rest of trust investment law, the duty to 
diversify is a default rule. Therefore, the prudent investor rule permits trustees not to 
diversify, but only under special circumstances. These circumstances are discussed 
below.136 
The prudent man rule of the Restatement (Second) (in this section referred to as 
the “prudent man rule”) did not necessarily frown on diversification as a concept of 
trust fund management. As a matter of fact, the prudent man rule required 
investments to be diversified.137 However, there are three key differences between 
the prudent man rule and the prudent investor rule when it comes to diversification: 
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first, the prudent man rule required diversification, but only among non-speculative 
investments,138 whereas trustees investing in accordance with the prudent investor 
rule are free to diversify using any investment.139 Second, the prudent man rule 
required trustees to evaluate prudence one investment at a time, whereas the 
prudent investor rule allows trustees to evaluate the performance of a portfolio as a 
whole.140 Third, under the prudent investor rule, the purpose of diversification has 
been broadened significantly.141 These differences require further discussion.  
Since the prudent investor rule is based on MPT, it requires a certain type of 
diversification. 142  More specifically, the rule does not simply require trustees to 
choose different types of investment; instead, it requires trustees to choose 
investments that have offsetting risks.143 However, choosing investments that have 
offsetting risks will often lead to trustees having to select investments that are seen 
as speculative or risky viewed in isolation. As explained in chapter 3:144 
“MPT’s focused attention on the portfolio as a whole means that injecting an asset that is 
highly volatile in itself into a portfolio is not necessarily illogical. Intuitively, it is not obvious 
that adding high-risk stocks (eg small capitalisation stocks) to a portfolio of low-risk 
investments (eg government bonds) would make the portfolio less risky than a portfolio 
composed entirely of low-risk investments. But, as seen above, it is possible to reduce a 
portfolio’s risk by adding an asset that moves inversely to the other investments of the 
portfolio.” 
In Levy’s example, discussed in chapter 3, an investor has to add small 
capitalisation stocks to his portfolio in order to reduce the risk of the portfolio of 
government bonds. The small capitalisation stocks are twice as volatile as the 
bonds, but since the correlation between the two investments is low, the addition of 
the stocks reduces the risk of the portfolio.145 
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The inclusion of higher risk investments in a portfolio is thus simply unavoidable 
for trustees investing in terms of an investment rule based on MPT. The drafters of 
Restatement (Third) understood and accepted this. 146  Accordingly, the drafters 
eliminated the prohibition on speculative investments and made it possible for 
trustees to be evaluated on the performance of the portfolio as a whole.147 The 
consequence of these changes is that trustees following the prudent investor rule are 
better equipped to select investments with offsetting risks, because they can make 
any kind of investment and select investments based on their contribution to the 
overall portfolio rather than their individual risk attributes. 
According to Schwartzel, the purpose of diversification has been broadened 
significantly under the prudent investor rule. As discussed above, trustees who fail to 
diversify introduce unsystematic risk to a portfolio.148 Furthermore, trustees who fail 
to diversify are not compensated with additional returns.149 In terms of the prudent 
investor rule, the purpose of diversification is not only to moderate risks that are 
inherent in investing, but also “to reduce risks that are not justified by some prospect 
of gain”. Stated differently, the purpose of diversification is not only to prevent large 
losses, but also to reduce as far as possible the risk of a portfolio that is not 
compensated for by the market by way of greater return. What has changed, 
therefore, is that the goal of trustees is now also to prevent the trust portfolio from 
carrying excessive unsystematic risk.150 
4 4 The current position in each of the comparable foreign jurisdictions 
New York’s prudent investor rule requires a trustee to:151 
“… diversify assets unless the trustee reasonably determines that it is in the interests of 
the beneficiaries not to diversify, taking into account the purposes and terms and 
provisions of the governing instrument; and … within a reasonable time after the creation 
of the fiduciary relationship, to determine whether to retain or dispose of initial assets.” 
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Before the enactment of the Prudent Investor Act in 1995, it was a well-
established rule in New York that there was no absolute duty to diversify, and a 
failure to do so was not necessarily imprudent.152 Diversification was not obligatory 
as a matter of law; instead it was only a fact that could be considered to determine 
whether trustees had exhibited the requisite degree of skill and care in structuring a 
portfolio.153 Radigan and Farinacci summarise the position since the enactment of 
the Prudent Investor Act as follows:154 
“… trustees have a presumed duty to diversify investments and may be liable if they 
neglect to do so …” 
In England, trustees are required to pay heed to “the need for diversification of 
investments of the trust, in so far as is appropriate to the circumstances of the 
trust”.155 Strictly speaking, trustees are not obliged to diversify but they are duty-
bound to consider diversification. Nevertheless, if the trust fund is substantial and the 
power of investment is unrestricted, the trustees would need good reason not to 
diversify. As Le Poidevin states it:156 
“... a trustee would need to have some good reason for putting all its eggs in one basket.” 
Trustees in England have long recognised the importance of diversification 
through the holding of a varied portfolio of investments.157 For instance, the Trustee 
Investments Act 1961 required trustees to have regard to the need for diversification 
of investments so far as appropriate to the circumstances of the trust.158 The Trustee 
Act 2000 in effect re-enacts the section in the Trustee Investments Act 1961 that 
deals with diversification.159 But this is not to say that the Trustee Act 2000 did not 
bring about any changes. A major improvement of the Act is that it better equips 
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trustees to choose investments with offsetting risks since trustees can now make any 
kind of investment. Furthermore, as a consequence of the Nestle case, trustees are 
entitled to be judged by the total portfolio approach as opposed to the isolation 
approach. 160  The end result is that trustees have been able to diversify more 
effectively since 2000. 
In New Zealand, section 13E of the Trustee Act 1956 (as amended) sets out a list 
of factors that trustees may have regard to in exercising powers of investments.161 
The desirability of diversification is expressly recognised in the list.162 While arguably 
there is no duty to diversify under the Act,163 trustees who do not diversify act at their 
own peril. For example, if it is believed that the trustees of a particular trust have 
failed to meet the standard of prudence expected of them, the beneficiaries may hold 
the trustees accountable for a loss to the trust fund. In such a case, the court will 
consider all relevant circumstances, including any of the factors listed in section 13E. 
Moreover, section 13M of the Act directs the attention of the court specifically to the 
issue of diversification.164 The section allows the court to have regard to two matters 
in determining whether trustees have acted prudently: first, the court may have 
regard to whether the trust investments have been diversified; and second, it is open 
to the court to consider whether the investment has been made pursuant to an 
investment strategy. Since diversification is mentioned in both section 13E and 
section 13M, one cannot help to feel that the drafters of the Act saw diversification as 
paramount to the interest of beneficiaries.  
Section 13E and section 13M are restated in the Trust Act 2019 as section 59 and 
section 128, respectively. 
4 5 The position in South African trust law 
There are three significant points to note about diversification in South African 
trust law: first, Scott JA in Estate Richards encourages the “spreading of 
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investments” and not the “diversification of investments”. Scott JA stated the 
following:165 
“Generally speaking, however, a trustee will as far as is practicable seek to spread the 
investments of the trust over various forms of undertaking in order to obtain a balance of 
stability and growth in the capital value of the trust and the income it produces.” 
As discussed in paragraph 3 3 above, what Scott JA indicated by this statement is 
that when constructing an investment portfolio, trustees should choose a mixture of 
higher risk investments (which could bring greater returns) and more secure 
investments (which would produce lower returns but expose the trust fund to less 
risk). As already pointed out in this chapter, diversification requires more than simply 
investing in different types of investment. 166  Diversification requires trustees to 
choose investments that have offsetting risks. 
Second, there is no duty to spread investments. Where then does the need to 
spread investments over various forms of undertaking fit into trust law? The answer 
appears to be this: De Waal states that trustees should test their investment strategy 
against five practical guidelines formulated in Estate Richards. One of these practical 
guidelines is whether the trustees have spread the trust’s investments over various 
market sectors.167 
Third, when compared with the prudent man rule and the prudent investor rule, it 
appears that the South African approach to the spreading of investments 
corresponds with the prudent man rule. This statement is based on the following 
factors: trustees in South Africa should avoid speculative investments;168 trustees 
are judged according to the isolation approach;169 and Scott JA did not give any 
indication that trustees should strive to eliminate unsystematic risk. 
4 6 Restricting diversification 
An important question that surrounds the duty to diversify is: when is it in the 
interest of beneficiaries not to diversify? Bearing the importance of diversification in 
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mind, it is suggested that a failure to diversify should only be justified in very unusual 
situations. The three most common situations found in the relevant jurisdictions are 
circumstances in which: the value of the trust fund is relatively small; 170 
diversification will lead to a considerable tax cost; 171  and the trust instrument 
contains a retention clause. Each of these situations are examined below in order to 
determine whether they can legitimately restrict diversification, and how trustees 
following an investing rule based on MPT should deal with such restrictions. 
4 6 1 The size of a fund 
The first situation in which restricting diversification may be appropriate is if the 
trust fund is relatively small. Hudson explains the thinking behind this possible 
exception to diversification as follows:172 
“… if the trust fund were comprised of only £10 000 in free cash, then it would be 
unreasonable to expect that a trustee would be able to diversify the trust’s investment 
portfolio as broadly as a trust containing £10 million because clearly the larger trust can 
afford many more different types of investment and can better afford the fees involved 
with buying that number of investments.” 
He concludes that the need to diversify is reduced significantly in the case of a 
£10 000 fund:173 
“Thus a trust comprising £10 million may include hundreds of different investments in its 
portfolio, whereas a trust fund including only £10 000 may have only six or seven 
different, carefully-selected investments in different markets.”  
However, it is submitted that the smallness of a trust fund should not be used as 
an excuse to restrict diversification. Instead of investing in six or seven investments, 
as suggested by Hudson, trustees could invest in an index fund tracking a market 
index. As discussed in chapter 3, an index fund is designed to match or track the 
components of an established index of stocks or some other investment type, while a 
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market index is intended to represent an entire stock market. An index fund that is 
constructed to approximate the performance of a market index is referred to in 
chapter 3 as a market index fund. 174  Therefore, even with an initial investment 
amount of only £10 000, trustees are able to invest in a highly diversified portfolio by 
investing in a market index fund. 
4 6 2 Tax considerations 
The second situation in which restricting diversification may be appropriate is if the 
tax costs of recognising a gain may outweigh the advantages of diversifying the fund. 
Consider the following example: a trust owns a large number of shares in a company 
listed on the JSE. A substantial capital gains tax may be triggered if the shares are 
sold to diversify the portfolio. The trustees face a difficult problem: if they sell the 
shares it might result in a large taxable gain; if they opt to retain the shares, they run 
the risk of personal liability. The shares can either perform as well as anticipated or 
fail to perform and gradually decline in value. In the latter event, the trustees will be 
held accountable for the losses. 
According to Collins and Stampfli, it is more advantageous to sell the shares, pay 
the tax costs, and invest the proceeds in a diversified portfolio.175 This suggestion is 
based on a comparison that Collins and Stampfli made on what the results would be 
if the trustees of a portfolio, consisting of shares in a company listed on the S&P 500 
with a value of $1 million and a base cost of $0, stayed invested in the company 
versus if the trustees sold the shares and invested the after-tax proceeds in an S&P 
stock index.176 After running a thousand trial simulations of portfolio values, they 
found that the “most likely” outcome is that the portfolio values would virtually be 
equal at year ten. Thereafter, the diversified portfolio dominates the single-stock 
portfolio by evidencing higher inflation-adjusted values.177 
Trustees who wish to retain investments owing to tax reasons should also 
consider the bankruptcy rate of a single-stock portfolio. Collins and Stampfli found 
that the bankruptcy rate of a single-stock portfolio by year twenty is 41%. Thus, in 
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41% of all trials, the portfolio value reduced to zero before the end of the twenty-year 
period.178 
As a side note, it is worth mentioning that there is an alternative risk-reduction 
strategy available to trustees following an investment rule based on MPT. The 
trustees could buy a put option on the shares in question. The put option’s value will 
increase in the event that the price of the underlying shares declines. The viability of 
this strategy will depend on the costs of buying the put option.179 
4 6 3 Retention provisions 
The final situation in which restricting diversification may be appropriate is the 
following: the founder of a trust, whether the founder of a testamentary or an inter 
vivos trust, might direct that a particular asset should be retained within the trust 
fund. In order to determine how trustees following an investment rule based on MPT 
should deal with such an instruction, it is necessary to analyse the different types of 
retention provision. Following this analysis, this section also examines a situation in 
which the founder has expressed the wish that a certain asset should be retained for 
the occupation of beneficiaries. 
According to the Restatement (Third), retention provisions come in two forms: 
“permissive” and “mandatory”.180 
4 6 3 1 Permissive retention provisions  
Permissive retention provisions can be divided into “specific” and “general”. In a 
specific permissive retention provision, the founder specifies a particular asset that is 
to be retained. 181  For example, say a testator has worked for a certain public 
company called “XYZ” most of his life and has accumulated a large number of 
shares in XYZ throughout his career. He dies and leaves the shares in XYZ in trust. 
The shares are the only substantial asset of the trust. In his will he provided that “it is 
my desire and hope that my trustees shall not dispose of my XYZ shares”. In a letter 
                                                            
178 217. 
179 Langbein (1996) Iowa LR 661; G Crawford “A fiduciary duty to use derivatives?” (1995) 1 Stanford 
JL Bus & Fin 307 312. 
180 DT Leibell, DL Daniels & Paulina Mejia “Holding family business interests in trust” (2012) 13 





addressed to the trustees he explains his thinking as follows: “I worked for XYZ for 
35 years, the share price of XYZ rocketed in value throughout my career. You just 
cannot do better”.182 
In this example, the testator is imposing his supposed investment wisdom on the 
trustees. According to Langbein, the testator’s investment strategy is “objectively 
stupid and imprudent” since it will result in the trustees having to bear additional risk 
(in the form of unsystematic risk) without any compensating advantage.183 In New 
York, because permissive retention provisions do not abrogate trustees’ duty to act 
prudently, and because diversification is fundamental to risk management, trust 
provisions are strictly construed against dispensing with the diversification 
requirement.184 A specific permissive retention provision will thus not be viewed by a 
New York court as sufficient to protect trustees from liability for failure to diversify. 
Another example of a specific permissive retention provision involves the 
expression of a wish to retain shares in a family-owned company. Langbein suggests 
that trustees should be given more leeway not to diversify if a family company is 
involved.185 While on the subject, one can also go a step further and argue that even 
in a trust with no retention provision, a family company should still receive special 
consideration and treatment from a diversification point of view. 186 According to 
Langbein, by comparison with the previous example concerning the investment of 
shares in a public company, authorisation to retain a family company presents more 
varied circumstances.187 First, trustees may wish to retain a family company because 
it would continue to be a source of income, employment or direct involvement for 
beneficiaries.188 Second, a family company sometimes occupies a market niche that 
produces returns superior to those readily available to the trustees in the ordinary 
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investment market.189 Third, Cooper argues that trust law is not exclusively about 
economics, but also includes a personal element to some extent.190 Therefore, a 
founder’s personal visions of wealth transmission should be a worthwhile factor for 
trustees to consider.191  Fourth, the family company might have held sentimental 
value not just for the founder, but it may also hold sentimental value for the 
beneficiaries.192 Fifth, selling the shares in a family company is more difficult than 
selling liquid, widely-held shares in a public company.193 
In re Hyde 194  serves to illustrate how various factors can be considered in 
deciding whether to retain shares in a family company. In this New York case, a 
majority shareholder of a large manufacturing company established multiple 
testamentary trusts at her death, each funded with her shares in the family company. 
The company was a closely held family business, the shares of which were not 
publicly traded. The corporate trustees of the different testamentary trusts decided to 
retain the shares in the company after the death of the testatrix. The beneficiaries 
objected, claiming that the trustees failed to diversify the trust investments 
adequately. The court, finding in favour of the trustees, noted that the trustees took 
the following factors into account in deciding to retain the shares in the company: 
first, they considered the liquidity (or lack thereof) of the company and the fact that 
the trustees could only obtain a discounted price if they tried to sell the shares in the 
company. The trustees determined that it was not in the best interest of the 
beneficiaries to sell the shares at a low price merely for the sake of diversification. In 
addition, the lack of marketability of the company was exacerbated by the company’s 
unusual capital structure. Second, the trustees also took into account general 
economic conditions, the adverse tax consequences of the sale of the shares, and 
the fact that the company paid considerable dividends. Third, there was an indication 
that the testatrix wanted the shares in the company to remain in the family and that 
the trusts were the vehicles chosen to achieve that result. It is unclear from a reading 
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of the judgment whether this indication came from a wish in the will, a letter of 
wishes to the trustees, or a conversation that the testatrix had with the trustees when 
the will was drafted. In light of all these factors, the court held that the trustees were 
not liable for failing to diversify.195 
In a general permissive retention provision, the founder does not mention any 
specific asset or assets, but permits the trustees to retain any assets received from 
the founder. 196  For example, the retention language may permit the trustees to 
“retain any securities in the same form as when received” or retain “initially settled 
assets”.197 In New York, trustees’ duty to diversify remains in such a case. Therefore, 
if the trust is funded with a non-controlling interest in a public company, as is the 
case in the XYZ example above, a general permissive retention provision would not 
be sufficient to protect trustees from liability for failure to diversify.198 
4 6 3 2 Mandatory retention provisions 
Mandatory retention provisions are typically binding on trustees in managing trust 
assets.199 There is, however, an exception to the rule. The doctrine of “changed 
circumstances” permits trustees to apply to court to be excused from complying with 
a condition that has become impractical or inadvisable for reasons not foreseen by 
the founder.200 For the issue at hand, this means that trustees who are directed by 
the trust instrument to retain a certain asset could petition the court for instructions if 
the value of an asset is expected to fall or is falling.201 
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The leading case applying the doctrine of changed circumstances is Matter of 
Pulitzer202 (“Pulitzer”). Joseph Pulitzer (“Mr Pulitzer”) died in 1911. In his will, he 
transferred his controlling interest in the “New York World” newspaper in trust for the 
benefit of his children.203 His will included language prohibiting the trustees from 
selling the interest in the newspaper company under any circumstances.204 After 
1926, the company fell upon hard times and became increasingly unprofitable.205 
The trustees petitioned the court to waive the mandatory sale provision, arguing that 
in the light of changed circumstances it had become inadvisable to keep the interest 
in the newspaper. The company had operated at a loss for five years and the 
possibility existed that if not sold, it might become worthless.206 Mr Pulitzer did not 
foresee the possibility that the company would become worthless. In fact, his 
expectation was that the newspaper “would flourish”. 207  The court applied the 
doctrine of changed circumstances and gave judicial approval to the sale of the 
interest in the newspaper. 208  In reaching its decision, the court stated that Mr 
Pulitzer’s dominant intent must have been to benefit the beneficiaries of the trust, 
while the continued operation of the newspaper was a subsidiary intention. 209 
Langbein explains that if there is a conflict between these two intentions, the 
founder’s dominant intent, which is to benefit the beneficiaries, should prevail.210 
In South African trust law, if the trust instrument makes it clear that a particular 
asset must be preserved for the ultimate beneficiaries, this naturally precludes sale 
by the trustees.211 It is submitted that a direction by the founder to retain a certain 
asset will not absolve the trustees from investigating whether the retention of the 
asset is in the best interest of the beneficiaries. Should the trustees find that the 
asset is deteriorating and is expected to keep on deteriorating, and that the decline 
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in value of the asset is due to circumstances that the founder did not contemplate or 
foresee, the trustees should apply to the court in terms of section 13 of the Trust 
Property Control Act for an order to sell the asset.212 It is submitted that the trustees’ 
application would succeed since the application satisfies both the subjective criterion 
(the founder’s lack of contemplation or foresight) and the objective criterion 
(prejudice to the interests of the beneficiaries) of section 13.213 
4 6 3 3 Property used for occupation by beneficiaries 
One matter concerning retention provisions remains for comment. A founder might 
require the trustees to retain the ownership of a family residence for occupation by 
beneficiaries.214 As a result, the trustees will not receive any rental income from the 
property. Viewed as an investment, allowing beneficiaries to live in a trust property 
rent-free appears quite imprudent, although it is clearly in the interest of the 
beneficiaries.215 
It is proposed that such a property should be classified by the trustees as “not 
being held for investment”.216 Other assets that might also be viewed as not being 
held for investment include a set of valuable books, a collection of unique coins, or 
an antique motor vehicle.217 Consequently, many trust portfolios will consist of an 
“investment portfolio” and a “non-investment component”. South Africa’s proposed 
prudent investor rule (section 9A of the Trust Property Control Act)218 will govern the 
investment portfolio, whereas trustees’ ordinary standard of care (section 9 of the 
Trust Property Control Act) will govern the non-investment component of a trust. 
The reason for this distinction is that the non-investment component is not 
subjected to the requirements of the prudent investor rule. Otherwise, trustees would 
have to consider selling a house occupied by beneficiaries in order to invest in a 
diversified portfolio or at least consider finding investments with offsetting risks to the 
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particular property. The importance of dividing the trust portfolio in this way will 
become even clearer when total return investing is discussed later in the chapter.219 
4 7 Conclusion and proposed changes to legislation 
The type of diversification that coincides with MPT is accomplished by finding 
investments that complement one another and by eliminating unsystematic risk. Two 
investments complement each other when they are likely to perform well under 
opposite market conditions or at different times. Adverse movements in one 
investment will be offset by positive results in the other. By finding investments that 
have offsetting risks, trustees can theoretically reduce all unsystematic risk in a 
portfolio. The only risk remaining in a diversified portfolio will be systematic risk. In 
contrast, there will be systematic and unsystematic risk in a non-diversified portfolio. 
Therefore, the risk of a diversified portfolio will typically be lower than that of a non-
diversified portfolio. Importantly, diversification permits the risk of a portfolio to be 
reduced without lowering the portfolio’s return expectations. The fact that 
diversification enables trustees to reduce the risk of a portfolio substantially while 
keeping expected returns constant makes diversification fundamental to the 
management of risk. 
Choosing investments that have offsetting risks will often lead to trustees having 
to select investments that are seen as speculative or risky viewed in isolation. 
Indeed, the inclusion of higher risk investments is simply unavoidable when trustees 
are investing in terms of an investment rule based on MPT. In order for trustees to 
select investments with offsetting risks, they should be allowed to make any kind of 
investment and select investments based on their contribution to the overall portfolio. 
Therefore, three changes to South African trust law are proposed: first, trustees 
should be allowed to make any kind of investment; second, trustees should be 
allowed to follow the total portfolio approach; and third, the Trust Property Control 
Act should impose on trustees an affirmative obligation to diversify trust investments. 
The first and second proposed changes have already been dealt with. Section 7 2 
states that subsection (2) of section 9A will give trustees wide powers of investment; 
and section 7 3 states that subsection (3) of section 9A will allow trustees to pursue 
                                                            




the total portfolio approach and subsection (4) will list the circumstances that 
trustees should consider before making investment decisions. 
Regarding the third proposed change, there is currently no duty to spread (or 
diversify) investments in South African trust law. The spreading of investments is 
rather seen as one of a number of practical guidelines against which trustees should 
test their investment strategy.  
In response to the lessons of MPT, the need to diversify trust investments has 
been intensified in the comparable foreign jurisdictions: in New York, trustees have a 
presumed duty to diversify investments; in England, a lack of diversification should 
be satisfactorily explained by the trustees; and in New Zealand, diversification is 
regarded as paramount to the interest of beneficiaries. The New York position is the 
preferred approach since it most clearly spells out that trustees have a duty to 
diversify. 
Accordingly, it is proposed that a new subsection, subsection (5), be added to 
section 9A of the Trust Property Control Act. The first part of the subsection will 
require trustees to diversify trust investments unless it is not in the interests of the 
beneficiaries; and the second part will require trustees to determine whether to sell 
or retain assets received from the founder. The reason for the inclusion of the 
second part requires explaining. 
In South African trust law, beneficiaries, at least in the case of testamentary trusts, 
are entitled to trust assets in the same state in which the assets were received.220 
Taking the benefits of diversification into consideration, it is submitted that it is 
generally more important for trustees to diversify trust investments than to leave 
investments to the ultimate beneficiaries in the form given by the founder. The only 
circumstances under which it might be in the interest of beneficiaries to leave certain 
types of initial assets undisturbed is if the assets of the trust consist of a family 
company or if there is an asset that is not being held for investment (for example, a 
property used for occupation by beneficiaries). The reason for the second part of 
subsection (5) is thus to signal the change in law. 
Consequently, it is proposed that subsection (5) of section 9A should read as 
follows:221 
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“The prudent investor rule requires a trustee to diversify assets unless the trustee 
reasonably determines that it is in the interest of the beneficiaries not to diversify; and to 
determine within a reasonable time after the creation of the trustee relationship whether 
to retain or dispose of initial assets.” 
An important question that surrounds the duty to diversify is: when is it in the 
interest of the beneficiaries not to diversify? Seeing that diversification is paramount 
to the interest of beneficiaries, it is suggested that a failure to diversify should only be 
justified in very unusual situations. The section examined the following three 
situations: the value of the trust fund is relatively small; diversification will lead to a 
considerable tax cost; and the trust instrument contains a retention clause. 
The conclusion reached regarding each of the situations is as follows: first, the 
smallness of a trust fund should not be used as an excuse to restrict diversification. 
Instead of investing in a small number of investments, trustees could invest in a 
market index fund. Second, it is safer and more advantageous to sell assets and 
invest in a diversified portfolio than it is to retain a concentrated position for tax 
reasons. Third, retention provisions can be divided into permissive and mandatory 
retention provisions. Permissive retention provisions relating to shares in public 
companies would not be sufficient to protect trustees from a failure to diversify when 
MPT-based diversification has been implemented. On the other hand, trustees 
should be given more leeway not to diversify in circumstances in which a permissive 
retention provisions relates to a family company. Mandatory retention provisions are 
binding on trustees. However, there is an exception to the rule. Should trustees find 
that an asset is deteriorating and is expected to keep on deteriorating, and that the 
decline in value of the asset is owing to circumstances that the founder did not 
contemplate or foresee, the trustees should apply to the court in terms of section 13 
of the Trust Property Control Act for an order to sell the asset. 
Finally, it is proposed that trustees should classify a property used for occupation 
by beneficiaries as “not being held for investment”. Consequently, many trust 
portfolios will consist of an investment portfolio as well as a non-investment 
component. South Africa’s prudent investor rule will govern the investment portfolio, 
whereas trustees’ ordinary standard of care will govern the non-investment 




for investment will be introduced into existing legislation by adding the following 
definition into section 1 of the Trust Property Control Act: 
 “Trust investment portfolio means the investment component of the trust and excludes 
assets in the trust that are not being held for investment.” 
It is submitted that the proposed changes discussed in this section will enable 
trustees in South Africa to diversify investment portfolios in accordance with MPT.  
5 Total return investing 
5 1 Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the fourth area of trustee investment 
affected by the implementation of MPT, namely the rules governing how income and 
capital returns are allocated to income and capital beneficiaries. The section begins 
by describing the problem with the current position in South African trust law. The 
section identifies total return investing as the solution to the problem and proceeds to 
explain the meaning of the concept and the benefits it provides. Next, the section 
discusses the different methods of facilitating total return investing. Following this 
discussion, the section briefly reviews the different approaches to total return 
investing in each of the comparable foreign jurisdictions. The second-last part of the 
section investigates which method of facilitating total return investing is best suited 
for which type of trust scenario. The section concludes with a summary, which is 
accompanied by proposals of how legislation should change to make it possible for 
trustees to operate total return investing. 
5 2 The problem with the current position in South African trust law 
As discussed in chapter 2, trustees in South Africa are obliged to protect the real 
value of trust capital and ensure that adequate income is produced continuously.222 
What is expected from trustees in this instance corresponds with the goals embodied 
in an investment rule based on MPT.223 The problem is that two rules in South 
African trust law, namely the “traditional distribution rule” and the “duty of 
                                                            
222 See chapter 2 para 4 2. 




impartiality”, when read together, make it extremely difficult for trustees to achieve 
this goal. These two rules are discussed below as well as the reason why taking 
them together creates a problem for trustees. 
5 2 1 The traditional distribution rule 
A person in a fiduciary position, such as a trustee, is at common law under a duty 
to invest trust assets.224 The object of investment is to produce gain, which, although 
it can arise in many forms, may be viewed as falling into two categories: first, gain 
may constitute income or revenue return, such as rentals on residential or 
commercial buildings, interest on bonds, or cash dividends on shares; and second, 
gain may take the form of capital appreciation.225 
No principle in South African trust law seems more settled than the rule that 
income beneficiaries are entitled to income and capital beneficiaries are entitled to 
capital. This principle is referred to as the “traditional distribution rule” in chapter 4.226 
The traditional distribution rule states that returns from fixed-income investments and 
dividends from shares must be allocated to the income beneficiaries’ account, while 
returns from the conversion of stocks must be allocated to the capital beneficiaries’ 
account. Therefore, in terms of the rule, trustees cannot distribute part of the profit 
from the sale of appreciated stock to income beneficiaries. 
What might not be immediately obvious when considering the traditional 
distribution rule, is that the rule links investment to distribution. What is meant by this 
statement is that one of the consequences of following the traditional distribution rule 
is that investment decisions taken by trustees largely determine the income level of 
income beneficiaries. 227  Langbein explains the link between investment and 
distribution as follows:228 
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“Our traditional long-established notion that the current beneficiary automatically receives 
all the ‘income’ has concealed from us the truth that the trustee’s investment policy 
largely determines how much that income will be.” 
5 2 2 The duty of impartiality 
Trustees are obliged to treat beneficiaries impartially unless the terms of the trust 
instrument show that the founder had a different intention. 229  This duty can be 
referred to as the “duty of impartiality” or the “duty to be even-handed”.230 At the first 
level, the duty of impartiality requires trustees to “exercise fairness as between each 
beneficiary, showing no favour to any one”;231 and at the second level, the duty 
requires trustees to act even-handedly as between different classes of 
beneficiaries.232 The focus of the discussion in this section is only on the second 
level of the duty of impartiality. 
The duty of impartiality requires trustees to maintain a careful balance between 
income and capital growth when investing and managing a trust’s investment 
portfolio:233 
“One of the challenges faced by most trustees in the investment of trust funds is 
achieving a proper balance between capital and income. The duty to be evenhanded 
requires a trustee to balance income and capital growth.” 
Maintaining a proper balance between income and capital is not a difficult task 
when all trust beneficiaries are both income and capital beneficiaries.234 However, 
treating beneficiaries impartially becomes particularly difficult when income and 
capital beneficiaries have competing interests.235 The clearest example of a situation 
in which trustees have difficulty in acting impartially arises where the trust is in favour 
of two or more persons with successive interests.236 For example, a fairly common 
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situation involves a deceased spouse who creates a trust to provide for the payment 
of income to the surviving spouse for life, with the trust capital to be distributed to the 
testator’s issue at the death of the income beneficiary.237 Since the testator has 
made an unconditional award of trust capital to the capital beneficiaries, the capital 
beneficiaries obtain a vested right to the trust capital upon the testator’s death. Such 
a vested right will, however, only become enforceable upon the income beneficiary’s 
death.238 This type of trust, in which trustees are directed to hold the capital and pay 
the income to the income beneficiary (or beneficiaries), is hereafter referred to as a 
“traditional net-income trust”.239 
The problem that the trustees of a traditional net-income trust face is how to 
balance the potentially conflicting interests of income and capital beneficiaries fairly. 
Income beneficiaries want to see the highest return of income, whereas capital 
beneficiaries wish to ensure the maximum possible capital appreciation.240 With this 
in mind, one can thus understand why Wolf describes the duty of impartiality as “one 
of the most difficult duties” imposed on trustees.241 
5 2 3 Traditional approaches to managing beneficiaries’ conflicting interests 
There are two ways that trustees can attempt to manage the conflicting interests 
of income and capital beneficiaries: first, trustees can invest with a view to balancing 
income and capital returns (the “balanced approach”); or second, trustees can allow 
the income beneficiaries’ needs to dictate asset allocation (the “income-focused 
approach”). 
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5 2 3 1 The balanced approach 
Under the balanced approach, trustees create an investment portfolio consisting 
of an even mix of fixed-income investments and equities. The aim is to weight the 
portfolio to provide a fair return for the income and capital beneficiaries. 242  For 
example, assume that the value of the investment portfolio of a trust is R10 million 
and that a fair return for income beneficiaries is 6% and a fair return for capital 
beneficiaries is 5%. Assuming fixed-income investments will average 6%, equities 
will average 9%, and the inflation rate for the period will be 5%, under the balanced 
approach, the income beneficiaries will receive an annual income of R300 000243 
and the capital beneficiaries will receive capital appreciation of R450 000.244 
Not only will the trustees fail to produce the income beneficiaries’ desired income 
of R600 000,245 but they will also fall short (although not by much) on protecting the 
capital from inflation.246 Under the balanced approach, therefore, both categories of 
beneficiaries are likely to be dissatisfied.247 Wolf characterises this result as trustees’ 
duty to disappoint equally:248 
“All the trustee can do is to try to fulfill their duty of impartiality by disappointing income 
and remainder beneficiaries equally!” 
5 2 3 2 The income-focused approach 
Under the income-focused approach, the needs of income beneficiaries dictate 
the trust’s asset allocation.249 The following example illustrates the disadvantages of 
this approach: suppose the trustees of a traditional net-income trust consult with the 
income beneficiaries. After discussing the income beneficiaries’ budgetary needs, 
the trustees determine that 75% of the trust’s investment portfolio should be 
allocated to fixed-income investments in order to fund the income beneficiaries’ 
targeted cash flow for the current year. The remainder will be allocated to growth-
                                                            
242 51; Medlin (2008) Real Prop Prob & Tr J 732. 
243 R10 000 000 × 50% × 6% = R300 000. 
244 R10 000 000 × 50% × 9% = R450 000. 
245 R10 000 000 × 6% = R600 000. 
246 Capital had to appreciate with R500 000 (R10 000 000 × 5%) in order to stay in line with inflation. 
247 British Columbia Law Institute Total Return Investing by Trustees 5. 





oriented investments. Assume fixed-income investments will average 6%, equities 
will average 9%, and the inflation rate for the period will be 5%. Assuming an initial 
value of R10 million, the trustees’ investment activity will generate an income of 
R450 000250 and capital appreciation of R225 000.251 
While the R450 000 income received by the income beneficiaries is more than the 
R300 000 they can receive under the balanced approach, it is still less than the 
income beneficiaries’ desired income of R600 000. But it is the capital beneficiaries 
especially that will have good reason to complain. They are in a far worse position 
under the income-focused approach than the balanced approach. Trust capital only 
grew with R225 000, while it had to grow with at least R500 000 in order to protect its 
purchasing power.252 
The income-focused approach clearly favours the interests of the income 
beneficiaries and compromises the interests of the capital beneficiaries.253 The New 
Zealand case Re Mulligan (deceased)254 can be used to illustrate the problem with 
favouring income beneficiaries.255 The trust founder’s widow, Mrs Mulligan, was both 
a trustee and an income beneficiary. Mrs Mulligan was able to intimidate her co-
trustee (a trustee corporation) into joining her in an investment strategy that was 
designed to maximise income. The investment strategy thus favoured her but at the 
expense of the capital beneficiaries. After her death, the capital beneficiaries sued 
both Mrs Mulligan and the trustee corporation for breach of trust, and were 
successful in their action. The trustees were held liable to make up the decline in 
capital value suffered by the trust fund. In the case of Mrs Mulligan, the liability to 
make restitution fell on her estate.256 
5 2 4 Preferential treatment of beneficiaries 
There are occasional instances where a founder’s chief interest is the income 
beneficiary (or beneficiaries), and where concern for the capital beneficiaries is 
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therefore secondary. For example, the founder wants his spouse, should he 
predecease her, to live out her days with the same degree of comfort she has 
enjoyed prior to his death. In order to achieve this result, the founder provides in the 
trust instrument that the trustees should produce sufficient income to maintain the 
surviving spouse’s lifestyle, even if it requires an increasing tilt towards fixed-income 
investments. 257  The lack of capital growth will be acceptable under these 
circumstances since the duty of impartiality is overridden by the terms of the trust. 
The founder in this example should, however, be advised that such an investment 
strategy will not only harm the capital beneficiaries’ interests, but will also ultimately 
compromise the interests of the income beneficiary. Fixed-income investments 
provide a good rate of income, but their market value is static. Fixed-income 
investments thus provide no prospect for capital growth.258 Therefore, an investment 
strategy designed purely to maximise income would not preserve the real value of 
trust capital. Although the preservation of the real value of capital has obvious 
importance to capital beneficiaries, it is also important to income beneficiaries. 
Halbach explains that safeguarding the real value of capital is important because it 
protects the purchasing power of the income flow of income beneficiaries over the 
years. 259  Founders considering an investment strategy skewed toward income 
production rather than capital growth should, therefore, bear in mind that such a 
strategy will inevitably not generate sufficient income to meet the future maintenance 
needs of the income beneficiaries.260 
5 2 5 Conclusion 
The combination of the traditional distribution rule and the duty of impartiality 
makes it exceedingly difficult for trustees to protect the real value of trust capital and 
to ensure that adequate income is produced continuously. Three trust scenarios are 
presented to support this claim: first, the balanced approach neither generates 
adequate income nor does it protect the real value of trust capital. Second, the 
income-focused approach provides more income to income beneficiaries than the 
balanced approach, but at the expense of the interest of the capital beneficiaries. 
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The pursuit of such an investment strategy constitutes a breach of trustees’ duty of 
impartiality and beneficiaries can hold trustees liable for the decline in trust capital. 
Third, where the founder has excluded the duty of impartiality and the trustees 
decide to follow an investment strategy designed purely for maximising income, the 
value of trust capital will not be preserved and the trustees will eventually not be able 
to generate sufficient income to meet the income beneficiaries’ maintenance needs. 
5 3 The solution to the problem 
An investigation of the trust law in each of the comparable foreign jurisdictions 
reveals that the solution to the problem identified in the preceding paragraph is 
legislative reform, which would enable trustees to operate total return investing. The 
term “total return investing” requires explaining. 
A key principle of MPT is that it is artificial to distinguish between income and 
capital when investing.261 Instead, MPT assesses investment options based on its 
overall total return regardless of whether the investments are categorised correctly 
as income or capital.262 This approach is referred to as “total return investing” in 
chapter 4.263 The traditional distribution rule and the duty of impartiality, when taken 
together, limit the ability of trustees to apply this principle of MPT and invest for total 
return. For example, trustees cannot invest 100% of a trust’s investment portfolio in 
equities and distribute 50% of the profit from the sale of appreciated stock to income 
beneficiaries because income beneficiaries are only entitled to trust income. Nor can 
trustees invest 100% of the investment portfolio in fixed-income investments in order 
to meet the income beneficiaries’ needs since such an investment policy violates 
trustees’ duty of impartiality. 
In order to enable trustees in South Africa to invest for total return, legislation 
should permit trustees to disregard the distinction between income and capital in 
certain circumstances. This is the only change to present law that is required. No 
changes are required to the duty of impartiality. The duty of impartiality retains its 
validity as a general principle under a total return investing regime.264 
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The effect of total return investing reform will be that investment decision-making 
will be separated from distributional issues. In other words, trustees will no longer 
have to select investments based on the legal category of the returns received.265 
Once total return investing has been implemented, trustees will, as a first step, invest 
for maximum overall return, and then, in a separate and subsequent step, allocate 
the return as fairly as possible.266 
The promise of total return investing is that, if implemented and administered 
correctly, it delivers a higher rate of return than an investment strategy that is 
required to achieve a particular income/capital allocation.267 This promise is based 
on the following grounds: first, total return investing removes restrictions from 
trustees’ choices.268 Collins and Stampfli state that:269 
“In the absence of a net-income trust structure, a portfolio manager is not constrained by 
the task of seeking targeted amounts of accounting income. Therefore, the manager has 
greater flexibility to implement portfolios to generate a total return adequate to the 
purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the trust.” 
Second, total return investing facilitates the proper diversification of 
investments. 270  Gordon observes that skewing a trust’s investment portfolio to 
achieve a particular income/capital allocation leads to the portfolio not being 
diversified optimally. Diversification is impaired because the portfolio is not 
assembled with the objective of producing the greatest expected returns for the 
risk. 271  Third, a total return approach to investment places trustees in the best 
position to employ the risk/return analysis effectively in order to obtain the maximum 
advantage for the trust and to make the kind of choices that other prudent investors 
would make.272 Phillips states that:273 
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“[Total return investing] gives trustees greater flexibility in assessing tradeoffs between 
risk and reward by providing a much broader view of what constitutes return and, 
consequently, what justifies increased risks for the portfolio.” 
By providing superior returns to other investment practices, total return investing 
increases the likelihood of trustees being able to preserve the real value of trust 
capital while simultaneously providing income beneficiaries with adequate income. 
Total return investing, therefore, significantly increases the chances of a successful 
outcome for all interested parties.274 
5 4 The different ways of facilitating total return investing 
There are three ways of facilitating total return investing: first, a founder can 
permit the trustees to access capital; second, legislation can give trustees the power 
to allocate income to capital beneficiaries or capital to income beneficiaries; and 
third, legislation can make provision for converting certain trusts to “percentage 
trusts”. 
5 4 1 The power to access capital 
The power to access capital gives trustees a discretion to invade trust capital and 
distribute it to income beneficiaries. 275  Typical language usually limits capital 
distributions to categories of need. For example, a trust may require the trustees to 
hold capital and pay income to the income beneficiaries, and also allow the trustees 
to distribute capital for the income beneficiaries’ health, maintenance, education or 
support.276 According to Butler, a clause of this nature makes it possible for trustees 
to invest on a total return basis.277 For instance, instead of trying to maximise income 
flows to ensure that the needs of income beneficiaries are met, trustees can invest 
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for total return, and in the event that the income of the trust is insufficient, distribute 
capital to income beneficiaries.278 
5 4 2 The power of allocation 
The power of allocation permits trustees to allocate returns to either income 
beneficiaries or capital beneficiaries at the trustees’ discretion. 279  There are two 
ways to permit trustees to use the power of allocation: first, legislation can authorise 
trustees to allocate income returns to capital and to allocate capital returns to 
income. Trustees would thus be free to use the power of allocation provided that the 
power to allocate is not prohibited by the trust instrument. In terms of this approach, 
the power of allocation is the default standard.280 Second, a founder can insert a 
clause in the trust instrument giving the trustees the power of allocation. In terms of 
this approach, the power of allocation is on an opt-in basis.281 Of the two options, the 
first approach is preferred since it makes total return investment available – not only 
to future trusts but existing trusts as well. 
5 4 3 Percentage trusts 
Under the percentage trust model, all investment gains (ie interest, dividends, and 
capital growth) are initially assigned to capital, thereafter a percentage of the capital 
is allocated to income beneficiaries.282 Percentage trusts are familiar in the United 
States where they are known as “unitrusts”.283 Percentage trusts can be established 
either by a founder or by trustees.284 Distributions from percentage trusts are usually 
first paid out of income, second from short-term capital gains, third from long-term 
capital gains, and lastly from trust capital. However, the governing instrument may 
provide a different ordering structure for distributions.285 
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One immediate question regarding percentage trusts is this: what should the 
percentage rate be? An ideal percentage rate will provide the highest income to the 
income beneficiaries, while also preserving the value of the capital for the eventual 
benefit of the capital beneficiaries. Too low a percentage rate is prejudicial to income 
beneficiaries, while too high a percentage rate disadvantages the capital 
beneficiaries and may even deplete the trust fund prematurely.286 The percentage 
rate can be a fixed percentage (eg 6%), an inflation-indexed percentage (eg inflation 
plus 2%), or a permissible range percentage (eg 4–7%); or the percentage rate can 
be linked to some external benchmark such as the yield obtainable on high quality 
bonds or the repo interest rate.287 
Wolf discourages the use of an inflation-indexed percentage because inflation is 
not correlated with return. He warns that inflation may even be inversely correlated 
with return. Linking the percentage rate to inflation would effectively mean that stock 
and bond markets will be adversely affected during a period of high inflation, and yet 
the distribution to the income beneficiaries would have to increase. 288  Wolf 
recommends that trustees should rather use a fixed percentage rate. He further 
recommends that the rate should not change. According to Wolf, giving trustees full 
discretion to determine the percentage rate annually would be burdensome rather 
than attractive:289 
“An annual requirement to select a distribution rate would be unattractive to trustees who 
must then make a fundamental decision about the trust at least once a year.” 
Wolf warns that changing rates, particularly at the extremes, affect the economics 
of the trust tremendously. Trustees might be tempted to pay out a higher rate when 
interest rates are high and a lower rate when interest rates are low.290 Wolf explains 
that this is exactly contrary to good financial practice:291 
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“High interest rates imply high inflationary expectations and typically are a companion of 
very low total returns, hence reflecting the very reverse of what should occur in 
distribution practice.” 
Wolf carried out computer simulations in the United States to determine the ideal 
percentage rate. The simulations used percentage rates ranging from 3% to 6% over 
the period from 1960 to 1997 and determined that the highest percentage rate that 
would protect both income and capital beneficiaries from inflation was 5%.292 It is 
submitted that any jurisdiction that wants to prescribe a statutory default fixed 
percentage rate will have to carry out similar simulations. 
Another question that has to be answered when considering percentage trusts is 
this: how should the trust portfolio be valued? A statutory regime for percentage 
trusts has to state that certain assets may be omitted from calculations. It further has 
to stipulate how often valuations should take place. As discussed in paragraph 4 6 3 
3 above, in a trust portfolio where there are assets that are not being held for 
investment, the trust portfolio effectively consists of an investment portfolio and a 
non-investment component. In order to avoid any doubt, legislation should provide 
that in determining the net value of the trust capital, trustees may exclude assets not 
being held for investment from the computations. 293  Regarding how often the 
investment portfolio should be valued, legislation should state that valuations should 
take place at least once every year unless the trust instrument requires more 
frequent valuations.294 It is also suggested that legislation should make provision for 
a three-year “smoothing rule”. This means that trustees must continue to value the 
investment portfolio at least once a year, but can apply the percentage rate to the fair 
market value of the investment portfolio averaged over a three-year period.295 The 
benefit of a smoothing rule is that it provides a more consistent stream of income 
distributions.296 
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5 5 The current position in each of the comparable foreign jurisdictions 
New York was the first state in the United States to take up the task of a serious 
analysis of the problem identified in paragraph 5 2, namely that the combination of 
the traditional distribution rule and the duty of impartiality limits the ability of trustees 
to apply total return investing. According to Wolf, while New York was the fourth 
state to enact total return friendly legislation, the work of New York’s legislative 
committees produced much of the early initiative and progress in legislative 
analysis. 297  Today, legislation in New York makes provision for the power of 
allocation as the default position (as opposed to having the power of allocation on an 
opt-in basis).298 Legislation further permits founders to establish percentage trusts 
and trustees to convert existing trusts to percentage trusts.299 
In England, concerns regarding the law governing the treatment of capital and 
income in trusts were raised in 2000 during the parliamentary debates on the 
Trustee Bill. The matter was referred to the Law Commission of England and Wales 
(referred to in this section as the “English Law Commission”. The English Law 
Commission commenced work on the project in 2003, published a Consultation 
Paper in 2004, and made recommendations in 2009. Six points were clear from the 
consultation exercise:300 first, the English Law Commission noted in its 2009 report 
that the law does not prohibit a founder from establishing a power of allocation in the 
trust instrument or constituting a percentage trust. Second, total return investing was, 
however, not being employed in private trusts. In charitable trusts, on the other hand, 
trustees were (and still are) investing profitably on a total return basis. Third, despite 
total return investing not operating in private trusts, there is considerable support for 
it within the trust industry. The English Law Commission found that many trustees 
would like to invest for total return and are frustrated by the inability to do so. Fourth, 
of the two total return investing models, the English Law Commission preferred the 
percentage trust model. Fifth, the English Law Commission explained that there is, 
however, a significant obstacle to the widespread adoption of total return investing in 
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England. From a tax perspective, the structure of the two ways of facilitating total 
return investing does not map onto the current tax system. Consequently, tax 
considerations prevented the English Law Commission from recommending that total 
return investing be made available to private trusts. Sixth, despite the tax issues, the 
English Law Commission remained of the view that total return investing would be an 
important step for England. Accordingly, it recommended that more work be done in 
order to enable trustees to use total return investing somewhere in the future:301 
“Accordingly, we conclude this Part with a recommendation that HMRC [Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs] and HM Treasury [Her Majesty’s Treasury] work with the trust 
industry to devise a mechanism for total return investment in a way that facilitates 
investment while remaining satisfactory from the point of view of taxation.” 
In New Zealand, the traditional distribution rule read together with trustees’ duty of 
impartiality means that trustees cannot invest for total return.302 The New Zealand 
Law Commission, however, proposed changes to the current position that would 
allow trustees to follow a total return investing approach. Both the power of allocation 
and the percentage trust model were considered as options to facilitate total return 
investment. Of the two options, the New Zealand Law Commission eventually 
decided to recommend the power of allocation. 
The Trusts Act 2019 reflects the recommendation of the New Zealand Law 
Commission:303 
“For the purposes of distribution, and of preparing and completing a financial statement 
for a trust, a trustee may determine whether a return on an investment is to be treated as 
income or capital.” 
Trustees will, therefore, be able to use the power of allocation as the default 
position once the Trusts Act 2019 enters into force on 30 January 2021. 
To summarise, the current position in each of the relevant jurisdictions is as 
follows: legislation in New York permits trustees to use either the power of allocation 
or the percentage trust model depending on the circumstances; the English Law 
Commission considers the percentage trust model the method most likely to be 
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successful in facilitating total return investment should total return investing 
eventually be adopted in England; and in New Zealand, trustees will be able to use 
the power of allocation as the default position once the Trusts Act 2019 enters into 
force. 
5 6 Choosing the correct method of facilitating total return investing 
According to Wolf, given the great variety of situations that founders and trustees 
face, no one method of facilitating total return investing is suitable for every kind of 
trust.304 Therefore, founders and trustees should be able to choose the option that is 
most fitting to the circumstances of the particular trust. Consequently, it is proposed 
that South Africa should follow an approach similar to that of New York. In New York, 
founders and trustees are in a position, depending on the circumstances, to either 
use the power of allocation or the percentage trust model. This raises the following 
question: which method of facilitating total return investing is best suited for which 
type of scenario? The following three scenarios are examined below in order to 
answer this question: first, where the income and capital beneficiaries have identical 
interests; second, where the income and capital beneficiaries have different interests 
and the trust is a discretionary trust; third, where the income and capital beneficiaries 
have different interests and the trust is a traditional net-income trust. 
5 6 1 Scenario one: beneficiaries with identical interests 
From a distributional point of view, where beneficiaries are both income and 
capital beneficiaries, the source of the gains flowing from trust investments is 
generally immaterial.305 The Ontario Law Commission explains why the distinction 
between income and capital in these types of trusts is not important:306 
“The distinction between income and capital is not crucial where there is only one trust 
beneficiary; for instance, it will be a matter of indifference, tax implications aside, to a 
minor who will receive the property from trustees upon the attainment of majority whether 
gain accrues as income or capital, because he will take both. Similarly, if there is a class 
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of beneficiaries, each of whom is to share in both income and capital when given 
circumstances occur, they will not be concerned with the form of the gain.” 
Therefore, trustees are automatically capable of investing for total return in 
circumstances in which all of the beneficiaries have identical interests.307 
5 6 2 Scenario two: discretionary trusts 
Founders often do not intend for distributions to be made on a regular basis. In 
many cases, founders instruct the trustees to exercise discretion with regard to the 
size and frequency of distributions, and the particular beneficiary or beneficiaries 
who are to receive benefits.308 These trusts are commonly known as discretionary 
trusts. 
The percentage trust model is not suitable for discretionary trusts.309 Discretionary 
trusts give trustees a discretion whether to make distributions and, if so, how much. 
According to Du Toit et al, discretionary trusts require flexibility regarding the award 
of trust benefits to beneficiaries.310 In a percentage trust, on the other hand, the way 
distributions are made is quite rigid: the investment portfolio is valued, a percentage 
of that value is allocated to income beneficiaries, and income is distributed to the 
beneficiaries on a recurring basis.311 
A more flexible method of facilitating total return investing in a discretionary trust is 
using the power of allocation.312 The following example serves to illustrate why the 
power of allocation is a suitable option for discretionary trusts. Assume that for the 
current year, after consulting with the income beneficiaries, the trustees determine 
that the income beneficiaries’ future budgetary needs are R450 000. The trustees 
decide to distribute trust income to the income beneficiaries at the end of the year. 
Further assume that the value of the trust fund is R10 million and that trustees will 
earn 6% return on fixed-income investments and 9% return on equities, and that the 
inflation for the year will be 5%. 
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Under the traditional approach, the trustees would have to invest 75% of the 
investment portfolio in fixed-income investments to generate an income of 
R450 000.313 In that event, the trust capital will not grow in line with inflation. The 
capital will only appreciate with 2.25%,314 while inflation for the year will be 5%. 
In contrast, the trustees can achieve their income goal and come much closer to 
reaching their capital goal if they use the power of allocation. Assuming that the 
beneficiaries accept the additional risk of a high equity mix,315 the trustees could 
invest the entire R10 million in equities and receive a total return of R900 000.316 
Using the power to allocate, the trustees could distribute R450 000 to the income 
beneficiaries and allocate the remaining R450 000 to the capital beneficiaries’ 
account in order to offset the impact of inflation. 
It is important to address a possible misunderstanding regarding total return 
investing at this stage. Total return investing should not be understood as always 
requiring an investment strategy heavily weighted toward equities. The purpose of 
total return investing is to free trustees to make the best possible choice concerning 
asset allocation and investment decisions.317 History suggests that the long-term rate 
of return from equity investments has consistently been shown to exceed that of 
fixed-income investments.318 Since fixed-income investments yield dramatically less 
than equity investments over long periods of time,319 a compelling case can be made 
that the asset allocation in a portfolio intended for a long duration should favour 
equities. The benefit of being able to disregard the distinction between income and 
capital when investing is that it enables trustees to use investment strategies 
weighted more toward equities. 
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5 6 3 Scenario three: traditional net-income trusts 
As discussed in paragraph 5 2 2, a traditional net-income trust is a trust that 
directs the trustees to hold the capital and pay the income to the income 
beneficiaries. The terms of such a trust may either require income and capital 
beneficiaries to be treated equally or may require one of the classes to receive 
preferential treatment. If there is no provision in the trust instrument addressing the 
issue of impartiality, the default position will apply in which case all classes of 
beneficiaries should be treated impartially. On the other hand, the trust instrument 
may require a certain class, for example, the income beneficiaries, to receive 
preferential treatment. 
5 6 3 1 If beneficiaries should be treated impartially 
As discussed in paragraph 5 4 1, it is possible for trustees to invest on a total 
return basis if a trust contains the power to access capital. The power to access 
capital is, however, not suitable for use in a traditional net-income trust that requires 
beneficiaries to be treated impartially.320 Werker explains that the power to access 
capital does not provide trustees with any guidance as to how the power should be 
used in such a scenario:321 
“This leaves it to the trustee at a later day to muddle along; investing with the hope that it 
will provide a suitable income for the life tenant; encroaching on capital with little 
guidance as to when this is appropriate; and fearing the wrath of the remaindermen at the 
end of the day because the investment performance has been worse than average and 
branches of the tree have been intermittently lopped off to compensate.” 
Despite its usefulness in a discretionary trust, the power of allocation is not 
suitable for use in a traditional net-income trust subject to the duty of impartiality. 
Gordon recommends that trustees’ discretion regarding the allocation of benefits in 
such a scenario should be as narrow as possible. He warns that the more reliance is 
placed on continual trustee discretion, the more opportunity beneficiaries will have to 
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complain about an abuse of power.322 Wolf states that most trustees of a traditional 
net-income trust are likely to be uncomfortable with the power of allocation, simply 
because they will not know how to use it. 323  According to Wolf, the power of 
allocation does not give trustees any kind of guidance as to what a fair and 
reasonable distribution of income would be.324 The shortcoming of the approach is, 
therefore, that it does not remove the great difficulty for trustees of fulfilling their duty 
of impartiality.325 
It is submitted, therefore, that the best way of facilitating total return investing in a 
traditional net-income trust is to convert the trust into a percentage trust. In a 
percentage trust, the trustees consider the risk tolerance of the beneficiaries, invest 
for total return, and pay out a percentage of the value of the investment portfolio to 
the income beneficiaries.326 Accordingly, trustees have less discretion regarding the 
allocation of benefits than in the case of the power of allocation.327 The advantage of 
keeping the question of the allocation of benefits as narrow as possible is that it 
provides freedom from conflict between the interests of beneficiaries. Wolf states:328 
“By directing the trustee to pay out a specific percentage of the trust set forth by the 
grantor or testator, this type of trust instrument removes the great difficulty in fulfilling the 
duty of impartiality.” 
The percentage trust model, therefore, does a number of things that no other trust 
can do as well: it forges a partnership between income beneficiaries and capital 
beneficiaries, because what is good for one is good for the other;329 it emphasises a 
common goal of providing maximum return;330 and it eliminates the burden of the 
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trustees’ duty of impartiality by directing trustees to pay out a specific percentage 
rate.331 
5 6 3 2 If preferential treatment is required 
There are cases where the founder instructs the trustees to produce sufficient 
income to maintain the lifestyle of the income beneficiaries even if it requires an 
investment strategy tilted toward income production rather than capital protection. 
The percentage trust model is not appropriate if it is apparent that the founder 
intends that the income beneficiaries should receive preferential treatment. Such a 
trust should not be converted into a percentage trust because the percentage of the 
investment portfolio paid to the income beneficiaries might be too low to maintain 
their lifestyle. 332  Where high-income payouts are required, it is suggested that 
trustees should still invest for total return, but that they should use more flexible 
methods of facilitating total return investing such as the power to access capital or 
the power of allocation.  
5 7 Conclusion and proposed changes to legislation 
The problem with the current position in South African trust law is that the 
combination of the traditional distribution rule and the duty of impartiality makes it 
extremely difficult for trustees to protect the real value of trust capital and to ensure 
that adequate income is produced continuously. 
Three trust scenarios are presented in support of this claim: first, the balanced 
approach does not generate adequate income, nor does it protect the real value of 
trust capital. Second, the income-focused approach provides more income to income 
beneficiaries than the balanced approach does but at the expense of the capital 
beneficiaries’ interests. Third, where the founder has removed the duty of impartiality 
and the trustees decide to follow an investment strategy designed purely to 
maximise income, the value of trust capital will not be preserved and the trustees will 
eventually not be able to generate sufficient income to meet the maintenance needs 
of the income beneficiaries. 
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The solution to the problem is legislative reform, which would enable trustees to 
operate total return investing. Total return investing increases the likelihood of 
trustees being able to preserve the real value of trust capital while simultaneously 
also providing income beneficiaries with adequate income. The only change to 
legislation required to enable trustees to invest for total return is to disregard the 
distinction between income and capital. No changes to the duty of impartiality are 
thus required. 
There are three ways of facilitating total return investing: the power to access 
capital, the power of allocation, and percentage trusts. Each of the relevant 
jurisdictions has a different view regarding which method is the most suitable way of 
accomplishing total return investing: legislation in New York permits both the use of 
the power of allocation and the creation of percentage trusts; the English Law 
Commission considers the percentage trust model as the method most likely to be 
successful in facilitating total return investment should total return investing be 
implemented in England; and in New Zealand, the Trusts Act 2019 reflects the 
recommendation of the New Zealand Law Commission that the power of allocation 
should be the default standard. 
It is proposed that South Africa should follow an approach similar to that of New 
York. Given the great variety of situations that founders and trustees face, no one 
method of facilitating total return investing is correct for all circumstances. Therefore, 
founders and trustees should be able to choose the option that best suits the 
circumstances of the particular trust. This raises the following important question: 
which method of facilitating total return investing is best suited for which type of 
scenario? After examining four possible trust scenarios, it is concluded that: 
(a) Where the income and capital beneficiaries have identical interests, the 
trustees are automatically capable of investing for total return. 
(b) In a discretionary trust where the income and capital beneficiaries have 
different interests, the most suitable method of facilitating total return investing 
is the power of allocation. 
(c) In a traditional net-income trust where the income and capital beneficiaries 




most suitable way of facilitating total return investing is to convert the trust to a 
percentage trust. 
(d) In a traditional net-income trust where the income and capital beneficiaries 
have different interests and preferential treatment is required, more flexible 
methods of facilitating total return investing should be used such as the power 
to access capital or the power of allocation. 
Accordingly, in order to enable trustees to invest for total return it is proposed that 
two subsections, subsection (6) and (7), be added to the newly proposed section 9A 
of the Trust Property Control Act. Subsection (6) will give statutory recognition to the 
power of allocation, while subsection (7) will make provision for the creation of 
percentage trusts. It is proposed that subsection (6) of section 9A should read as 
follows: 
“For the purposes of distribution, and in the absence of any contrary indication in the trust 
instrument, a trustee may in the trustee’s discretion allocate a return on an investment, 
whether income or capital in nature, either to the income beneficiaries or the capital 
beneficiaries.” 
In terms of subsection (6), the power of allocation is the default standard and the 
trustees of both existing and future trusts will thus have the ability to use the power 
of allocation. However, since the subsection is subject to any contrary indication in 
the trust instrument, founders can opt out of any total return investing regime. 
It is further proposed that subsection (7) of section 9A should read as follows: 
“A founder may establish a percentage trust or, absent any contrary indication in the trust 
instrument, a trustee may convert an existing trust into a percentage trust. Once a 
percentage trust has been created, a trustee must – 
(a) valuate the trust assets at least once every year unless the trust instrument 
requires more frequent valuations; and 
(b) pay the income beneficiaries the percentage rate specified in the trust instrument, 
or if no percentage is specified, the percentage rate as per the regulations 
published by Government Notice. 
Once a percentage trust has been created, a trustee may – 




(b) apply the specified percentage rate to the trust assets averaged over a three-year 
period.” 
The proposal is, therefore, that trustees must apply the percentage rate found in 
the trust instrument; however, if a rate is not specified, trustees should use a fixed 
percentage rate. The rate will not be fixed by statute but rather by regulation. 
Computer simulations will have to be carried out in order to determine the ideal 
percentage rate. It is expected that the simulations will suggest that the percentage 
rate ought to be 5%.333 
Section 9A(7) would introduce a new term, namely a “percentage trust” into 
existing legislation. This term, absent the contextualisation and explanations 
contained in the dissertation, requires elucidation in the statute. Therefore, it is 
proposed that the following definition of a percentage trust be added to section 1 of 
the Trust Property Control Act: 
“Percentage trust means a trust in which all investment gains are initially assigned to trust 
capital and then at a later stage a percentage of the capital is allocated to income 
beneficiaries.” 
Finally, the Prudent Investor Act in New York provides a list of factors that trustees 
should consider before creating a percentage trust or exercising the power of 
allocation. 334  These factors closely resemble the considerations found in 
subsection (4) of section 9A (which lists the circumstances that trustees should 
consider before making investment decisions). 335  It is, therefore, unnecessary to 
repeat the list under the subsections dealing with total return investing. 
6 The delegation of investment functions 
6 1 Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the fifth area of trustee investment 
affected by the implementation of MPT, namely the delegation of trustees’ 
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investment functions. The section begins by describing the current position in South 
African trust law regarding the delegation of investment functions. Thereafter, the 
section discusses the problem with our current position and explains why in most 
cases relying on the advice of investment experts is not the solution to the problem. 
Following this discussion, the section briefly reviews the different approaches to the 
delegation of investment functions in each of the comparable foreign jurisdictions. 
The second-last part of the section presents the suggested solution to the problem 
and explains why the solution offers adequate protection to the interests of trust 
beneficiaries. The section concludes with a summary, which is accompanied by 
proposals of how legislation should change to enable trustees to delegate 
investment functions to someone with the necessary investment expertise. 
6 2 The position in South Africa 
In terms of South African common law, trustees have a general authority to 
delegate administrative functions to others.336 Trustees may thus take fundamental 
decisions relating to a trust and delegate the implementation of such decisions to, for 
example, a co-trustee or a suitable qualified professional person. 337  In such 
instances, trustees must exercise oversight and will remain liable for any losses 
resulting from the actions of the person to whom a task was delegated.338 
On the other hand, trustees cannot in terms of our common law delegate 
“fundamental decisions” and “fundamental discretionary power” to others.339 Since 
making investment decisions requires the exercise of discretion,340 trustees cannot 
delegate such decisions to someone else. Trustees are generally, therefore, not 
entitled to delegate investment functions to another. This rule is hereafter referred to 
as the “non-delegation rule”.341 
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Notwithstanding the aforementioned, it can be argued that in light of the decision 
in Hoosen NO v Deedat342 (“Hoosen”), it would be legally permissible for trustees to 
delegate investment functions to someone else if certain conditions are met. Before 
discussing these conditions, it is helpful first to discuss the facts of Hoosen. 
6 2 1 The facts in Hoosen 
In Hoosen, one of the trustees of a trust suffered a stroke, which left him 
paralysed from the neck down and unable to speak. Despite his physical disability, 
he remained of sound mind and was able to communicate with the help of a 
computer-aided communication system. However, because of his disability, he was 
incapable of attending meetings of the trustees and performing his related duties as 
trustee.343 He granted a special power of attorney to his daughter-in-law “to act on 
[his] behalf and in [his] name and place” at all meetings as she “may deem fit”.344 
The trustee effectively transferred his powers and duties as trustee to his daughter-
in-law, which amounted to “a delegation of the trustee’s judgement and discretion in 
relation to the decision-making powers of the trust”.345 
The Supreme Court of Appeal had to decide whether the trustee was entitled to 
delegate his judgement and discretion to his daughter-in-law.346 The court held that 
the trust instrument did not expressly authorise delegation of this nature. The court 
further held that the trust instrument left no room for such authorisation to be 
implied.347 The daughter-in-law, therefore, was interdicted from acting in terms of the 
power of attorney.348 
Two considerations strengthened the court’s finding against an implied 
authorisation of the delegation of the trustee’s judgement and discretion: first, the 
collective nature of the trustees’ duties and the general prohibition against the 
delegation of a fundamental discretionary power; and second, the principle that a 
trustee whose appointment was occasioned by particular personal attributes and 
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skills is generally not allowed to delegate his functions to someone who does not 
possess that same attributes and skills.349 The trust at issue was established in the 
interests of the Muslim community in order to propagate and promote the Islamic 
faith. The court, therefore, concluded that the trustees of the trust must be “people 
imbued with the spirit of Islam who could be relied upon to give effect to the objects 
of the trust”.350 According to Du Toit et al, this requirement militated against any 
delegation of trustee functions to “someone who was not likewise positioned to fulfil 
the trust’s objects”.351 
6 2 2 The conditions for the delegation of investment functions 
In light of the Hoosen decision, it is submitted that trustees may delegate 
investment functions if the following conditions are met: first, the trust instrument 
must authorise the trustees to delegate their judgement and discretion. In Hoosen, 
the court stated that a delegation of this nature was neither expressly nor impliedly 
permitted by the trust instrument.352 This statement can be interpreted to mean that 
in a case in which the delegation of trustees’ judgement and discretion is expressly 
authorised in the trust instrument, such delegation may indeed be permitted. Support 
for this interpretation of the statement in Hoosen is found in Van Wyk v Daberas 
Adventures CC353 (“Daberas”). In this more recent case, Olivier J stated that for 
trustees to have the right to delegate fundamental decisions and fundamental 
discretionary power, such a power would have to be expressly provided for in a trust 
instrument:354 
“In my view these findings in the Hoosen case pertained specifically to the delegation of 
‘fundamental decisions’ and of ‘fundamental discretionary power’. The right to delegate 
such a power would have to be expressly provided for in a trust deed and, if not, it will not 
readily be implied.” [Olivier J’s emphasis.] 
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Second, the decision to delegate investment functions must not be taken by an 
individual trustee but by the trustees acting as a collective.355 A clear principle in 
South African trust law is that trustees must act jointly.356 This is known as the “joint-
action rule”.357  In terms of this rule, all decisions by co-trustees must be taken 
unanimously. 358  However, a trust instrument may allow decisions to be made 
otherwise; for example, by majority vote. 359  Therefore, the decision to delegate 
investment functions must not be taken by an individual trustee but by the entire 
trustee complement. Depending on the provisions of the trust instrument, the 
decision may either be taken by a unanimous vote or by way of a majority vote. 
Third, trustees wishing to delegate their investment functions must not be selected 
specifically for their investment knowledge and experience. The court stated in 
Hoosen that if the trustees’ attributes and skills are pivotal in their selection as 
trustees, delegation is not allowed:360 
“In considering the issue one may also, by analogy, draw usefully from an established 
principle in the law of agency, while not losing sight of the essential differences between a 
trustee and an agent. That principle states that where the identity and personal attributes 
or skills of the performer of an act are of material importance, delegation is not 
permitted …” 
To summarise, trustees are not allowed to delegate investment functions to others 
in terms of the non-delegation rule. However, the non-delegation rule does not 
preclude trustees from delegating investment functions if the following conditions are 
met: the trust instrument expressly allows such delegation; the full trustee 
complement decides to delegate investment functions; and the trustees of the 
particular trust are not selected specifically for their investment knowledge and 
experience. 
It is submitted that, as is the case with the delegation of administrative functions, 
delegating investment functions will not release trustees from the duty of supervising 
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the actions of any co-trustee or non-trustee to whom the delegation has been made. 
Furthermore, delegating their investment functions will not relieve trustees from 
liability for the wrongful acts done by the delegate. 
6 3 The problem with the non-delegation rule 
Making sound investment decisions in today’s world requires considerable 
knowledge and experience.361 According to Duckworth, investment management has 
become a difficult and complex business:362 
“… the changes that have occurred in the course of this century, principally in the period 
since the Second World War, have turned investment management into a difficult and 
complex business. There are no simple answers, and there are no universal answers. 
The business of investment management now demands a high degree of expertise and 
technical support; it has spawned a diversity of theories and techniques almost as great 
as the diversity of investment opportunities; it is still changing rapidly; and it is a 
dangerous business, occasionally burning the fingers of the most expert and diligent.” 
The skills required to construct and manage an investment portfolio should thus 
not be underestimated, as the following passage illustrates:363 
“Managing a portfolio of marketable securities is as demanding a speciality as stomach 
surgery or nuclear engineering. There is no more reason to expect the ordinary individual 
serving as a trustee to possess the requisite investment expertise than to expect ordinary 
citizens to possess expertise in gastroenterology or atomic science.” 
Furthermore, the theory of investment management advanced in this dissertation, 
namely MPT, is highly sophisticated and requires a high degree of professional 
knowledge.364 As discussed in chapter 3, a person investing in accordance with MPT 
is required to: construct a portfolio with different asset classes and adjust the asset 
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allocation when circumstances change; diversify the portfolio, properly using a large 
amount of stocks; and apply active management strategies if necessary.365 
Given that investment management has become a difficult and complex business, 
trustees with no training in finance or asset management will find it extremely difficult 
to manage an investment portfolio of a trust in the best financial interest of the 
beneficiaries of the trust.366 To ensure that persons with the necessary investment 
expertise make investment decisions, the jurisdictions discussed below abrogated 
the prohibition on the delegation of investment functions and have instead sought to 
encourage such delegation. 367  In South Africa, however, the non-delegation rule 
does not allow non-expert trustees to delegate investment functions to persons with 
expertise in making optimal investment decisions. 
One of two things is likely to happen if MPT principles are integrated into South 
African trust law, but no changes to the non-delegation rule are made: first, trustees 
without investment expertise might become unwilling to serve as trustees for fear of 
being held personally liable for imprudent investment decisions;368 second, and the 
more likely result, is that trustees will not employ a challenging investment strategy, 
such as MPT, which they do not fully comprehend.369 
To summarise, the problem with the non-delegation rule is that it prevents trustees 
from pursuing rewarding investment strategies since non-expert trustees are not 
allowed to delegate investment functions to someone with investment expertise. 
Consequently, the rule would hinder trustees’ use of MPT should MPT be adopted in 
our law since non-expert trustees would not understand MPT and would not be 
allowed to delegate their investment functions to someone with the necessary 
investment expertise. 
At this stage, one might object and argue that the problem can be addressed in a 
simple way: trustees who lack sophistication in investment matters can seek expert 
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advice and then act on the basis of that advice.370 The problem with relying on 
advice, however, is that in most cases it will effectively amount to delegation, but 
without the necessary safeguards in place. This statement requires explaining. 
According to Schwartzel, trustees lacking the expertise to develop an investment 
program on their own will often lack the competence required properly to evaluate 
the plans that an investment advisor recommends.371 In such instances, the trustees 
are relying on the advice of the advisor to the extent that investment decisions 
cannot be truly said to be those of the trustees.372 Although it might seem that the 
trustees are making the final decision on investment selection, they are actually 
approving the advisor’s selections without proper consideration. 373  According to 
Dickson, trustees often rubberstamp the advisor’s decisions:374 
“In many cases, the agent made the investment selections, and the trustee merely 
‘rubberstamped’ the agent’s decisions.” 
Langbein refers to this type of delegation as “de facto delegation”.375 According to 
Langbein and Posner, de facto delegation takes place when:376 
“… the investment advisor ‘recommends’ and the trustee routinely ‘decides’ to follow the 
advice, the trustee in reality is delegating the selection of investments.” 
The main concern with de facto delegation is that, although delegation occurs, 
suitable safeguards are not in place. Suitable safeguards have to be in place in order 
to protect beneficiaries against imprudent delegation of investment functions.377 The 
safeguards that must be complied with are discussed in paragraph 6 5 1 below. 
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6 4 The current position in each of the comparable foreign jurisdictions 
In New York, the Prudent Investor Act permits trustees to delegate investment 
functions to an investment manager.378 Trustees are, however, required to follow 
very strict and specific guidelines when delegating investment functions.379  More 
specifically, trustees are required to exercise care, skill and caution in selecting a 
suitable delegate; establish the scope and terms of authority; monitor the delegate’s 
performance; and control overall costs by reason of the delegation.380 According to 
Klein, trustees who properly delegate investment functions are not liable for the 
decisions of an investment manager.381 
New York permits delegation among co-trustees. Delegation to a fellow trustee is 
generally acceptable where one trustee has expertise in a particular aspect of trust 
administration, such as investing. Yet delegation is not absolute, and delegating 
trustees must monitor the dealings and decisions of a delegate trustee. If a delegate 
trustee has acted in an irresponsible manner, the delegating trustees will not be held 
liable for a loss to the trust fund if they can demonstrate that their behaviour was 
prudent.382 
In England, the Trustee Act 2000 provides that trustees are permitted to 
“authorise any person to exercise any or all of their delegable functions as their 
agent”.383 Section 11(2) of the Act defines delegable functions to consist of any 
function other than the following four exceptions: a decision regarding the distribution 
of trust assets; the power to decide whether fees should be payable out of income or 
capital; any power to appoint a person as a trustee; or any power to delegate trustee 
responsibilities. Trustees thus have the power to delegate investment functions by 
virtue of investment functions being absent from the proscribed list.384 Investment 
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functions may be delegated to an outside agent or one of the trustees themselves,385 
but not to any trustee who is also a beneficiary.386 
Special conditions apply where trustees delegate investment functions: first, the 
agreement for appointing an investment manager must be in writing; 387  second, 
trustees must prepare a written “policy statement” giving guidance as to how the 
delegated functions should be exercised;388 third, the agreement under which an 
investment manager is to act must contain a term ensuring the investment 
manager’s compliance with the policy statement;389 and fourth, having delegated 
their investment functions, trustees are required to keep the arrangements under 
which an investment manager acts under review and have to consider any power of 
intervention which trustees may have.390 
Trustees will not be liable for any losses arising out of any act or default of an 
investment manager unless the trustees failed to comply with their duty of care in 
relation to the appointment and subsequent supervision of an investment 
manager.391 
The current position in New Zealand is that trustees may not delegate their 
responsibility of selecting and holding investments to an investment manager 392 
unless delegation is specifically authorised by the trust instrument.393 Research from 
the New Zealand Law Commission indicates that many modern trust deeds enable 
trustees to delegate in such a way.394  
New Zealand’s current position will change once the Trusts Act 2019 enters into 
force on 30 January 2021. The New Zealand Law Commission recommended in its 
report on trust law that trustees should be able to appoint investment managers with 
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the authority to make investment decisions.395 The Trusts Act 2019 reflects these 
recommendations relating to the appointment of investment managers. Section 67(1) 
provides that trustees may: 
“… (a) appoint a person to exercise or perform, on behalf of the trustee, specified powers 
or functions in relation to the trust; (b) appoint a person to make specified decisions in 
relation to all or part of the trust property; (c) appoint an eligible person to hold or deal 
with all or part of the trust property as nominee or custodian and vest all or part of the 
trust property in that person.” 
According to Cone et al, section 67(1) thus provides scope for the appointment of 
investment managers.396 
The New Zealand Law Commission further recommended that the appointment of 
investment managers should be subject to certain safeguards. 397  Based on this 
recommendation, the Trusts Act 2019 provides the following safeguards: first, it is 
mandatory for trustees to keep any delegation under review and consider whether 
they need to intervene at any point;398 and second, trustees must apply the general 
duty of care in section 29 of the Act in appointing an investment manager.399 
The New Zealand Law Commission was of the view that trustees should not 
remain liable for the actions or decisions of an investment manager:400 
“If a trustee has delegated investment decision-making because the trustee does not 
have the necessary expertise, it would seem anomalous for the trustee to remain liable 
for what the delegate does. If the trustee remained liable, he or she would likely feel 
obliged to take a much greater interest in investment matters.” 
Accordingly, the Trusts Act 2019 provides that trustees will not be held liable for 
any act or default of an investment manager unless the trustees failed to apply the 
legislative safeguards.401 
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6 5 The solution to the problem 
The proposed solution to the problem identified in paragraph 6 3 is that legislation 
in South Africa should allow trustees to delegate investment functions to a co-trustee 
with the necessary investment expertise. Furthermore, legislation should provide that 
as long as the delegation is proper, delegating trustees will not be liable for the 
actions or decisions of a delegate trustee. Delegation will be regarded as proper if 
the delegating trustees comply with certain legislative safeguards.402 The proposal, 
therefore, is that the non-delegation rule should be abandoned and replaced with a 
“pro-delegation default rule”.403 Authorising trustees to delegate investment functions 
will allow trustees to serve beneficiaries better, since it will ensure that persons with 
an understanding of MPT make investment decisions.404 
In order to determine whether a pro-delegation default rule will strike an 
appropriate balance between, on the one hand, the benefit that beneficiaries will 
receive from the delegation of investment functions and, on the other hand, the 
securing of adequate protection of the interests of beneficiaries, the following 
questions must be answered: first, which safeguards should legislation put in place? 
Second, should delegating trustees be liable for the actions or decisions of a 
delegate trustee? Third, should delegating trustees also be capable of delegating 
investment functions to a third party? Before answering these questions, it is helpful 
to first consider a typical trust scenario in which the delegation of investment 
functions would be beneficial to the beneficiaries of the trust. 
When selecting trustees, the basic decision for a founder often comes down to 
choosing between a professional trustee and a “lay trustee”, or sometimes a 
combination of the two.405 Examples of people who can act as professional trustees 
are admitted attorneys, accountants, or individuals who are affiliated to a trust 
company. 406  Examples of lay trustees are family members or close friends. 407 
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According to Dickson, the fact that trust administration may be a full-time job makes 
it better suited for a professional trustee.408 However, several factors may influence a 
founder to appoint a lay trustee rather than a professional trustee: a lay trustee might 
be more familiar with the beneficiaries’ circumstances; choosing a lay trustee might 
be less expensive than choosing a professional trustee; and a founder might trust a 
lay trustee more than a third party.409 While family members and close friends of 
ordinary intelligence can serve as trustees, they often do not have the time or 
expertise to make complex investment decisions. 410  Fortunately, a compromise 
position exists. A founder can appoint individual trustees in joint trusteeship with a 
professional trustee. Having individual trustees and a professional trustee serve 
together gives a founder the best of both worlds, since each trustee will have his own 
talents and areas of expertise.411 For example, the lay trustees might be familiar with 
the founder’s family intricacies, while the professional trustee will have expertise in 
trust administration, investment of trust funds and tax matters. 412  Delegating 
investment functions to the professional trustee would benefit the beneficiaries, since 
someone with investment experience would be making investment decisions. 
6 5 1 Which safeguards should legislation put in place? 
According to Dickson, putting appropriate legislative safeguards in place protects 
beneficiaries against imprudent delegation.413 The two main safeguards favoured by 
the comparable foreign jurisdictions are establishing a written policy statement and 
monitoring a delegate’s conduct and performance.414 
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6 5 1 1 Written policy statement 
Legislation should provide that a written policy statement must be prepared before 
any delegation of investment functions occurs.415 The purpose of a policy statement 
is to give a delegate trustee guidance as to how asset management functions should 
be exercised.416 Wilson states that trustees must not treat the creation of a policy 
statement as a “once and for all” exercise:417 
“If the circumstances of the trust change, or they find their initial requirements to have 
been inappropriate, the trustees must change the policy statement.” 
A policy statement does not have to be a detailed document, but should at least 
address the following two matters: first, a policy statement should specify the desired 
level of risk exposure for the investment portfolio of a trust;418 and second, a policy 
statement should impose reporting requirements on the delegate trustee.419 
Trustees must consider a number of factors to determine the appropriate level of 
risk exposure for the portfolio. These factors are discussed in paragraph 3 5 above. 
Trustees should, for example, take into consideration: the size of the portfolio; the 
estimated duration of the trust; and the needs of the beneficiaries. Suppose that the 
trustees of a particular trust determine that an appropriate level of risk exposure for 
the trust’s investment portfolio is half as much as the market exhibits as a whole. In 
other words, the trustees find that the investment portfolio should have a beta of 
0.5.420 As risk and return are inextricably linked, the trustees will have to accept a 
lower return in exchange for less risk exposure. In order to achieve the desired risk/
return combination, the portfolio will have to consist of a mix of risky assets and 
relatively risk-free assets. Securities with typically low betas, such as corporate or 
government bonds or other fixed-income securities, should thus be combined so that 
the portfolio has an average beta of 0.5.421 Interestingly, by setting out the desired 
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level of risk exposure in the policy statement, the trustees effectively determine the 
asset allocation of the portfolio. The delegate trustee, being the investment expert, 
should advise his fellow trustees in determining an appropriate level of risk tolerance 
for the portfolio, but the delegate trustee will not make the decision on asset 
allocation on his own. Thus, for example, a decision to invest in 60% listed shares 
and 40% bonds will be agreed upon by all of the trustees, while the actual shares to 
be acquired will be decided by the delegate trustee. 
The second matter that a policy statement should address is reporting 
requirements. Delegating trustees should impose reporting requirements on a 
delegate trustee. According to Wilson, the level of information that must be provided 
and the frequency of reports will vary depending upon the circumstances of each 
trust.422 
6 5 1 2 Monitoring conduct and performance 
Legislation should require delegating trustees to monitor the conduct and 
performance of a delegate trustee. 423  Given the complexity of investment 
management, what is expected from delegating trustees in this regard is not closely 
to review or second-guess the decisions of the delegate trustee.424 Instead, sufficient 
monitoring requires delegating trustees to consider investment reports and ensure 
that the delegate trustee complies with the terms of the policy statement.425 It is 
recommended that delegating trustees should meet with the delegate trustee at least 
twice a year to discuss the trustee’s performance, or hold a special meeting if there 
are special circumstances (eg when performance changes substantially). 426  If 
performance is clearly inadequate, the delegate trustee must provide reasons for the 
poor performance and satisfy his co-trustees that steps are in place to meet 
investment goals. If the trustee is given a reasonable opportunity and is still unable 
to meet expectations, the remaining trustees should replace the delegate trustee.427 
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6 5 2 Should delegating trustees be liable for the actions or decisions of a delegate 
trustee? 
This part begins by explaining the problem with holding a delegating trustee who 
complied with the proposed legislative safeguards liable for the actions or decisions 
of a delegate trustee. Thereafter, the current position in South African trust law 
regarding the liability of co-trustees is examined to determine how, if at all, the law 
should change. 
According to the New Zealand Law Commission, if delegating trustees remain 
liable for the actions or decisions of a delegate trustee, they will likely feel obliged to 
take a much greater interest in investment matters. 428  Delegating trustees are, 
however, not capable of reviewing or second-guessing the decisions of a delegate 
trustee.429 After all, the entire reason why delegation would take place is because 
delegating trustees usually lack investment skills. 430  The New Zealand Law 
Commission summarises the point being made here as follows:431 
“If a trustee has delegated investment decision-making because the trustee does not 
have the necessary expertise, it would seem anomalous for the trustee to remain liable 
for what the delegate does.” 
Allowing delegating trustees to be more involved in investment matters places the 
delegate trustee in a very difficult situation. Assume, for example, that the delegating 
trustees and the delegate trustee of a particular trust disagree over an investment 
strategy. Since the delegating trustees do not understand the delegate trustee’s 
proposed strategy, they insist on a less complex investment strategy. The delegate 
trustee has two options: he could obey the delegating trustees’ instruction, which is 
against his own advice; or if he is unwilling to violate his duty to the beneficiaries to 
make the best possible investment decisions, he can resign as trustee. Either way, 
the consequence of maintaining liability is that the skill and judgement of 
professional investment manager will not be fully utilised,432 and the delegate trustee 
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is prevented from pursuing a potentially rewarding investment strategy. 433  In 
conclusion, delegating trustees should not be liable for the actions or decisions of a 
delegate trustee because maintaining liability “defeats the purpose of delegation”.434 
The question to be addressed next is whether delegating trustees who are 
innocent of any wrongdoing or neglect (hereafter referred to as “innocent” delegating 
trustees) will in terms of current trust law be held liable for the wrongful acts of a 
delegate trustee.435 This question will be answered by examining the exact nature of 
a co-trustee’s liability in South African trust law. 
In Gross v Pentz436 (“Gross”), the Supreme Court of Appeal conceded that the 
precise position in South African law regarding the liability of co-trustees for breach 
of trust “is not altogether clear”.437 The facts of Gross need not be discussed here; 
suffice it to say that the case dealt primarily with the question whether a trust 
beneficiary had locus standi to institute legal proceedings for the recovery of a loss 
to the trust estate as a consequence of an alleged breach of trust by one of the 
trustees.438 Unfortunately, the court did not find it to be the appropriate occasion to 
provide more clarity on the liability of co-trustees.439 According to De Waal, the court 
suggested obiter that a trustee who had been innocent of any wrongdoing or neglect 
would nevertheless be liable for a breach of trust committed by other trustees.440 The 
court added, however, that a re-evaluation of South African law “could result in a 
relaxation of the rule”.441 
De Waal published an article in 1999 that focused on the issue that the court in 
Gross found unnecessary to address.442 According to De Waal, the case law on the 
joint and several liability of co-trustees for breach of trust points strongly to the 
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operation of the fault principle. 443  As a result, co-trustees will be held liable for 
breach of trust only if fault, even if only in the form of negligence, is attributable to 
them:444 
“Therefore, a trustee can only be held liable for a breach of trust if fault, even if only in the 
form of negligence, can be proved. Neither authority nor policy considerations suggest 
that a different approach should be followed in the case of co-trustees.” 
On this basis, it is submitted that South African courts will not hold innocent 
delegating trustees liable for the wrongful acts of a delegate trustee. However, it 
would provide greater certainty to delegating trustees if legislation clearly states that 
trustees who have complied with the proposed legislative safeguards will not be held 
liable for any wrongful acts. 
6 5 3 Should delegating trustees be allowed to delegate investment functions to a 
third party? 
This part clarifies why it is proposed that delegating trustees should only be 
allowed to delegate investment functions to a co-trustee, but not to a third party. 
Under this heading, delegation to a co-trustee will be referred to as “internal 
delegation” and delegation to a third party as “external delegation”. 
An example of external delegation is trustees who delegate investment functions 
to an outside investment manager. The concern raised by Radigan et al regarding 
external delegation is that an investment manager is not under a fiduciary duty of 
any kind to the beneficiaries, but is only required to reasonably comply with the 
terms of the delegation.445 Stated differently, an investment manager owes duties to 
trustees, but not to beneficiaries.446 In order to provide beneficiaries with adequate 
protection, a possible solution is to make an investment manager responsible to 
beneficiaries. 447  In other words, legislation could create duties running directly 
between an investment manager and beneficiaries. It is submitted, however, that 
there is a much simpler solution: trustees should delegate investment functions to a 
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co-trustee, since a co-trustee, in the same way as all other trustees, is already 
subject to an array of statutory and common law duties. For example, trustees must, 
among other things: keep trust property separate from private property; adhere to the 
terms of the trust instrument; exercise independent judgement and discretion; and 
avoid conflicts of interest between their private affairs and their official functions as 
trustees. 448  Furthermore, the proposed South African prudent investor rule will 
impose additional duties on trustees, specifically relating to the management of a 
trust’s investment portfolio. Trustees will be obliged, among other things, to: exercise 
the care, diligence and skill that a prudent investor would exercise in similar 
circumstances;449 pursue an overall investment strategy in accordance with the level 
of risk and return reasonably suited to the entire trust portfolio; 450  and properly 
diversify assets unless the trustees reasonably determine that it is in the interest of 
the beneficiaries not to diversify.451 
6 6 Conclusion and proposed changes to legislation 
In terms of South African common law, trustees have a general authority to 
delegate administrative functions to others. Trustees are generally, however, not 
entitled to delegate investment functions to someone else. This rule is referred to as 
the non-delegation rule. However, it can be argued that in light of the decision in 
Hoosen it would be legally permissible for trustees to delegate investment functions 
if the following conditions are met: first, the trust instrument must expressly allow 
such delegation; second, the full trustee complement must decide to delegate 
investment functions; and third, trustees must not be selected specifically for their 
investment knowledge and experience. 
The problem with the non-delegation rule is that it prevents trustees from pursuing 
rewarding investment strategies, since non-expert trustees are not permitted to 
delegate investment functions to someone with investment expertise. Furthermore, 
should MPT be implemented in South African trust law, the non-delegation rule 
would prevent trustees from implementing such an investment strategy because the 
rule would not allow non-expert trustees to delegate investment functions to 
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someone with an understanding of MPT. This problem cannot simply be addressed 
by consulting with experts and acting on their advice. In most cases, relying on 
advice will amount to de facto delegation. Delegation would thus occur, but without 
the necessary safeguards in place. As discussed above, beneficiaries’ interests are 
not adequately protected if proper safeguards are not in place. 
In contrast to the general position in South African trust law, trustees in New York 
and in England are permitted to delegate their investment functions. As a general 
rule in New Zealand, trustees are not allowed to delegate investment functions to 
investment managers. Yet research from the New Zealand Law Commission 
indicates that many modern trust deeds permit such delegation. Furthermore, New 
Zealand’s current position will change once the Trusts Act 2019 enters into force. 
The proposed solution is to abandon South Africa’s non-delegation rule and 
replace it with a “pro-delegation default rule” that enables trustees to delegate 
investment functions to a co-trustee with investment expertise. Furthermore, 
legislation should provide that as long as the delegation is proper, delegating 
trustees will not be liable for the wrongful acts of a delegate trustee. Delegation will 
be regarded as proper if delegating trustees comply with certain legislative 
safeguards. 
Accordingly, in order to enable trustees to delegate investment functions to a 
co-trustee, it is proposed that three subsections, namely subsections (8), (9) and 
(10), be added to the newly proposed section 9A of the Trust Property Control Act.452 
Subsection (8) will authorise trustees to delegate investment functions to a 
co-trustee, subsection (9) will put appropriate safeguards in place, and subsection 
(10) will provide that delegating trustees will not be liable for the actions or decisions 
of a delegate trustee. It is proposed that subsection (8) of section 9A should read as 
follows: 
“Unless provided for otherwise in a trust instrument, trustees may delegate investment 
functions to a co-trustee with the necessary investment expertise.” 
Subsection (9) should state the following: 
“In delegating investment functions under subsection (8), trustees are required to – 
(a) provide a written policy statement; and 
                                                            




(b) monitor the performance of the delegate trustee.” 
Subsection (10), which deals with the liability of delegating trustees, should read 
as follows: 
“Delegating trustees are liable for a loss in the value of trust assets caused by an act or 
omission of a delegate trustee only if the delegating trustees are in breach of subsection 
(9).” 
Under the proposed pro-delegation default rule, delegation is not only permitted, 
but it is also encouraged (although not required). In small trusts, therefore, trustees 
could obtain expert advice and make investment selections themselves as long as 
relying on advice does not amount to de facto delegation taking place. The proposed 
changes will further not prevent founders from prohibiting the delegation of investing 
functions in trust instruments. 
Section 9A(9) would introduce a new term, namely a “policy statement” into 
existing legislation. This term, absent the contextualisation and explanations 
contained in the dissertation, requires elucidation in the statute. Therefore, it is 
proposed that the following definition of a policy statement be added to section 1 of 
the Trust Property Control Act: 
“Policy statement means a document that gives a delegate trustee guidance as to how 
asset management functions should be exercised.” 
It is submitted that authorising trustees to delegate investment functions to a 
co-trustee who possesses the necessary investment expertise will allow trustees 
better to serve beneficiaries, since it will ensure that persons with an understanding 
of MPT make investment decisions. 
7 The anti-netting rule 
7 1 Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the sixth area of trustee investment 
affected by the implementation of MPT, namely the balancing of investment gains 




in previous chapters,453 a discussion of this particular area of trustee investment 
requires giving specific consideration to the application of the anti-netting rule. 
The first part of the section explains the way the anti-netting rule operates, 
discusses the reason why the anti-netting rule should form part of South African trust 
law, and addresses the criticism of the anti-netting rule. Next, the section briefly 
reviews how the rule is applied in each of the comparable foreign jurisdictions. The 
second-last part of the section evaluates the application of the rule in South African 
trust law, explains the problem with the rule as it is currently operates, and presents 
the solution to this problem. The section concludes with a summary, which is 
accompanied by proposals of how legislation should change in order to give a 
complete and comprehensive anti-netting rule statutory recognition in our law. 
7 2 The nature, basis and criticism of the anti-netting rule 
7 2 1 Introduction 
The anti-netting rule provides that where a court finds that trustees have invested 
imprudently, the trustees cannot offset the loss from such an investment against the 
gains from any other source. More specifically, trustees cannot balance a loss 
arising from a breach of trust against a gain from another breach of trust, or against 
a gain from an investment not involving a breach of trust.454 The anti-netting rule can 
also be referred to as the “rule against balancing losses against gains”455 or the 
“no-netting rule”.456 
The anti-netting rule has an exception: if two or more breaches of trust are 
connected, the trustees are only accountable for the net gain or loss. 457  Stated 
differently, the anti-netting rule does not apply if two or more breaches of trust are 
not “separate and distinct”.458 The factors that are likely to be helpful in determining 
whether two breaches are connected are discussed later in paragraph 7 3. 
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Before proceeding to an example illustrating the application of the anti-netting 
rule, it is first necessary to explain the concept of “loss”. Loss is the amount 
necessary to restore a trust’s investment portfolio to the value it would have 
achieved if proper administration had taken place. 459  The amount necessary to 
restore the portfolio is calculated by determining the difference between the profit 
that would have been made by authorised investments (hereafter referred to as the 
“potential profit”) and the profit or loss that was actually made from unauthorised 
investments (hereafter referred to as the “actual profit or loss”). The two examples 
that follow illustrate how to determine potential profit. In the first example, the 
trustees receive clear instructions on how to invest; in the second example, the trust 
instrument does not provide the trustees with specific instructions. 
Example one: suppose that the terms of a particular trust require the trustees to 
invest the trust’s initial R10 million trust fund in bonds. Despite this clear instruction, 
the trustees decide to invest only 50% of the trust fund in bonds and the other 50% 
in the stock of a listed company. After five years, the value of the bonds is 
R6 700 000 and the value of the stock is still R5 000 000. The bonds thus 
appreciated R1 700 000 in value, representing a compound annual return of around 
6%, while the stock did not appreciate in value. Assume that the beneficiaries of the 
trust institute an action against the trustees and that the court finds that the trustees 
invested outside the scope of their authority with respect to the stock investment and 
thus acted in breach of trust. 
In the present example, determining the profit that would have been made by an 
authorised investment is rather straightforward. The court can use the investment in 
bonds as a benchmark and thus assume a compound annual return of 6%. Since no 
actual profit was made, the loss on the stock investment is R1 700 000.460 Ignoring 
the application of the anti-netting rule for now, the beneficiaries of the trust would 
thus have a claim of R1 700 000 against the trustees. 
Example two: suppose that the trustees of a particular trust neglect to invest the 
trust’s initial R10 million trust fund. Further suppose that the trust instrument does 
not state how trust funds should be invested. Due to bank costs and no significant 
interest rate on the trust’s bank account, the trust fund is still worth R10 million after 
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five years. Assume that the beneficiaries of the trust institute an action against the 
trustees and that the court finds that the trustees have committed a breach of trust 
for failing to invest the trust’s funds properly. 
In order to restore the trust’s portfolio to the value it would have been if proper 
investment had taken place, the court must consider how the trustees would have 
invested had the trustees invested according to the prudent investor rule. The court, 
with the help of expert testimony, must determine what an appropriate level of risk 
exposure for the trust would have been five years ago. 461  By determining the 
appropriate level of risk exposure, the court effectively determines what the trust’s 
asset allocation should have been.462 
Assume that the court concludes that the trust’s portfolio should have had a beta 
of 0.5 (ie half as much volatility as the market as a whole exhibits) and that the 
trustees should have invested 50% of the portfolio in listed shares and 50% of the 
portfolio in bonds.463 In order to determine the return that the portfolio would likely 
have earned, the court would as a next step have to determine the actual shares and 
bonds that the trustees would have acquired.464 According to Hudson, the practical 
difficulty lies in demonstrating that the trustees would have chosen shares and bonds 
that would have realised a large profit as opposed to shares and bonds that would 
have realised a lower profit. Hudson states:465 
“… it would be impossible to know precisely which shares would have been acquired and, 
because different shares would make different levels of profit, it would be impossible to 
demonstrate with exactitude the extent of the trust’s loss.” 
The suggested solution to this problem is to use a bond index fund and a market 
index fund to estimate the loss.466 If one assumes that a portfolio with an allocation 
of 50% in a bond index fund and 50% in a market index fund would have grown at a 
compounded annual return of 8%, the portfolio would have appreciated to about 
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R14 700 000 in value after a five-year term. Loss as a result of the trustees’ breach 
of trust is thus R4 700 000.467 
7 2 2 Application of the anti-netting rule 
Having explained the concept of loss, the application of the anti-netting rule can 
now be considered. Suppose that the trust instrument of a particular trust requires 
the trustees to invest the trust’s initial R10 million fund solely in bonds. Despite this 
clear instruction, the trustees decide instead to invest R5 000 000 in the stock of 
company “X” and R5 000 000 in the stock of company “Y”. After five years, the stock 
of company X has decreased in value to R4 000 000 and the stock of company Y 
has increased in value to R10 million. Assume that the beneficiaries of the trust 
institute an action against the trustees and that the court finds that the trustees 
invested outside the scope of their authority and thus acted in breach of trust. 
Before applying the anti-netting rule, the court must first determine the loss on 
each investment. The present example is similar to example one, discussed under 
the preceding heading, in that the trustees received a clear instruction to invest in 
bonds.468 However, unlike in example one, the trustees did not invest a portion of the 
trust fund in an investment that can serve as a yardstick by which the performance of 
the other investment can be measured. It is suggested, therefore, that the court 
should use a bond index fund to calculate the loss.469 
Assuming a compound annual interest rate of 6% on a bond index fund, each 
investment should have increased in value to at least R6 700 000. As discussed, 
loss is the difference between the potential profit and the actual profit or loss.470 In 
the present example, no loss is suffered on the investment in the stock of company Y 
since the investment outperformed the bond index fund, while a loss of R2 700 000 
is suffered on the investment in the stock of company X.471 
Having determined the loss occasioned by the breach of trust, the next step is to 
establish whether the two investments are connected or rather separate and distinct 
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transactions. Should the court find that the two transactions are connected, the anti-
netting rule’s exception would apply and the trustees would be permitted to net the 
gain from the investment in the stock of company Y and the loss from the investment 
in the stock of company X. The beneficiaries would thus not have a claim against the 
trustees since the net effect is positive.472 Consequently, after the two unauthorised 
investments have been realised, the trustees would have R14 000 000 to reinvest in 
an authorised manner.473 
On the other hand, should the court find that the two transactions are not 
connected, the anti-netting rule would not permit the trustees to balance gains and 
losses. The beneficiaries would therefore be entitled to the R5 000 000 profit arising 
from the investment in the stock of company Y and may recover the loss of 
R2 700 000 resulting from the investment in the stock of company X. 474 
Consequently, after the two investments have been realised, the trustees would 
have R16 700 000 available for reinvestment in bonds.475 
7 2 3 Justification for the anti-netting rule 
At first glance, it might appear that the application of the anti-netting rule may lead 
to rather harsh consequences for trustees. In the preceding example, for instance, 
despite one of the investments in the trust outperforming the bond index fund by 
quite a large margin, the court found that the trustees are still liable for an amount of 
R2 700 000.476 There are, however, good reasons why the anti-netting rule should 
form part of trust law in South Africa: the rule deters trustees from committing 
additional breach of trust; it deters trustees from speculating with certain parts of the 
portfolio; and it deters trustees from carelessly investing trust funds. This statement 
requires further explanation. 
In a jurisdiction that does not accept the anti-netting rule, trustees are able to 
offset investment gains in the trust against their personal liability for wrongful 
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investments. The trustees are, in other words, capable of using investment gains to 
their own advantage. As a result, some trustees may be inclined to commit breaches 
of trust under certain circumstances. For example, trustees whose misconduct has 
caused a loss could commit additional breaches of trust in an effort to recoup the 
prior loss; 477  trustees could speculate with certain parts of a trust’s investment 
portfolio in an attempt to achieve excessively high returns while safely investing 
other parts;478 or trustees could be careless in investing trust funds since they have a 
safety net in that they are able to escape liability if certain parts of the trust portfolio 
perform well.479 
The anti-netting rule holds that gains or profits in a trust do not belong to the 
trustees; they belong to the trust.480 Therefore, gains are not the trustees’ to offset 
against their personal liability for wrongful investments.481 Bloom and LaPiana in 
their report on trusts and estate laws in New York express this principle as follows:482 
“… a trustee who has harmed the trust by a breach of duty cannot be allowed to use to 
his own advantage investment ‘fruits’ that the terms of the trust have earmarked for the 
beneficiary.” 
Justification for the anti-netting rule thus lies in the fact that the rule discourages 
trustees from committing breaches of trust in the circumstances mentioned above. 
7 2 4 Criticism of the anti-netting rule 
The anti-netting rule has been criticised as being at odds with MPT. More 
specifically, some authors and academics argue that the rule is an uneasy fit with 
one of the central ideas of MPT, namely the total portfolio approach.483 As discussed 
earlier in the chapter, the total portfolio approach provides that investment decisions 
must not be considered in isolation, but rather in the context of a trust’s investment 
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portfolio as a whole and as a part of an overall investment strategy.484 According to 
Hirsch, the anti-netting rule is in conflict with the total portfolio approach because the 
rule compels trustees to consider investment decisions in isolation:485 
“… [the anti-netting rule] embodies the tendency inherent in the prudent-man rule to 
consider investment decisions in isolation rather than as a part of a portfolio strategy.” 
Consequently, as maintained by Hirsch, trustees must worry constantly that if 
some of their investments fail, they will be held personally liable in spite of a record 
of overall success.486 
It is submitted, however, that such criticism of the anti-netting rule is without merit. 
The rule is not inconsistent with the total portfolio approach since the rule is only 
triggered after a breach of trust has occurred.487 Halbach emphasises that the rule 
serves only to measure damages and not to measure the prudence of investment 
decisions:488 
“… the no-netting rule is not involved in determining whether there has been a breach but 
only in determining the measure of damages when breaches do occur.” [Halbach’s own 
emphasis.] 
Since the anti-netting rule has no bearing on gains and losses from ordinary 
investments where no breach of trust has taken place, trustees do not have to be 
concerned that a court will view every investment that the trustees made in isolation. 
In conclusion, the anti-netting rule should not be seen as standing in the way of 
MPT or the total portfolio approach.489 
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7 3 The current position in each of the comparable foreign jurisdictions 
In New York law, there is presently no statute that deals with the anti-netting rule. 
The rule does, however, prevail in New York case law.490 The rule was stated in 
Matter of Buck491 as follows:492 
“[A] gain realized by the retention of certain securities may not be employed to offset a 
loss occasioned by the retention of other securities to which objection has been made. A 
trustee who is liable for a loss resulting from a breach of trust with respect to one portion 
of the trust property cannot reduce his liability by reason of a gain with respect to another 
portion of the trust property occasioned by a separate and distinct breach of trust.” 
Two observations regarding this statement can be made: first, the anti-netting rule 
is accepted in full in New York law since a loss from a breach of trust cannot be 
offset by either gains from investments not involving a breach of trust, or from gains 
involving a breach of trust. Support for this observation is found in Bloom and La 
Piana’s Final Report where they state:493 
“… a trustee who has harmed the trust by a breach of duty cannot be allowed to use to 
his own advantage investment ‘fruits’ that the terms of the trust have earmarked for the 
beneficiary …” 
A second observation is that the words “separate and distinct breach of trust” 
seem to indicate that the exception to that anti-netting rule is recognised in New York 
law. As recalled, the exception to the anti-netting rule provides that if multiple 
breaches are connected, the trustees are only accountable for the net gain or loss.494 
According to Moffat, the difficulty lies in deciding what constitutes a connected 
breach of trust.495 Certainty on this point is important since clear guidelines will make 
it difficult for trustees to prove that a connected breach of trust took place in order to 
reduce or escape their liability. The commentary to the Restatement (Third) 
describes four factors that are likely to be helpful in determining whether two or more 
                                                            
490 Bloom & LaPiana Final Report A-210. 
491 55 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sur. Ct. Westchester Co. 1945). 
492 Matter of Buck 55 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sur. Ct. Westchester Co. 1945) 843-844. 
493 Bloom & La Piana Final Report A-210 and A-211. 
494 See para 7 2 1 above. 




breaches of trust are connected. The factors that the commentary deems worth 
considering are as follows: first, whether the breaches of trust arose out of a single 
investment policy; second, the length of time that elapsed between the breaches; 
third, whether between the breaches of trust the trustees became aware of the 
earlier breach and the resulting loss; and fourth, whether the trustees intended to 
commit a breach of trust.496 
In England, if a court finds that trustees have invested imprudently, the trustees 
cannot offset the loss from such an investment against a gain from another breach of 
trust,497 or offset the loss against a gain from an investment not involving a breach of 
trust. 498 The anti-netting rule is thus accepted in its entirety in English law. 
Furthermore, the exception to the anti-netting rule applies in English law.499 A case 
that illustrates the operation of the anti-netting rule’s exception is Bartlett v Barclays 
Bank 500  Trust (“Bartlett”). 501  In that case, there were two property development 
projects: one was the Old Bailey project, which was a failure; the other project was 
the Guildford development on which a substantial profit was made.502 Both of these 
projects were undertaken in breach of trust.503 Brightman J found that although the 
projects were two separate transactions, they “stemmed from exactly the same 
policy”.504 As a result, Brightman J held that it was permissible to offset the loss on 
the Old Bailey project against the profit realised on the Guildford development.505 
In New Zealand, section 13Q of the Trustee Act 1956 (as amended) implicitly 
revokes the anti-netting rule,506 while section 129(2) of the Trusts Act 2019, once it 
comes into force, will expressly revoke the rule.507 In this regard, the position in New 
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Zealand differs markedly from the positions in New York and England in that the 
latter two jurisdictions accept and apply the anti-netting rule, whereas legislation in 
New Zealand is designed to overcome the effect of the rule. 
In its investigation into the law of trusts, the New Zealand Law Commission came 
to the conclusion that the anti-netting rule is in conflict with MPT.508 Consequently, 
the Law Commission recommended that the anti-netting rule should expressly be 
abolished.509 Its recommendation led to the inclusion of section 55 in the Trusts Bill 
2016, which later became section 129 in the Trusts Act 2019. Section 129(2) of the 
Act reads as follows:510 
“The court may set off all or part of the loss resulting from the investment against all or 
part of any gain resulting from any other investment whether in breach of trust or not.” 
Exploring the reasons for the New Zealand Law Commission’s conclusion that the 
anti-netting rule is in conflict with MPT is not particularly meaningful. As discussed in 
chapter 6, when reading the Law Commission’s report, it becomes apparent that the 
authors of the report did not fully appreciate the distinction between the anti-netting 
rule and the isolation approach.511 The Law Commission’s position thus derives from 
an incorrect understanding of the nature and extent of the anti-netting rule. 
7 4 The position in South Africa 
The anti-netting rule is partially accepted in South African trust law. According to 
Cameron et al:512 
“A loss in one transaction carried out in breach of a trustee’s duty cannot be set off 
against a gain made in another distinct transaction in breach of trust.” 
The second part of the anti-netting rule – the part that deals with a loss carried out 
in breach of trust netted off against a gain from an investment not involving a breach 
of trust – is not mentioned. Before discussing the problem with this omission, it 
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should be pointed out that the exception to the anti-netting rule finds application in 
our law. Cameron et al states:513 
“However, if there is a breach of trust that results in a loss as well as a gain, the net effect 
upon the trust should be looked at to see whether there is a loss to be made good.” 
Returning to the issue of partial acceptance of the anti-netting rule, the problem is 
that it allows delinquent trustees to escape liability if certain parts of a trust’s 
investment portfolio perform well. Consequently, there is no deterrent against 
carelessness in managing an investment portfolio since trustees who have made a 
loss out of an unauthorised investment can balance the loss against a gain from an 
authorised investment, and if the net effect is positive, the trustees would benefit 
from their own imprudence.514 
To illustrate this point, consider the following example: suppose that the terms of a 
particular trust require the trustees to invest the trust’s initial R10 million fund solely 
in bonds. Despite this clear instruction, the trustees decide to invest only 50% of the 
trust fund in bonds and 50% in the stock of company “Z”. After five years, the value 
of the investment in bonds has increased to R6 700 000 and the value of the stock of 
company Z is still R5 000 000. Accordingly, the beneficiaries of the trust decide to 
institute an action against the trustees. 515  Assume that the court finds that the 
trustees committed a breach of trust with respect to the stock investment and that 
the loss on the investment is R1 700 000.516 
The fact that the beneficiaries can prove that a breach of trust occurred does not 
of itself mean that there will be any recoverable loss. Since the second part of the 
anti-netting rule does not form part of South African trust law, the trustees are 
entitled to offset the gain from the investment in bonds against the loss from the 
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investment in the stock of company Z.517 Seeing that there is no loss, the court will 
not award compensation.518 
It is submitted that it is unfair, viewed from the beneficiaries’ perspective, that the 
trustees can escape personal liability for their mistakes simply because other parts of 
a trust’s investment portfolio performed well. In order to discourage trustees from 
managing an investment portfolio carelessly and negligently, it is proposed that the 
anti-netting rule should be accepted in its entirety in South African trust law. To be 
more specific, the proposal is that the Trust Property Control Act should contain a 
complete and comprehensive anti-netting rule similar to the rule found in English and 
New York law. 
7 5 Conclusion and proposed changes to legislation 
The anti-netting rule provides that trustees cannot balance a loss arising from a 
breach of trust against a gain from another breach of trust or against a gain from an 
investment not involving a breach of trust. An exception to the anti-netting rule is 
carved out for situations described as connected breaches of trust. In such cases, 
the trustees are only accountable for an investment portfolio’s net gain or loss. 
At first glance, it might appear that the application of the anti-netting rule may lead 
to rather harsh consequences for trustees. However, the rule’s inclusion in South 
African trust law is justified since it deters trustees from: committing additional 
breaches of trust; speculating with certain parts of a trust’s investment portfolio; and 
investing trust property carelessly. 
Some authors and academics criticise the anti-netting rule as being at odds with 
MPT. More specifically, they argue that that the rule is an uneasy fit with one of the 
central ideas of MPT, namely the total portfolio approach. Such criticism is, however, 
without merit. The rule only comes into effect after a breach of trust has occurred 
and thus has no bearing on gains and losses from ordinary investments where no 
breach of trust has taken place. The anti-netting rule should, therefore, not be 
viewed as being in conflict with MPT or the total portfolio approach. 
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The anti-netting is accepted in its entirety in New York and English trust law. In 
contrast, legislation in New Zealand is designed to overcome the effect of the anti-
netting rule. Exploring the reasons why the position in New Zealand differs from the 
positions in New York and England is not particularly meaningful, since New 
Zealand’s position derives from an incorrect understanding of the nature and extent 
of the anti-netting rule. Having explained the benefits and the importance of the rule, 
the position in New York and England is preferred over the position in New Zealand. 
The anti-netting rule’s exception can be applied in both New York and England 
trust law, but is, of course, not applicable in New Zealand. Clear guidelines on what 
constitutes a connected breach of trust are essential because the guidelines prevent 
trustees from proving that a connected breach of trust took place in order to reduce 
or escape their liability. The section identifies four factors that are likely to be helpful 
in determining whether two or more breaches of trust are connected. These factors 
are included in the proposed legislation discussed below. 
An examination of South Africa trust law indicates that the anti-netting rule is only 
partially accepted and that the exception to the rule finds application. Partial 
acceptance of the rule means that the second part of the anti-netting rule – the part 
that deals with a loss carried out in breach of trust netted off against a gain from an 
investment not involving a breach of trust – does not form part of our trust law. The 
problem with this omission is that it allows delinquent trustees to escape liability if 
certain parts of a trust’s investment portfolio perform well. In order to discourage 
trustees from committing breaches of trust, it is proposed that the anti-netting rule 
should be accepted in its entirety in South African trust law. To be more specific, the 
proposal is that the Trust Property Control Act should contain a complete and 
comprehensive anti-netting rule similar to the rule found in English and New York 
law. 
As far as practical implementation is concerned, it is proposed that the following 
two subsections, namely subsections (11) and (12), be included in the newly 
proposed section 9A of the Trust Property Control Act. 519  Subsection (11) will 
implement the anti-netting rule in its entirety as well as make provision for the rule’s 
exception, while subsection (12) will list the factors that a court could take into 
                                                            




consideration in determining whether two breaches are connected. It is proposed 
that subsection (11) of section 9A should read as follows:520 
“Losses from a breach of trust cannot be offset by either gains from investments not 
involving a breach of trust, or gains from other breaches of trust; unless those other 
breaches are connected.” 
It is proposed that subsection (12) should read as follows: 
“Whether or not two or more breaches of trust are connected depends on the following 
factors – 
(a) whether the breaches of trust are the result of a single policy, judgement, or set of 
interrelated decisions; 
(b) the length of time that elapsed between the breaches of trust; 
(c) whether, between the breaches of trust, the trustees became aware of the earlier 
breach, and particularly of a resulting loss or profit; and 
(d) whether the trustees intended to commit a breach of trust.” 
                                                            




CHAPTER 8 – CONCLUSION 
1 Introduction 
The main research questions posed at the start of this dissertation were: first, 
should trustees’ investment functions in South African law be modernised through 
the implementation of an investment rule based on modern portfolio theory (“MPT”)? 
Second, if the answer to the first question is yes, what should the core features of 
such an investment rule be? In order to answer the main research questions, chapter 
1 further posed the following four additional and more specific questions: 
(a) Question 1: what is the principal problem that trustees face when they are 
unable to rely on an investment rule based on MPT? 
(b) Question 2: is an investment strategy based on MPT the best possible 
approach for people managing other people’s assets? 
(c) Question 3: which areas of trustee investment would be most affected by 
integrating MPT principles into trust law? 
(d) Question 4: how should these areas of trustee investment be amended in 
South African trust law in order to accommodate MPT? 
The findings and recommendations of the dissertation are compiled in this chapter 
in an attempt to answer the main research questions and the four additional 
questions. The chapter commences by answering the four additional questions. 
Thereafter, the main research questions are answered. The chapter then gives a 
summary of the proposed amendments to the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 
(“Trust Property Control Act”). The chapter concludes with recommendations for 
further research. 
2 The additional and more specific questions to the main research questions  
2 1 Question 1: what is the principal problem that trustees face when they are 
unable to rely on an investment rule based on MPT? 
The rule that governs how trustees should exercise their investment functions in 




Sackville West v Nourse1 (“Sackville West”), and in Administrators, Estate Richards v 
Nichol2 (“Estate Richards”) it was confirmed that the rule has not been departed from 
since. Trustees’ main investment objective when following the rule is to protect the 
real value of trust capital and ensure that an adequate income is produced 
continuously.3 
Chapters 4 to 6 revealed that this is also what is expected from trustees in the 
comparable foreign jurisdictions. In terms of New York’s prudent investor rule, 
trustees owe a duty of caution to beneficiaries. This duty requires trustees to invest 
with a view to both preserve the real value of trust capital and to secure a reasonable 
return.4 In England, trustees are under an obligation to preserve the real value of a 
trust fund (as opposed to merely seeking to protect its nominal value) and, because 
of trustees’ duty of impartiality, they are also obliged to produce a reasonable income 
for income beneficiaries.5 Trustees in New Zealand are required to allocate a fair 
rate of return to income beneficiaries and not allow a trust fund to reduce in value.6 It 
is important to point out that all three jurisdictions had to change their law from a 
prudent man type of rule to an investment rule based on MPT in order to meet the 
challenge of protecting the real value of capital and producing an adequate income.  
The question raised in chapter 2 is whether it is possible for trustees to achieve 
their main investment objective without being able to rely on an investment rule 
based on MPT. The conclusion reached after examining the development of 
trustees’ investment standards in the comparable foreign jurisdictions is that it is 
exceedingly difficult – if not impossible – to meet this goal under a prudent man or 
similar type of rule. Longstreth confirms this conclusion where he states:7 
“For managers subject to the prudent man rule in one form or another – fiduciaries we will 
call them – the task of meeting the challenges and exploiting the opportunities is much 
more difficult.” 
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Therefore, to answer question 1 of the additional questions, the principal problem 
that trustees face when they are unable to rely on an investment rule based on MPT 
is that they cannot achieve their main investment objective, namely to protect the 
real value of capital and produce adequate income. Chapter 4 revealed the reason 
why it is such a challenging task to achieve this objective under a prudent man type 
of rule. This is because a prudent man type of rule is not capable of adapting to 
“changing times” (eg rising inflation) and “changing notions of investment opportunity 
and risk taking” (eg the findings of MPT).8 
2 2 Question 2: is an investment strategy based on MPT the best possible 
approach for people managing other people’s assets? 
MPT is a theory of investment that attempts to maximise the expected portfolio 
return for a given amount of portfolio risk or equivalently minimise the risk for a given 
level of expected return by carefully choosing the proportions of various assets.9 The 
advantage of MPT is that a careful application of its principles allows an investor to 
achieve reasonably good returns with a greater degree of security than is possible 
under other models of investment behaviour. The main reason for the greater 
security under MPT is because of the theory’s emphasis on diversification, or to be 
more precise, its emphasis on the “right kind” or “proper” diversification. In order to 
reduce a portfolio’s overall risk, MPT requires an investor to combine investments 
that do not go up and down in value at the same time. Chapter 3 demonstrated that 
this type of diversification is highly effective in reducing risk without reducing 
expected return.10  
In most cases, professional investment managers are required to ensure an 
appropriate risk level in light of the needs of their clients and are obliged to be risk 
averse. Risk aversion means that a risk-averse investor will choose the less risky 
investment when given two investment portfolios that offer the same level of return. 
Chapter 3 illustrated that the risk of a diversified portfolio is lower than the risk of a 
non-diversified portfolio. Consequently, a risk-averse investment manager will 
choose a diversified portfolio. In doing so, the investment manager is able to provide 
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his client with good returns and a greater degree of security than is possible under 
other theories of investment.11 Therefore, the answer to the question posed in the 
heading above is yes, an investment strategy based on MPT is the best possible 
approach for a person managing someone else’s assets. Furthermore, chapters 4 to 
6 confirmed this last statement by showing the benefits of trustees using MPT 
strategies when investing and managing the assets of trust beneficiaries. 
2 3 Question 3: which areas of trustee investment would be most affected by 
integrating MPT principles into trust law? 
A number of key principles are at the centre of MPT: first, MPT defines what 
constitutes return using the concept of total return; second, MPT maintains that when 
managing an investment portfolio the focus should be on the total portfolio and not 
the individual investments; third, according to MPT, no asset or investment technique 
is inherently good or bad or prohibited per se as too risky; fourth diversification is 
essential to the management of risk.12 
Chapters 4 to 6 illustrated that while the introduction of these principles into trust 
law affects many areas of trustee investment, six particular areas are affected most 
prominently. These six areas are summarised below. 
2 3 1 Trustees’ choice of investments  
As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, one of the tenets of MPT is that no 
asset or investment technique is inherently good or bad, or prohibited per se as too 
risky. The basis for this tenet is the finding of MPT that it is possible to reduce a 
portfolio’s risk in appropriate circumstances by adding an investment that is risky in 
itself. The full integration of MPT into trust law, therefore, requires wide powers of 
investment as opposed to limiting trustees to narrow categories of investment or 
prohibiting them from investing in speculative investments. 
This principle has been integrated in the trust law of all three of the comparable 
foreign jurisdictions. Whereas New York’s old prudent man rule warned trustees to 
avoid speculative investments, New York’s prudent investor rule authorises trustees 
to invest in any type of investment, since no particular investment is inherently 
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prudent or imprudent.13 The primary obstacle to implementing MPT in England was 
the fact that trustee investment was limited to only certain types of investment. The 
Trustee Act 2000 successfully removed this obstacle by conferring the widest 
possible investment powers on trustees.14 In New Zealand, the legal list approach 
was abolished and replaced with a provision that empowers trustees to invest in any 
investment.15 
Importantly, all three jurisdictions established safeguards to act as a 
counterbalance to trustees’ wide powers of investment. First, any form of investment 
should only be permissible provided that proper care, diligence and skill are 
employed.16 Second, trustees are given greater flexibility in choosing investments, 
provided that the overall investment plan is prudent and that any additional 
investments advance the overall investment plan. A trust’s overall investment plan is 
viewed as prudent if trustees invest at a level of risk-and-return that is suitable for the 
particular trust.17 New investments are viewed as advancing the overall investment 
plan if these investments are employed in a manner that reduces the overall risk of 
the trust portfolio or allow the trust to achieve a higher return expectation without a 
disproportionate increase in the overall level of portfolio risk.18 
2 3 2 The evaluation of a trust’s investment portfolio 
 One of the most basic tenets of MPT is the maxim that the riskiness of an asset 
cannot be determined in isolation, but can be usefully determined only within the 
context of the overall risk of the portfolio to which the asset is added. Integrating this 
principle of MPT into trust law requires trustees’ investment decisions to be 
evaluated – not in isolation, but in the context of the trust’s investment portfolio as a 
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whole and as a part of an overall investment strategy. This approach is referred to as 
the total portfolio approach.19 
The total portfolio approach contrasts markedly with the isolation approach. The 
latter approach assesses the decisions of trustees on an investment-by-investment 
basis. The isolation approach creates the following two problems for trustees: first, it 
tends to label broad categories of investments and techniques as speculative and 
thus as imprudent per se; and second, because the isolation approach concentrates 
on single investments without looking at the portfolio in its entirety, trustees are 
required to defend the performance of each individual investment in the portfolio. 
This practice exposes trustees to liability for the value of one investment declining 
even if that investment is part of a well-diversified portfolio.20 
Jurisdictions such as New York and England have moved from the isolation 
approach to an approach that evaluates trustees’ performance in light of the 
performance of the entire portfolio, while New Zealand is also in the process of 
making this shift. Currently, existing law in New Zealand does not go far enough in 
making the compatibility of the total portfolio approach and trustee investing obvious. 
The New Zealand Law Commission recommended that reforming legislation ought to 
require trustees to look at a trust’s investment portfolio as an interlocking whole, and 
not just at its individual elements. Accordingly, the Trusts Act 2019 includes 
provisions that indicate the acceptance of the total portfolio approach.21 
2 3 3 The diversification of trust investments  
The type of diversification that coincides with MPT is accomplished by finding 
investments that complement one another and by eliminating unsystematic risk. Two 
investments complement each other when they are likely to perform well under 
opposite market conditions or at different times. Adverse movements in one 
investment will be offset by positive results in the other. By finding investments that 
have offsetting risks, trustees can theoretically reduce all unsystematic risk in a 
portfolio. The only risk remaining in a diversified portfolio will be systematic risk. In 
contrast, there will be systematic and unsystematic risk in a non-diversified portfolio. 
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Therefore, the risk of a diversified portfolio will typically be lower than that of a non-
diversified portfolio.22 
Choosing investments that have offsetting risks will often lead to trustees having 
to select investments that are seen as speculative or risky when viewed in isolation. 
Diversification is thus related to the previous two areas of trustee investing, namely 
“trustees’ choice of investments” and “the evaluation of a trust’s investment portfolio”. 
Trustees are better equipped to choose investments with offsetting risks if they are 
allowed to make any kind of investment and select investments based on their 
contribution to the overall portfolio.23 
Importantly, MPT-based diversification permits the risk of a portfolio to be reduced 
without lowering the portfolio’s return expectations. The fact that diversification 
enables trustees to reduce the risk of a portfolio substantially while keeping expected 
returns constant makes diversification fundamental to the management of risk.24 
In response to the lessons of MPT, the need to diversify trust investments has 
been intensified in the comparable foreign jurisdictions: in New York, trustees have a 
presumed duty to diversify investments; in England, trustees should explain a lack of 
diversification satisfactorily; and in New Zealand, diversification is regarded as 
paramount to the interest of beneficiaries.25 
2 3 4 Traditional capital and income allocation rules  
A key principle of MPT is that it is artificial to distinguish between income and 
capital when investing. Instead, MPT assesses investment options based on its 
overall total return regardless of whether the investments are categorised as income 
or capital.26 
Traditional capital and income allocation rules do not allow trustees to ignore the 
distinction between income and capital for purposes of investing. The full integration 
of MPT into trust investment law results in trustees not being constrained by these 
allocation rules. Investing without this constraint is known as total return investing. 
The effect of total return investing reform is that investment decision-making is 
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separated from distributional issues. In other words, trustees do not have to select 
investments based on the legal category of the returns received. Total return 
investing thus allows trustees to, as a first step, invest for maximum overall return, 
and then in a separate and subsequent step, allocate the return as fairly as possible. 
The promise of total return investing is that, if implemented and administered 
correctly, it delivers a higher rate of return than an investment strategy that is 
required to achieve a particular income/capital allocation.27 
There are three ways of facilitating total return investing in a trustee investment 
context: the power to access capital, the power of allocation, and percentage trusts.28 
Each of the comparable foreign jurisdictions has a different view regarding which 
method is the most suitable way of accomplishing total return investing: legislation in 
New York permits both the use of the power of allocation and the creation of 
percentage trusts; the English Law Commission considers the percentage trust 
model as the method most likely to be successful in facilitating total return 
investment should total return investing be implemented in England; and in New 
Zealand, the Trusts Act 2019 reflects the New Zealand Law Commission’s 
recommendation that the power of allocation should be the default standard.29 
2 3 5 Delegation of trustees’ investment functions 
MPT maintains that people who manage other people’s assets but who possess 
limited investment knowledge should use the skills and judgement of persons with 
the necessary investment expertise.30 The full integration of MPT into trust law thus 
necessitates that non-expert trustees should be allowed to appoint investment 
experts to make investment decisions. 
Trustees in New York and in England are permitted to delegate their investment 
functions. As a general rule in New Zealand, trustees are not allowed to delegate 
investment functions to investment managers. However, New Zealand’s current 
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position will change once the Trusts Act 2019 enters into force, since the Act allows 
trustees to delegate investment decision-making to investment managers.31 
2 3 6 Balancing of investment gains against investment losses in the event of a 
breach of trust  
A discussion of this particular area of trustee investment requires giving specific 
consideration to the application of the anti-netting rule. The anti-netting rule provides 
that trustees cannot balance a loss arising from a breach of trust against a gain from 
another breach of trust or against a gain from an investment not involving a breach 
of trust.  An exception to the anti-netting rule is carved out for situations described as 
“connected breaches of trust”. In such cases, the trustees are only accountable for 
an investment portfolio’s net gain or loss.32 
Some authors and academics criticise the anti-netting rule as being at odds with 
MPT. More specifically, they argue that that the rule is an uneasy fit with one of the 
central ideas of MPT, namely the total portfolio approach. Such criticism is, however, 
without merit. The rule only comes into effect after a breach of trust has occurred 
and thus has no bearing on gains and losses from ordinary investments where no 
breach of trust has taken place. The anti-netting rule should, therefore, not be 
viewed as being in conflict with MPT or the total portfolio approach.33 
The anti-netting is accepted in its entirety in New York and English trust law. In 
contrast, legislation in New Zealand is designed to overcome the effect of the anti-
netting rule. Exploring the reasons why the position in New Zealand differs from the 
positions in New York and England is not particularly meaningful since New 
Zealand’s position is derived from an incorrect understanding of the nature and 
extent of the anti-netting rule. 34 
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2 4 Question 4: how should the six particular areas of trustee investment be 
amended in South African trust law in order to accommodate MPT? 
As discussed in chapter 7, it is proposed that South Africa’s current rule governing 
trustees’ investment functions, namely the prudent and careful person rule, be 
replaced with an investment rule based on MPT, namely South Africa’s prudent 
investor rule.35 Therefore, it is proposed that a new section, section 9A, be inserted 
in the Trust Property Control Act with the heading “The prudent investor rule”.36 
An important point to highlight is that South Africa’s prudent investor rule will only 
find application when trustees are exercising their investment functions. The current 
prudent and careful person rule will thus continue to govern all non-investment 
related functions. Accordingly, no changes to section 9 of the Trust Property Control 
Act are proposed, save for the section indicating that it is only applicable to non-
investment related functions. 
The recommendations of how the six particular areas of trustee investment should 
be amended in South African trust law to accommodate MPT are summarised below. 
Significantly, the discussion of how these investment areas should change also 
reveals what the core features of the proposed South Africa’s prudent investor rule 
should be. 
2 4 1 Wide investment powers 
In South African trust law, not all investments are in principle open to 
consideration for trustee investment. The rule that governs how trustees should 
exercise their investment functions is the prudent and careful person rule.  In terms 
of the rule, if trustees receive investments that are speculative, they should sell the 
investments and reinvest the proceeds in safer investments.37 
The problem with South African trust law restricting trustees’ choice of 
investments is that it prevents trustees from using investment strategies that offer 
greater diversification across the investment spectrum and that have the potential to 
add significantly to the stability and long-term prospects of a trust portfolio. 
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Consequently, it is proposed that South Africa’s prudent investor rule should declare 
all assets open to consideration for trustee investment.38 
In order to balance the introduction of wide investment powers, it is further 
proposed that the newly proposed section 9A should contain the following two 
safeguards: first, trustees are subject to a statutory duty of care when exercising 
their powers of investment;39 and second, trustees are given greater flexibility in 
choosing investments provided, that the overall investment plan is prudent and that 
any additional investments advance the overall investment plan.40 
2 4 2 Total portfolio approach 
South African trust law requires trustees’ investment decisions to be assessed on 
an investment-by-investment basis if these decisions are called into question. The 
isolation approach is thus currently used in South African trust law to evaluate a 
trust’s investment portfolio.41 
It is proposed that South Africa’s prudent investor rule should require trustees to 
pursue an overall investment strategy in accordance with the level of risk-and-return 
reasonably suited to the entire trust portfolio. In other words, it is proposed that 
trustees should follow the total portfolio approach.42 
In order to determine what would be regarded as a suitable level of risk-and-
return, trustees must take the circumstances of each particular case into account. 
Therefore, it is further proposed that section 9A should list the circumstances that 
trustees have to consider before making investment decisions.43 
It is submitted that these two proposals would give concerned trustees the 
necessary confidence that the total portfolio approach has statutory approval and 
that the approach would be readily defensible in legal proceedings. 
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2 4 3 Duty to diversify 
There is currently no duty to diversify investments in South African trust law.44 As 
discussed in paragraph 2 3 3 above, the benefit of MPT-based diversification is that 
it enables trustees to reduce the risk of a portfolio substantially while keeping 
expected returns constant. It is, therefore, proposed that South Africa’s prudent 
investor rule should require trustees to diversify trust investments unless it is not in 
the interests of the beneficiaries.45  
Furthermore, it is proposed that trustees should be required to determine whether 
to sell or retain assets received from a founder. 46  The reason for the latter 
requirement is to signal a change in law. Beneficiaries, at least in the case of 
testamentary trusts, are currently entitled to trust assets in the same state in which 
the assets were received. Considering the benefits of diversification, it is submitted 
that it is generally more important for trustees to diversify trust investments than to 
leave investments to the ultimate beneficiaries in the form given by the founder. The 
only circumstances under which it might be in the interest of beneficiaries that certain 
types of initial assets be left undisturbed is if the assets of the trust consist of a family 
company (or farm) or if there is an asset that is not being held for investment (eg a 
property used for occupation by beneficiaries).47 
An important question that surrounds the duty to diversify is: when is it in the 
interest of the beneficiaries not to diversify? Seeing that diversification is paramount 
to the interest of beneficiaries, it is suggested that a failure to diversify should only be 
justified in very unusual situations. Therefore, the smallness of a trust fund should 
not be used as an excuse to restrict diversification. Instead of investing in a small 
number of investments, trustees could invest in a market index fund. Possible tax 
costs should also not be used to justify non-diversification. Chapter 7 illustrated that 
it is safer and more advantageous to sell assets and invest in a diversified portfolio 
than it is to retain a concentrated position for tax reasons.48 Finally, when confronted 
with retention clauses, trustees should meticulously consider whether such clauses 
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are in the best interest of beneficiaries. Retention provisions can be divided into 
permissive and mandatory retention provisions. Permissive retention provisions 
relating to shares in public companies would not be sufficient to protect trustees from 
a failure to diversify. On the other hand, trustees should be given more leeway not to 
diversify in circumstances in which a permissive retention provisions relates to a 
family company (or farm). Although mandatory retention provisions are binding on 
trustees, there is an exception to the rule. Should trustees find that an asset is 
deteriorating in value and is expected to keep on deteriorating, and that the decline 
in value of the asset is owing to circumstances that the founder did not contemplate 
or foresee, the trustees should apply to the court in terms of section 13 of the Trust 
Property Control Act for an order to sell the asset.49 
Finally, it is proposed that trustees should classify a property used for occupation 
by beneficiaries as “not being held for investment”. Consequently, many trust 
portfolios will consist of an investment portfolio as well as a non-investment 
component. South Africa’s prudent investor rule will govern the investment portfolio, 
whereas trustees’ ordinary standard of care will govern the non-investment 
component of a trust. This notion of classifying a property as not being held for 
investment will be introduced into existing legislation by adding the following 
definition into section 1 of the Trust Property Control Act: 
“Trust investment portfolio means the investment component of the trust and excludes 
assets in the trust that are not being held for investment.” 
2 4 4 Total return investing 
 In South Africa, the combination of the traditional distribution rule and the duty 
of impartiality limits trustees’ ability to invest for total return. As a consequence, it is 
extremely difficult for trustees to protect the real value of trust capital and produce an 
adequate income continuously. 50  As discussed in paragraph 2 3 4 above, the 
solution is total return investing since it significantly increases the chances of a 
successful outcome for both income and capital beneficiaries. 
The only change to legislation required to enable trustees to invest for total return 
is to disregard the distinction between income and capital. No changes to the duty of 
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impartiality are thus required. In order to enable trustees to use total return investing, 
it is proposed that section 9A should give statutory recognition to the power of 
allocation and make provision for the creation of percentage trusts. It is also 
proposed that a definition of a percentage trust be added to section 1 of the Trust 
Property Control Act. 
Given the great variety of situations that founders and trustees face, no one 
method of facilitating total return investing is correct for all circumstances. 
Accordingly, founders and trustees should be able to choose the option that best 
suits the circumstances of the particular trust. This raises the following important 
question: which method of facilitating total return investing is best suited for which 
type of scenario? After examining four possible trust scenarios, it is concluded that:51 
(a) Where the income and capital beneficiaries have identical interests, the 
trustees are automatically capable of investing for total return. 
(b) In a discretionary trust where the income and capital beneficiaries have 
different interests, the most suitable method of facilitating total return investing is 
the power of allocation. 
(c) In a traditional net-income trust where the income and capital beneficiaries 
have different interests and beneficiaries should be treated impartially, the most 
suitable way of facilitating total return investing is to convert the trust to a 
percentage trust. 
(d) In a traditional net-income trust where the income and capital beneficiaries 
have different interests and preferential treatment is required, more flexible 
methods of facilitating total return investing should be used such as the power to 
access capital or the power of allocation. 
2 4 5 Delegation of investment functions 
The default position in South African trust law is that trustees are not entitled to 
delegate investment functions to someone else. This rule is referred to as the non-
delegation rule.52 The problem with the non-delegation rule is that it prevents trustees 
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from pursuing rewarding investment strategies since non-expert trustees are not 
permitted to delegate investment functions to someone with investment expertise.53 
Furthermore, should MPT be implemented in South African trust law, the non-
delegation rule would prevent trustees from implementing such an investment 
strategy because the rule would not allow trustees to delegate investment functions 
to someone with an understanding of MPT. 
The proposed solution is to abandon South Africa’s non-delegation rule and 
replace it with a pro-delegation default rule that enables trustees to delegate 
investment functions to a co-trustee with investment expertise. Notice that the 
proposed pro-delegation default rule will only allow internal delegation (delegation to 
a co-trustee) and not external delegation (delegation to a third party). The main 
concern with delegating investment functions to a third party (eg an outside 
investment manager) is that an investment manager is not under a fiduciary duty of 
any kind to trust beneficiaries. Therefore, in order to provide beneficiaries with 
adequate protection, the proposal is that only delegation to co-trustees should be 
allowed.54 
It is further proposed that South Africa’s prudent investor rule should provide that 
as long as the delegation is proper, delegating trustees will not be liable for the 
wrongful acts of a delegate trustee. Maintaining liability would defeat the purpose of 
delegation. Delegation will be regarded as proper if delegating trustees comply with 
the following two legislative safeguards: first, trustees must provide a written policy 
statement before delegating their investment functions; and second, they must 
monitor the performance of the delegate trustee.55 It is also proposed that a definition 
of a policy statement be added to section 1 of the Trust Property Control Act. 
The problem with the non-delegation rule cannot simply be resolved by consulting 
with experts and acting on their advice. In most cases, relying on advice will amount 
to de facto delegation. Although delegation would thus occur, the necessary 
safeguards would not be in place. Beneficiaries’ interests are not adequately 
protected if the proper safeguards are not in place.56 
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It is submitted that if trustees are authorised to delegate investment functions to a 
co-trustee who possesses the necessary investment expertise, trustees will be 
allowed to serve beneficiaries better since it will ensure that persons with the 
necessary investment expertise and with an understanding of MPT make investment 
decisions. 
2 4 6 Anti-netting rule 
The anti-netting rule is only partially accepted in South African trust law. Partial 
acceptance of the rule means that the second part of the anti-netting rule – the part 
that deals with a loss carried out in breach of trust netted off against a gain from an 
investment not involving a breach of trust – does not form part of our trust law. The 
problem with this omission is that it allows delinquent trustees to escape liability if 
certain parts of a trust’s investment portfolio perform well.57 
In order to discourage trustees from committing breaches of trust, it is proposed 
that the anti-netting rule should be accepted in its entirety in South African trust law. 
To be more specific, the proposal is that South Africa’s prudent investor rule should 
contain a complete and comprehensive anti-netting rule similar to the rule found in 
New York and English law. 58  Such a rule will deter trustees from: committing 
additional breaches of trust; speculating with certain parts of a trust’s investment 
portfolio; and investing trust property carelessly.59 
It is also proposed that section 9A of the Trust Property Control Act should give 
statutory recognition to the anti-netting’s rule exception and list the factors that a 
court could consider in determining whether two breaches are connected.60 Clear 
guidelines on what constitutes a connected breach of trust are essential because the 
guidelines prevent trustees from proving that a connected breach of trust took place 
in order to reduce or escape their liability. 
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3 The main research questions 
3 1 Question 1: should trustees’ investment functions in South African law be 
modernised through the implementation of an investment rule based on MPT? 
New York, England and New Zealand have embraced the principles of MPT and 
have integrated these principles into their respective trust laws. South African trust 
law has not taken advantage of these concepts and is thus largely outdated 
compared with the laws and practices of the comparable foreign jurisdictions. 
Chapters 4 to 7 showed that the introduction of MPT’s principles into trust law is a 
positive development from the perspective of trustees and that beneficiaries can 
benefit greatly from such development. More specifically, these chapters illustrated 
that an investment rule based on MPT provides trustees with better guidance in 
making investment decisions and makes it possible for trustees to protect the real 
value of trust capital while simultaneously also ensuring that adequate income is 
produced continuously. 
Therefore, the first research question should be answered in the affirmative: 
trustees’ investment functions in South African law should be modernised by 
implementing an investment rule based on MPT, namely South Africa’s prudent 
investor rule. 
3 2 Question 2: what should the core features of an investment rule based on MPT 
be? 
The core features of an investment rule based on MPT correspond to the six 
areas of trustee investment that are affected most prominently by the introduction of 
MPT into trust law.61 Therefore, to answer the second research question, the core 
features of South Africa’s proposed prudent investor rule should be the following: 
first, the rule should give trustees wide investment powers; second, the rule should 
require trustees to follow the total portfolio approach; third, the rule should require 
trustees to diversify trust investments; fourth, the rule should enable trustees to use 
total return investing; fifth, the rule should allow trustees to delegate investment 
functions; and sixth, the rule should accept the anti-netting rule.62 
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4 Proposed amendments to the Trust Property Control Act   
Based on the analysis conducted in chapter 7, below is a compilation of the 
proposed provisions of section 9A and the three additions to section 1 of the Trust 
Property Control Act: 
9A The prudent investor rule 
(1) In performing his investment related functions, a trustee must exercise the 
care, diligence and skill that a prudent investor would exercise in similar 
circumstances. 
(2) A trustee may make any kind of investment consistent with the prudent 
investment standard. 
(3) A trustee is required to pursue an overall investment strategy in accordance 
with the level of risk-and-return reasonably suited to the trust’s investment 
portfolio. 
(4) The following circumstances should be taken into consideration in investing 
and managing trust assets– 
(a) the purpose and terms of the trust; 
(b) the size of the trust estate; 
(c) the estimated duration of the trust; 
(d) general economic conditions; 
(e) the possible effect of inflation or deflation; 
(f) the need to maintain the real value of the capital of the trust and to ensure 
the production of adequate income; 
(g) the expected tax consequences of investment decisions or strategies; 





(i) the expected total return of the portfolio (including both income and 
appreciation of capital); 
(j) the needs of the beneficiaries (to the extent reasonably known to the 
trustees) for present and future distributions; 
(k) other resources of the beneficiaries; and 
(l) other relevant matters worth considering. 
(5) The prudent investor rule requires a trustee to diversify assets unless the 
trustee reasonably determines that it is in the interest of the beneficiaries not to 
diversify; and to determine within a reasonable time after the creation of the 
trustee relationship whether to retain or dispose of initial assets. 
(6) For the purposes of distribution and in the absence of any contrary indication 
in the trust instrument, a trustee may in the trustee’s discretion allocate a return on 
an investment, whether income or capital in nature, either to the income 
beneficiaries or the capital beneficiaries. 
(7) A founder may establish a percentage trust or, absent any contrary indication 
in the trust instrument, a trustee may convert an existing trust into a percentage 
trust. Once a percentage trust has been created, a trustee must– 
(a) valuate the trust assets at least once every year unless the trust instrument 
requires more frequent valuations; and 
(b) pay the income beneficiaries the percentage rate specified in the trust 
instrument, or if no percentage is specified, the percentage rate as per the 
regulations published by Government Notice. 
Once a percentage trust has been created, a trustee may– 
(a) exclude from calculations trust assets not being held for investment; and 





(8) Unless provided for otherwise in a trust instrument, trustees may delegate 
investment functions to a co-trustee with the necessary investment expertise. 
(9) In delegating investment functions under subsection (8), trustees are required 
to– 
(a) provide a written policy statement; and 
(b) monitor the performance of the delegate trustee. 
(10) Delegating trustees are liable for a loss in the value of trust assets caused by 
an act or omission of a delegate trustee only if the delegating trustees are in 
breach of subsection (9). 
(11) Losses from a breach of trust cannot be offset by either gains from 
investments not involving a breach of trust, or gains from other breaches of trust; 
unless those other breaches are connected. 
(12) Whether or not two or more breaches of trust are connected depends on the 
following factors– 
(a) whether the breaches of trust are the result of a single policy, judgement, or 
set of interrelated decisions; 
(b) the length of time that elapsed between the breaches of trust; 
(c) whether, between the breaches of trust, the trustees became aware of the 
earlier breach, and particularly of a resulting loss or profit; and 
(d) whether the trustees intended to commit a breach of trust. 
Section 1 (definitions): 
“percentage trust” means a trust in which all investment gains are initially 
assigned to trust capital and then at a later stage a percentage of the capital is 
allocated to income beneficiaries. 
“policy statement” means a document that gives a delegate trustee guidance as 




“trust investment portfolio” means the investment component of the trust and 
excludes assets in the trust that are not being held for investment. 
5 Recommendations for further research 
5 1 Tax considerations 
The actual implementation of South Africa’s prudent investor rule requires not only 
an understanding of MPT and trust law, but also an understanding of tax. The main 
area that raises questions regarding tax is “total return investing in trusts”. 63 
Unfortunately, space did not allow for a discussion of the tax considerations of total 
return investing. 
In order to heighten the chances of reform actually being achieved, it is 
recommended that further research into the tax implications of total return investing 
should be undertaken. The focus of such research should be on answering the 
question whether total return investing fits into the current South African tax 
framework or requires tax reform. 
5 2 The trust fund concept 
Another interesting topic for further research is the recent scholarship on the 
character of a common law trust “as a fund”. More specifically, it is recommended 
that the following should be investigated: how the trust fund concept was developed, 
how the concept was adopted over time and how the concept was influenced by 
modern financial theories. It is recommended that research on this topic should start 
with an analysis of Lau’s 2013 paper.64 In the paper, Lau states that:65 
“But it was only in the twentieth-century that modern financial theories were impressed 
upon trust law. Income and capital gain investment preferences were rendered obsolete 
by modern portfolio theory, emphasizing on total returns. So although Chancery judges 
did not invent the fund concept, they certainly adopted it, turned it into a legal concept, 
and perfected it.” 
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Research on this topic could strengthen the arguments in favour of the “total 
portfolio approach”66 and the argument to disregard the distinction between income 
and capital.67  
5 3 Component duties of trustees’ general fiduciary duty 
The dissertation only dealt with two of the component duties of trustees’ general 
fiduciary duty, namely the duty of care68 and the duty of impartiality.69 Regarding the 
duty of care, the dissertation addressed the duty mainly within the context of 
trustees’ duty to invest. Although there were fleeting references made to trustees’ 
general duty of care,70 the duty was mostly discussed within an investment context. 
Regarding the duty of impartiality, the dissertation only addressed the second 
element of the duty of impartiality (ie trustees’ obligation to treat beneficiaries 
impartially) and not the first element of the duty of impartiality (ie the duty of trustees 
to avoid a conflict of interest between their private interests and those of the 
beneficiaries).71 
Further research is recommended regarding the origin and content of trustees’ 
general duty of care. Further research could also discuss the origin and content of 
trustees’ other component duties, namely the duty of accountability, the duty of 
independence and the first element of the duty of impartiality.72 The aim of such 
research would be to show how trustees should exercise these duties when 
investing in accordance with South Africa’s prudent investor rule.  
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